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SALLUST

The Histories

Translated
with Introduction and Commentary by

Patrick McGushin

VOLUME 2

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PREFACE

For nearly a century B. Maurenbrecher's *C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarum reliquiae* (Stuttgart 1893) has been the definitive edition of Sallust's major work, the *Histories*. Sallust's political attitude and historical perspective, the close connection between his three historical works, their relevance to our understanding of the last decades of the Roman Republic have, in the period since the appearance of Maurenbrecher's edition, given rise to a considerable body of Sallustian scholarship. Wide-ranging research combined with the discovery of some source material not available to Maurenbrecher justifies a fairly long-held view that the *Histories* in particular need fresh appraisal on matters such as the placement of the fragments, the establishing of coherent contexts, and the provision of a fuller commentary. The introduction of the Clarendon Ancient History Series has provided the opportunity to present the text of the *Histories* to a much wider readership; the commentary will, it is hoped, be of use to scholars of all levels.

My debt to published work on Sallust is apparent from the commentary. I also owe a more immediate debt of thanks to individuals: to my colleague Brian Bosworth for the stimulus of encouragement and advice; markedly to the generosity and scholarship of Dr Miriam Griffin, who read my work in draft. For the blemishes that remain I am totally responsible.

The work has been assisted to a significant degree by the grant of a Senior Honorary Research Fellowship in the University of Western Australia, the benefits of which secured pleasant working conditions and access to research material from many parts of the world. To the secretarial staff of the Department of Classics I record my appreciation for expert assistance in the preparation of my text for publication.

P. McG.

PARENTUM MANIBUS

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ABBREVIATIONS

The abbreviations used for ancient authors and their works are, with slight modification in some cases, those found in *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*[2] (1970), and for periodicals the system used in *L'Année philologique*.

(a) Editions of Sallust

de Brosses	C. de Brosses, *Histoire de la république romaine dans le cours du septième siècle par Salluste* (1977).
Dietsch	R. Dietsch, *Gai Sallusti Crispi quae supersunt*, vol. 2 (1859).
Ernout	A. Ernout, *Salluste: Catilina Jugurtha Fragments des Histoires* (Paris 1960).
Fighiera	L. S. Fighiera, *Le Orazioni e le Epistole contenute nelle Storie di C. Crispo Sallustio* (Savona 1896).
Frassinetti	P. Frassinetti, 'Sallustio: Opere Frammenti', *Classici Latini* 17 (Turin 1963).
Gerlach	F. D. Gerlach, *C. Crispi Sallusti quae extant*, vol. 3 (1870).
Jacobs–Wirz–Kurfess	R. Jacobs, H. Wirz, and A. Kurfess, 'Orationes et epistulae ex Historiis excerptae', in *De Coniuratione Catiline Liber*[12] (Berlin/Zurich 1965).
Kritz	F. Kritz, *C. Sallustii Crispi Opera quae supersunt*, vol. 3 (1853).
Maurenbrecher	B. Maurenbrecher, *C. Sallusti Crispi Historiarum reliquiae*, vol. 2 (Stuttgart 1893).
Opitz	T. Opitz, *C. Sallustii Crispi III: Orationes et Epistulae ex Historiis excerptis* (Leipzig 1897).

Paladini — V. Paladini, *Sallustii Crispi Orationes et Epistulae de historiarum libris excerptae* (Bari 1956).

Pasoli — E. Pasoli, *Le historiae e le opere minori di Sallustio*^{2} (Bologna 1967).

Reynolds — L. D. Reynolds, *C. Sallusti Crispi Catilina Iugurtha Historiarum Fragmenta Selecta Appendix Sallustiana* (Oxford 1991).

(b) Other Works

Asconius' commentary on Cicero's speeches is cited in the edition by A. C. Clark (Oxford 1907). The *Scholia Bobiensia* and *Gronoviana*, and the scholia of Pseudo-Asconius, are cited according to the collection of T. Stangl, *Ciceronis orationum scholiastae* (Hildesheim 1964).

CAH — *The Cambridge Ancient History.*

CGL — *Corpus glossariorum Latinorum.*

CIG — *Corpus inscriptionum Graecarum.*

CIL — *Corpus inscriptionum Latinarum.*

FHG — C. Müller, *Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum.*

FGrH — F. Jacoby, *Fragmente der griechischen Historiker.*

GGM — C. Müller, *Geographi Graeci Minores* (Paris 1855–61).

HRR — H. Peter, *Historicorum Romanorum Reliquae*, vol. I^2 (Leipzig 1967).

ILS — H. Dessau, *Inscriptiones Latinae selectae.*

Magie — D. Magie, *Roman Rule in Asia Minor*, 2 vols. (Princeton 1950).

Malcovati — H. Malcovati, *Oratorum Romanorum fragmenta.*

Memnon — Memnon, *Herakleia am Pontos in FGrH*, 336–68.

MRR — T. R. S. Broughton, *The Magistrates of the Roman Republic*, 3 vols. (Amer. Philol. Assoc. 1951–).

OGIS	W. Dittenberger, *Orientis Graeci inscriptiones selectae.*
RE	A. Pauly and G. Wissowa, *Real-Encyclopädie der classischen Altertumwissenschaft* (Stuttgart 1894–1980).
Schulten	A. Schulten, *Sertorius* (Leipzig 1926).
St.	T. Stangl, *Ciceronis orationum scholiastae* (Hildesheim 1964).
Syme	R. Syme, *Sallust* (Berkeley, Calif./Cambridge 1964).
Thilo–Hagen	*Servii grammatici qui feruntur in Vergili Carmina Commentarii*, ed. G. Thilo and H. Hagen, 3 vols. (Hildesheim 1961).
Ward	A. M. Ward, *Marcus Crassus and the Late Roman Republic* (Univ. Missouri Press 1977).

INTRODUCTION

I. LIFE OF SALLUST

In spite of the fact that the writings and life-style of C. Sallustius Crispus aroused a wide variety of comment in the ancient world, surprisingly little reliable information exists for much of his career. It is now generally accepted that Sallust was born at Amiternum in Sabine land, about 50 miles north-east of Rome, in 86 BC and died in 35 BC, four years before the Battle of Actium. These dates depend on scholarly interpretation of the data provided by the *Chronicle* of St Jerome and on the conflicting evidence of the *Chronicon Paschale* (pp. 347, 359 Dindorf) and the *Consularia Constantinopolitana* (Mommesen, *Chron. Min.* I. 214, 217). I have accepted these standard dates even though there is no absolute certainty about them because of Jerome's record of carelessness and inaccuracy in other particulars of literary history. Syme (13–14) points out that Jerome cannot be accepted on Lucretius and Catullus and that his dates for Livy and Varro are questionable.

Syme (28) notes that no evidence whatever exists concerning Sallust's boyhood, education, political training and beliefs, and public career before he stood for the tribunate in 53. One can therefore merely surmise the influence on Sallust's character and outlook of such external factors as his municipal origin, the effect on the Italian *municipia* of the Social War, the civil war which led to the dictatorship and proscriptions of Sulla, his experience under the oligarchy which Sulla restored, the turbulence and intrigues of the sixties.

Sallust's first attested office was the tribunate of 52. The evidence for this (Asc. 37. 18, 44. 21–45. 1, 49. 24–50, 1, and 51. 8–14) indicates his possible political allegiance at the time and helps to combat a common assumption that Sallust was from first to last a partisan of Caesar. The year 52 opened without consuls, but three candidates were

in the field. The Optimates supported Titus Annius Milo; Pompeius' candidates were Quintus Caecilius Metellus Scipio, and Titus Plautius Hypsaeus, who were also strongly supported by Publius Clodius Pulcher, then a candidate for the praetorship. Asconius names the tribunes Quintus Pompeius Rufus and Titus Munatius Plancus as active in hostility to Milo and Cicero and as chief inciters to riot and arson after the murder of Clodius. Asconius also names Sallust as active in support of his fellow tribune, Pompeius Rufus, and as co-operating with Plancus. It could be surmised from this that Sallust was on the side of Clodius and Pompeius Magnus; all three were certainly opposed to Milo, but Sallust's opposition to him is not attested before Clodius' death, and he was allegedly reconciled to him later (Asc. 37. 23C). Roman politics often placed ill-assorted people temporarily on the same side; there is nothing to show what Sallust's motives were in 52.

His transference to the camp of Caesar is to be accounted for by the vicissitudes of political intrigue—Sallust was expelled from the senate in 50 (Dio, 40. 63. 4) and Caesar was prepared to accept allies without question (R. Syme, *The Roman Revolution* (Oxford 1939), 66–7; *Sallust*, 35). Dio gives no hint of the allegations made against Sallust; the censorship was used as a weapon in party strife and Sallust may have paid the penalty for actions and attitudes during his tribunate. He is next heard of commanding one of Caesar's legions in Illyricum late in 49 and failing to stave off the capitulation of the Caesarians under Gaius Antonius on the island of Curicta (Oros. 6. 15. 8). For nearly two years there is no mention of him in history. He re-emerges in 47 when as praetor-elect he is reported to have failed in a mission to quell a mutiny among Caesarian troops in Campania (App. *BC* 2. 92; Dio 42. 51. 1–2). As praetor in 46 Sallust was active in Caesar's African campaign, where he showed administrative and executive ability in securing much needed supplies from the island of Cercina (*Bell. Afr.* 8. 3, 34. 1, 34. 3). After the victory of Thapsus Caesar took the greater part of Numidia away from King Juba and turned it into

a Roman province, Africa Nova. Sallust was appointed its first governor (*Bell. Afr.* 97. 1; App. *BC* 2. 100; Dio, 43. 9. 2). His readmission to the senate was a consequence of this praetorship.

According to Dio (loc. cit., and *Inv. in Sall.* 19) Sallust so misgoverned his province that he had to face a charge of extortion on his return to Rome. This charge was not pressed and Dio's report (43. 47. 4) that the suppression of bribery charges in 45 was due to bribes paid to Caesar for this favour suggests that this may have been the case with Sallust. Whatever the circumstances, Sallust was spared the humiliation of a second expulsion from the senate and retained riches vast enough to maintain a palatial house. He survived the assassination of Caesar and apparently secured a highly favoured and protected position under the rule of the Triumvirs, Antony, Lepidus, and Octavian (later the Emperor Augustus). He both survived the proscriptions unscathed and wrote with remarkable candour on the pernicious effects of the *potentia paucorum*. In this context it is worth noting that a similar kind of protected status marked the career of Sallustius Crispus the younger, great-nephew and adopted son of the historian. The younger man, who died in AD 20, never attained high office, remaining an *eques* throughout his career, but he succeeded Maecenas as the leading private counsellor to Caesar Augustus and went on to advise his successor Tiberius (see Tac. *Ann.* 3. 30; Syme, 277). While one cannot speak with certainty concerning the effect on Sallust of Caesar's assassination in 44, it is probable that it confirmed his resolve to abandon political ambitions and to devote himself to literary pursuits (*Cat.* 4. 2).

For fuller accounts of Sallust's career see Syme, chs. 4 and 15; G. M. Paul, 'Sallust', ch. 4 of T. A. Dorey (ed.), *Latin Historians* (London 1966).

2. THE WRITINGS OF SALLUST

Three historical works are ascribed without dispute to Sallust. Two of these we possess complete, the mono-

graphs *Bellum Catilinae* and *Bellum Iugurthinum*; the third is the fragmentary major work, the *Historiae*, which is here presented in translation. There is no doubt about Sallust's authorship of these three works. There is less agreement concerning other works sometimes ascribed to Sallust. Scholars have long been occupied with the question of the genuineness of the two *Epistulae ad Caesarem senem* which are transmitted in the Codex Vaticanus Latinus 3864 (V) along with the letters and speeches from the historical works. The existing state of the question is that many continental scholars are in support of Sallustian authorship of the *Epistulae*, and some even include the far more dubious *Invectiva in Ciceroneum* as part of the Sallustian corpus. Most English-speaking scholars have remained unconvinced. On the topic of authenticity see Syme, 314 ff. and the bibliography cited.

Indications as to the dates of publication of Sallust's three works are few and general in character. His attitude to Caesar and Cato in chapter 54 of the *Bellum Catilinae* and use of the word *fuere* in 53. 6 show that both Caesar and Cato were dead; this provides a *terminus post quem* of 44 BC. The date of death, 35 BC (with the caveat on p. 1 that Jerome is unreliable) gives us a *terminus ante quem*. Otherwise we have only the relative dating which places the *Bellum Catilinae* probably earlier than the *Bellum Iugurthinum* and both these works earlier than the *Historiae*. The lack of precise indication has given scope to scholars to indulge their theories and to make the dates fit in with what they conceived to be the purpose of the work in question. Thus, for example, L. Wohleb (*Phil. Woch.* 48 (1928), 1242 ff.), interpreting the tone of both monographs, claimed that the *Bellum Catilinae* was begun before the death of Caesar and finished during Cicero's lifetime, and that the *Bellum Iugurthinum* was written when the Second Triumvirate was imminent, but not yet established, that is before November 43. None of the theories on dating is compelling; precise dating remains unattainable.

3. THE SOURCES OF THE *HISTORIES*

Satisfactory evidence for the sources used by Sallust is hard to come by. In the case of literary sources one can perhaps speak of Varro with some confidence: Varro served under Pompeius in Spain, described his own campaigns, and wrote three books *De Pompeio*. The possibility has been raised that other friends and clients of Pompeius celebrated his deeds in writing: L. Voltacilius Pitholaus, Pompeius' tutor, who was the first freedman to write history (Suet. *Rhet.* 3); Theophanes of Mytilene, the historian of Pompeius who accompanied him in the Third Mithridatic War and, now a Roman citizen, fought in the Civil War. There is evidence that Lucullus, who was fluent in both Latin and Greek (Plut. *Luc.* 1. 4), wrote in Greek a history of the Social War, in which he served under Sulla in 89. There is nothing to suggest that Lucullus later produced his own memoirs, but other writers, Greek and Latin, did commemorate the exploits of his later career (Cic. *Acad. Pr.* 2. 4).

It seems (see my commentary on 2. 44) that scarcely any of the political orations of the seventies survived, but family records will almost surely have preserved the laudatory funeral speeches for ex-consuls, such as Gaius Scribonius Curio and Publius Servilius Vatia Isauricus, who celebrated triumphs. Given the paucity of historical narratives, Sallust will have had recourse to oral tradition, material which would have been available to him from a wide variety of informants such as surviving consuls like Gnaeus Domitius Calvinus and Marcus Valerius Messala Rufus (consuls in 53) and men who had participated in important events like Lucius Cornelius Balbus, who was granted Roman citizenship for services in the Sertorian War, and who survived to become consul suffect in 40.

4. THE TRANSMISSION OF THE TEXT

The esteem which kept alive the fame and influence of Sallust's two monographs was clearly shared by his last

and greatest work: more than five hundred extant quotations and references from his *Histories* by grammarians, scholiasts, lexicographers, and others form a tribute unequalled among historical works. Unfortunately in this case the fame of the work was not sufficient to secure the preservation of a complete text of the work into the Carolingian period (late eighth century AD) when the devoted scholars of that Renaissance ensured the survival of much of extant Latin literature by restoring and copying manuscripts which had escaped the ravages of the Dark Ages (*c.* AD 600–780). However, something was saved: items from the direct manuscript tradition, some of relatively recent discovery, have survived; all are crucially important for providing a structural framework of the *Histories* and indicating the principles of that structure. The indirect transmission of the text in a series of quotations by grammarians and other types of commentator provides a reasonable, though obviously imperfect, guide to the kind and order of the events within the work.

(a) Direct transmission

Codex Vaticanus Latinus 3864 (V). In the days, probably in the second century AD, when rhetoric was the staple of Roman education, a collection was made of all the speeches and letters contained in Sallust's writings. A manuscript containing this collection is extant (Cod. Vat. Lat. 3864). The six pieces from the *Histories* give speeches first, followed by letters of Pompeius and Mithridates.

The Fleury manuscript. An actual manuscript of the *Histories*, or part of one, also entered the Dark Ages. Written in Italy in the fifth century in Rustic capital, two columns to a page, this codex eventually reached the French monastery of Benoît-sur-Loire (Fleury) where part of it was prepared for different purposes in the seventh or eighth century. At least one double leaf (bifolium) was cut down for binding purposes; now in a miscellaneous manuscript (Cod. Vat. Lat. Reg. 1283B), this bifolium deals

with the rebellion of Spartacus at the end of 73 BC (frr. 3. 64 and 66). I refer to it as the Vatican fragment.

Other portions of the Fleury manuscript were cut down to a smaller size and folded in the middle; the original text was removed and replaced with St Jerome's *Commentary on Isaiah*, written in one column. Three double leaves of this Jerome palimpsest have survived. One of these was further cut down and thereby deprived of nearly half its surface; eventually it came apart at its fold. Half of this bifolium ended up with the other two bifolia in the miscellaneous codex in the Municipal Library of Orléans as Codex 192 (169), fo. 20; it is referred to as the Orléans fragment (*fragmentum Aurelianense*, or A). The other half of fo. 20 was presented in 1847 to the Royal Library in Berlin, where it is still kept (Deutsche Staatsbibliothek Lat. Qu. 364). It is referred to as the Berlin fragment (*fragmentum Berolinense*, or B).

The Viennese philologist Edmund Hauler (1859–1941) first identified and deciphered the Sallust palimpsest; he published his findings mainly in *Wiener Studien*, between 1886 and 1931. In my translation of the text I use Hauler's numbering of the columns as part of my identification of the fragments. Schematic reconstructions of the bifolia of the MS are provided in H. Bloch, *Didascaliae* (1961), 62–76.

Codex P. Vindobonae Latinus 117. The Vienna fragment, first published in readable form by Bernhardt Bischoff and Herbert Bloch in *WS* 13 (1979), 116–29, contains, two fragments from the *Histories*; these appear as 1. 98 and 1. 100 in the text.

Papyrus Rylands III 473. Two pieces of papyrus published by C. H. Roberts in 1938 contain fr. 12 of the 'Fragments of Uncertain Reference' and fr. 2. 9 of the text.

(b) Indirect transmission

By indirect transmission is meant the quotations from and references to the text of the *Histories* made by grammarians

and commentators of various types. The five hundred or so fragments thus provided involve the contributions of some forty-six commentators. Five of these, grammarians all, provide slightly more than three-quarters of the total. The nature of the indirect transmission can be adequately indicated by a brief treatment of the contribution of each of these five. The statistics which emerge from this examination are based on the Latin text of the fragments; I deal only with citations which I have identified as the primary or major sources of the fragments. In the commentary I sometimes refer to additional sources which provide partial versions of the fragments under discussion; I also note fragments whose published form is the result of the combined contributions of more than one source.

Nonius (early fourth century AD.) The primary source of sixty-one quotations from the *Histories*. More than half of these are of two-line length or longer. Book-numbers have been transmitted for all but three of his fragments; the book-numbers allotted to five of his citations have been queried by some editors. It is not surprising that the section 'Fragments of Uncertain Reference' contains no Nonian citations.

Nonius' method of compilation and the sources of his quotations are exhaustively dealt with in W. M. Lindsay, *Nonius Marcellus' Dictionary of Republican Latin* (Oxford 1901) and in a more lucid and compelling fashion by Diana C. White in *Stud. Non.* 8 (1980), 111–211. The reliability of Nonius' book-numbers is dealt with by A. K. Frihagen, *SO* 50 (1975), 149–53, and G. Maggiulli, *Stud. Non.* 6 (1981), 117–22. On errors in Nonius see F. Bertini, *Stud. Non.* 1 (1967), 56–8.

Servius (fourth century AD). His major work, a commentary on Virgil, supplies 119 quotations, which are the primary source of fragments of the *Histories*. Of this number, thirty-nine quotations are from the augmented Servius (Servius Danielis). Fragments of one-line length predominate in Servius' contribution.

In Book 1 Servius has apparently been credited with the transmission of six book-numbers (frr. 21, 38, 54, 92, 122,

129) but in the case of fr. 92 it should be noted that the book-number is provided by the scholiast *Anon. Brevis Expositio* (Thilo–Hagen, 3. 299) on *Georgic* 2. 197. For fr. 129 the number is supplied by Arusianus, who cites the first clause of this fragment ('seeing . . . of the enemy'). In book 2 three fragments have been transmitted with book-number (frr. 52, 68, 101); the reliability of the number provided for fr. 101 has been questioned by some editors. In Book 3 one of the two book-numbers connected with Servius (fr. 12) has rightly been queried; the other (fr. 79) owes its book-number to Nonius, who cites the last part of the fragment ('the other official . . . Perperna'). Likewise, fr. 4. 24, the product of a combination of sources, owes its book-number to Arusianus, who cites the last sentence of the fragment.

While it is not surprising to find that Servian quotations figure prominently in the section 'Fragments of Uncertain Reference', it should also be noted that the vast majority have found a place in the text, a factor due mainly to the clues provided by their content, at times supplemented by the evidence of other sources.

Arusianus Messius (late fourth century AD*).* Provides 106 primary quotations from the *Histories*, all but three transmitted with book-numbers. Editors have queried the accuracy of four of his book-numbers. The vast majority of the citations are of one-line length or less. For a treatment of Maurenbrecher's handling of cases which involve transmissions shared by Arusianus with other sources see L. Di Salvo, *SRIL* 5 (1981), 29–52.

Aelius Donatus. The most notable grammarian of the fourth century AD, whose extant commentary on the plays of Terence owed much to Aemilius Asper whose late second-century AD commentaries on Terence and on Sallust (*Catiline* and *Histories*) are now lost. The vast majority of his thirty-two quotations are of one-line length or less; six have been transmitted with book-number.

Priscianus (early sixth-century AD *grammarian).* Gives fifty-five quotations from the *Histories*, the majority being

one-line length or less. Three quotations have been transmitted without book-numbers, while the accuracy of just one of the transmitted book-numbers has been unanimously queried by editors. On the reliability of Priscian's book-numbers see G. Perl, *Philologus* 111 (1967), 285–8 and the commentary on 2. 83.

5. COMPOSITIONAL STRUCTURE

Editors before Maurenbrecher took different approaches to the structure of the *Histories*. The first attempt at a systematic arrangement of the fragments was that of C. de Brosses (1777). He arranged all the fragments known to him in a chronological sequence without paying heed to the division into books as transmitted in the tradition. Since in the case of many fragments there was no hint of a specific situation, he often assigned the same fragment to two different places, and occasionally used a fragment even more often. The lack of method and of rigour in his procedure naturally aroused criticism, but the perceptiveness of his location of numerous fragments remained a redeeming feature. In his 1831 edition Gerlach, working on the annalistic framework of the twelve years mentioned by Ausonius (*Ep.* 22. 62 ff.), allocated the fragment according to specific events and books without paying much attention to the transmitted book-numbers. This procedure was censured by Kritz, who in his 1853 edition maintained that the book-numbers transmitted were a vital clue to the content and time-frame of individual books. Within the books as Kritz arranged them the fragments were placed according to the arena of activity; on the analogy of the monographs, a whole complex of connected events covering more than one year was at times reported in one place. Dietsch (1859) followed a more rigorous and more cautious procedure of allocating the fragments, with the result that many fragments were relegated to the section 'Fragments of Uncertain Reference'. Somewhat harshly dismissed by Maurenbrecher, Dietsch's scholarly commentary is often the source of valuable information.

Hauler's decipherment of the Fleury manuscript revealed a fresh basis for deciding on the structure of the work. Two transitions from one year to the following have been preserved in this palimpsest (see 2. 40 and 2. 82 D). These show that Sallust followed the annalistic tradition with a statement on consuls and an annual organization of events in their chronological order. Wars extending over several years were not dealt with in a continuous narrative; their narration was sometimes interrupted by the changeover to a new year. In addition, the Fleury manuscript, cols. XI–XII (frr. 2. 75–6), shows that Sallust's report of the Sertorian War for 75 has been divided into summer and winter campaigning seasons, interrupted by events from other theatres in the same year. Maurenbrecher had the advantage of these discoveries for his 1893 edition of the text, a work, for its time, of considerable merit. However, he appears to have overlooked some of the implications of the manuscript evidence.

Presentation of the structure of the *Histories* in tabular form may be of use when dealing with what I believe are questionable assumptions on Maurenbrecher's part regarding structure.

Book 1 (78–77 BC)

Personal preface.

Introduction:

(1) General considerations on the moral, social, and political history of Rome.

(2) Treatment of the historical period which preceded his own subject-matter—the Social War; conflict between Marius and Cinna; Sulla's conquest of Italy and Rome; the proscriptions which ushered in the Sullan restoration.

Revolt of Lepidus—speeches of Lepidus and Philippus.

Sertorius' career from 105 to 80 BC—a brief report on urban affairs 78.

Early stages of Sertorian War.

Preliminary treatment of operations in Cilicia and Macedonia.

Expedition of P. Servilius Vatia against the Cilician pirates.

Book 2 (late 77–early 74 BC)

Excursus on Sardinia—Corsica.
Final phase of Lepidus' revolt.
Transfer of command in Spain from Metellus to Pompeius; character-sketch of Pompeius.
Urban affairs of 76.
Events of Sertorian War in 76.
Foreign wars elsewhere—Macedonia, Dalmatia, Illyria, province of Asia.
Urban affairs of 75—civil unrest.
Course of Sertorian War in 75—summer campaign.
Curio's campaign in Macedonia; P. Servilius Vatia against the Isauri.
Winter campaign in Spain in 75.
Pompeius' letter to the senate.
Urban affairs of early 74.

Book 4 (74–72 BC)

M. Antonius against the pirates.
Urban affairs of 74.
Opening campaign of Third Mithridatic War (74–73); siege of Cyzicus.
Sertorian War in 74.
Urban affairs in 73—speech of Licinius Macer.
Mithridatic War in 73–72; siege of Amisus.
Excursus on topography of the Black Sea region.
Outbreak of slave rebellion under Spartacus (73).
Antonius' campaign against Crete (73–72).
Final phase of Sertorian War (72).
The slave rebellion in 72.
Events in Macedonia (72).

Book 4 (72–68 BC)

Urban affairs of 72.
Events of Mithridatic War 72; fall of Cabeira.
Activity of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus in Thrace (72).
Last phase of the Spartacus war, incorporating an

excursus on topography of southernmost Italy and the Strait of Sicily (72–71).
Urban affairs of 71.
Mithridatic War (71).
Activity of M. Aurelius Cotta (71).
Urban affairs of 70.
Lucullus' campaign in Armenia (69); the Letter of Mithridates.
Urban affairs of 69.
Lucullus invades northern Armenia (68).
Urban affairs of 68.

Book 5 (68–67 BC)
Final phase of the campaign of Lucullus.
The pirate threat—the Gabinian Law of 67 BC.

From this outline of the content and architecture of the *Histories* some additional points can be deduced concerning the compositional principles on which it was structured. The fact that Sallust was strongly influenced in the monographs by the work of the Greek historian Thucydides in matters of style and concept suggests that the structure of his *Histories* may have come under the same influence. Deductions concerning this feature of Sallust's work are naturally hazardous because of the fragmentary nature of the tradition: the fragments, excerpted for the most part for linguistic and not historical interest, only rarely provide a composite text of some detail. The chronology of events within the period dealt with is by no means established throughout; specific dates are rare, as are indications of summer or winter half-years.

Maurenbrecher considered events such as the operations of C. Cosconius in Dalmatia as *res minores* ('minor matters') and held that it was Sallust's practice to deal in a single combined passage with minor matters which covered more than one year (2. 57). Consequently he believed that 2. 37–8 were part of a combined treatment of about two years' campaigning by Cosconius, governor of Illyricum, and that 2. 63–8 were part of a narrative dealing with the campaigns conducted by P. Servilius Vatia

over the triennium 77–75. He dismissed the apparent contradiction posed by the fact that campaigns in Macedonia are dealt with in two different segments of Book 2 (2. 35–6 and 60–2) with the statement that these are two different Macedonian wars, the former conducted by Appius Claudius, the latter by Scribonius Curio (see notes ad loc.). On the contrary, the partition of the treatment of the Macedonian campaign in this case is evidence of a basic structural principle used by Sallust, after the manner of Thucydides, of providing an exact chronological development of events inside a year's report; in this case the first treatment deals with 76, the second with 75 BC. It is not known how Sallust dealt with campaigns which overlapped normal campaigning seasons, such as those involving the sieges of Cyzicus and Amisus in Book 3 and the fall of Cabeira in Book 4. I have assumed an extended campaigning season in each case.

Apart from the use of half-yearly campaigning seasons as a chronological indicator Sallust seems also to have followed the Thucydidean practice of providing a change of book inside a year's report, corresponding to a change of subject-matter, of war-theatre, or of campaigning season. Such a change is certainly the case with Sallust's Books 1/2 and the year 77, and Books 2/3 and the year 74; it is probably also the case with Books 3/4 and the year 72 and with Books 4/5 and the year 68.

Thucydides' influence can more confidently be assumed with regard to the speeches and letters in the *Histories*. Like Thucydides, Sallust uses speeches to provide a variation in narrative method; in each of his works speeches and letters are used to highlight the background and the atmosphere of important events and decisions. The two speeches of Book 1 of the *Histories* conform to some extent to the Thucydidean device of using a pair of speeches to reflect the crucial alternatives governing a decision. By using the words of men who play an important role in the events he is dealing with, Sallust is able to present a deeper and more varied analysis of the political and social problems which form the essence of his theme. In the monographs, which have been preserved intact, and

in the *Histories* Sallust apparently allows his characters to present their own points of view, to explain or justify conduct or policy, and to present assessments of event or motive as the only true version. In the monographs one can detect an ironical contrast between what is stated in speech or letter and the facts of the situation as Sallust narrates them. Even from the fragmentary text of the *Histories* one can surmise a similar contrast, especially in the case of Cotta's speech (2. 47) and Pompeius' letter to the senate (2. 72).

In the commentary, a preface to each speech and letter discusses to what extent each is a genuine document and how far its content and thrust is the work of the historian himself.

6. THEMATIC STRUCTURE

The few autobiographical details which appear in Sallust's work are concerned with the circumstances on account of which he abandoned his political career. His personal crisis had its cause in the crisis of state and society which had reduced Roman political life to a stage of corruption threatening the fabric of contemporary Rome and for which he saw no remedy. All of Sallust's writings are directed at illuminating salient points of this social and political turmoil and revealing as far as possible how deeply rooted its symptoms were.

From early in his political life Sallust realized that the abandonment of the moral and social values which had led to the ancient greatness of Rome must inevitably produce disastrous results. This he expressed pungently in all three works (*Cat.* 5. 9, 10. 6; *Iug.* 41. 3–5, 9–10; *Hist.* 1. 10, 12–13). He labelled the Catilian conspiracy as 'worthy of special notice because of the extraordinary nature of the crime and the danger arising from it' (*Cat.* 4. 4). By this he meant that the conspiracy was simply an external manifestation of unrest behind which there lurked the committed seekers of personal power (*Cat.* 17. 5, 7: cf. 36. 4, 39. 4). This emphasis on the hidden dangers presented

by civil unrest, factional conflict, and the abdurate stupidity of the ruling clique is present in his treatment of similar developments in the *Bellum Iugurthinum* and the *Historiae*. Common to all are the developments which followed the significant changes in army service introduced by Marius, the emergence of the mercenary army, the failure of the government to handle emergencies by constitutional procedures, and the opportunities thereby presented to men of ability and ambition to pursue goals of personal power. The developments which ensued showed that the civil conflicts of the final half-century of the crisis were fought by protagonists working for their own interests.

The reasons given by Sallust for the selection of the Jugurthine War as the topic of his second monograph are bluntly expressed: 'first because it was long, bloody, and of varying fortune; and secondly, because then for the first time resistance was offered to the arrogance of the nobles'. This latter factor, he says, was the beginning of a struggle which led to civil wars and the devastation of Italy. This Numidian War exacerbated the rivalry of parties and factions (*Iug.* 41. 6) and was the precursor to the Social War, the civil war of Marius and Sulla, the dictatorship of Sulla—events which are outlined in the second part of the Introduction to the *Histories*. Sallust's treatment of it was designed to illustrate the aspects of the Roman crisis in its external development and in its military character.

The pressure exerted by external wars on the ability and willingness of an inept ruling oligarchy firmly to govern a growing imperial system was to increase in the succeeding decades; the ineptitude and indecision which marked official Roman administration in these years gave rise to dissension and unrest, and presented opportunities for ambitious individuals to aim at personal dominance.

Such opportunities were enhanced by another factor. Appointed consul for 107 BC and confirmed in the command against Jugurtha, Marius introduced a series of innovations in the recruitment of Roman legions which became the crucial factor in bringing about the series of civil wars which ended only with the establishment of the

Principate. Enlistment was opened to members of the lowest class (*capite censi*); in time the Roman army was composed of men who made soldiering a profession, who depended on general-patrons for their needs both during and after their service years. These close ties with commanders and the building up of an *esprit de corps* over years of active service led to a type of military dictatorship. The five successive consulships of Marius anticipated the series of consulships of Caesar and Octavian Augustus. The last sentence of the monograph, 'At that time the hopes and welfare of our country were in his hands', would eventually apply in a more permanent form to Octavian Augustus.

The *Histories* embrace the period from the death of Sulla in 78 to the extraordinary command conferred on Pompeius by the Gabinian law of 67 BC. The basic views and discussions of the two monographs on how the contemporary situation had developed are once more summarized in the introduction to Sallust's major work.

The narrative of the *Histories* (see tabular analysis) deals with the incompetent handling of problems at home and abroad by a ruling oligarchy which continued to demonstrate its lack of ability to administer a Roman imperial system. This unsatisfactory state of affairs leads to the revolt of Lepidus, the Sertorian War, civil unrest in 75, the pirate threat, the Third Mithridatic War, and the slave rebellion, all of which play a part in contributing to the rise of Pompeius. This general, competent, ruthless, ambitious, is the dominant character of the *Histories*; his career was the prelude to the demise of the Republican constitution and of political freedom.

The importance which Sallust attached to the role of Pompeius is indicated by the inclusion of the general's early career as part of the introduction to the narrative proper (comm. 1. 44–6) and by the character-sketch which preceded the narrative of Pompeius' role in the Sertorian War (2. 17–20). The fragmentary nature of the extant narrative makes accurate assessment of the scope and tenor of Sallust's treatment of Pompeius' personality and activities hazardous. The immediate impression from what

remains of the character-portrait and Pompeius' conduct of the Sertorian War (2. 26–31, 46–57, 70–8; 3. 30–3, 77–85) is that the historian has concentrated on character traits and activity unfavourable to Pompeius' reputation. Sallust's chief interest was the political factor. Pompeius' letter to the senate (2. 82) illustrates graphically the political motivation which compels him to action. The demagogic practices he resorted to, the use of venal tribunes to achieve his goal of personal domination emerge clearly in a few fragments of Book 4 (37–45), while all the traits noted in earlier fragments—demagogy, hypocrisy, conceit—mark his attitude during the heated debate on the *Lex Gabinia* (5. 15–20).

The outcome is an unbalanced treatment of a very complex personality. It is possible that by accident of transmission discreditable aspects of Pompeius' career out-number the less reprehensible. It is certain that Pompeius' role in accelerating the crisis of the Roman Republic would rule out the glossing-over of aspects less favourable to his reputation. That the historian's strong feelings led him to concentrate only on the negative side of Pompeius' activity cannot be dogmatically asserted, but it remains a strong possibility.

Works on the formative years of Pompeius' career include the following: E. Badian, *FC* (1958), 267–84; R. E. Smith, *Phoenix* 14 (1960), 1–13; A. La Penna, *Athenaeum* 41 (1963), 232–8; Syme, 201–2, 206, 212, 224; B. R. Katz, *Riv. stor. di antichità* (1982), 111–39.

The crisis of the Roman Republic has been dealt with by several modern scholars. Major treatments include: Syme, *Roman Revolution*; A. La Penna, *Sallustio e la rivoluzione Romana*[3] (Milan 1973); Ch. Meier, *Res Publica Amissa*[2] (Wiesbaden 1980); P. A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic* (Oxford 1988). Briefer treatments in Syme, *passim*, and G. Perl, *Philologus* 113 (1969), 201–16.

7. THE TIME OF WRITING

The monographs and the *Histories* were written during the period of the Second Triumvirate. Sallust, who must

have had high hopes that Caesar's victory in the civil war would be followed by the restoration of the Republican constitution, realized after Caesar's one-year dictatorship and the political disturbance which followed the assassination that his forebodings concerning the dangers connected with political and moral decay (*Cat.* 5. 9) were well founded—the *libera res publica* was no longer a viable constitutional organ.

This final stage of realization affected the tone and manner of the proems and narratives of his works. Events dealt with in the monographs and the *Histories* are viewed, not in isolation and with reference to their individual content, but from Sallust's experience and knowledge of these later developments. In the note on 1. 67. 22, **on his own authority** I draw attention to widely recognized parallels between the *tumultus Lepidi* and the civil war which broke out late in 44, exemplified particularly by the manifold echoes, in the speech of Philippus, of Cicero's *Philippics* against Antony. In the note on 2. 42, **They then demolished the defensive wall** attention is drawn to the similarities between the attack by a Roman mob on the consuls of 75 and the attack in 40 on the triumvirs Octavian and Antony which is described in App. *BC* 5. 67–8. Thus in the *Histories* events in the past which had a paradigmatic usefulness for developments in Sallust's present were especially stressed. Less immediately obvious events and statements may also have been introduced for their exemplary significance: thus the remarks on the futility of *vis* ('violence') as an instrument for reform, and the failure of more enlightened measures because of moral and political corruption (*Iug.* 3. 2–3) may be a comment on Caesar's failure to set things right; similarly, it has been deduced from the description of 'these degenerate ways' (*Iug.* 4. 7) that Sallust reacted with bitterness against the policy of Caesar and Antony which by debasing the membership of the senate had lowered the dignity and effectiveness of that body. In some cases his writing carries an emphasis which does not flow naturally from the material as such and is perhaps to be accounted for by his passionate attitude to events at his time of writing.

Phrases in Catiline's speech, for example, such as: 'For ever since the state fell under the jurisdiction and way of a few powerful men, it is always to them that kings and potentates are tributary, and peoples and nations pay taxes. All the rest of us, good and bad, nobles and commons alike, have made up the mob, without influence, without weight, and subservient to those to whom in a free state we should be an object of fear' (*Cat.* 20. 7; cf. 33. 4. 36. 4), have some application to Pompeius in the east, but are more vividly relevant to the rule of the Triumvirate.

Sallust was able without fear to express his feelings on Sulla's later career: 'As to what he did later, I know not if one should speak of it rather with shame or with sorrow' (*Iug.* 95. 4). Direct criticism of the power-lords of his writing years was out of the question; it would have been an almost suicidal act. He had, therefore, to give expression to his strong antipathy to political despotism by means of indirect remarks and veiled allusions. It is a manner of communication which demands alertness from the reader. It is also an indicator of his political stance during those years.

No direct evidence exists concerning Sallust's political alignment after Caesar's death. The view put forward by W. Allen (*Stud. in Philol.* 51 (1954), 1–14) that Sallust was a follower of Antonius has rightly been dismissed: see A. La Penna, *SIFC* 31 (1959), 168; 33 (1961), 253; *Athenaeum* 41 (1963), 244; Syme 223; G. Perl, *DLZ* (1964), 880; *Klio* 48 (1967), 105; *WZ Rostock* 18 (1969), 379–90. A suggestion made, with no proof provided, of a connection with Octavian (A. Rosenberg, *Einleitung und Quellenkunde zur römischen Geschichte* (Berlin 1921), 174) has also been rejected; Syme (122, 224, 237–8) has noted that probable Sallustian allusions to Octavian are uniformly negative. Moreover, the sundry statements and allusions in his writings which reveal his rejection of despotism as a form of government would clearly apply to the members of the Second Triumvirate. For Sallust this form of rule was not, as its official description has it, *rei publicae constituendae* ('for the purpose of setting up

the republic'), but rather a definitive casting aside of the *libera res publica*.

Sallust's achievement as a historical thinker is that he recognized the decline of the Roman Republic as a historically unavoidable development, even though he deplored that development. His power as a writer lies in the passion with which he expressed his sorrow at the destruction of a political system and of its moral basis, which had earlier opened up for Rome the way to greatness.

Note: where Maurenbrecher's ordering of fragments differs from that adopted in this edition, the Maurenbrecher number is given in the left-hand margin of the translation.

SALLUST
THE HISTORIES

BOOK 3

1. Arusianus Messius, 482. 6

during the recent subjugation of the Isauri and the Pisidians.

2.* Schol. in Iuv. 8. 105

who, although more of a criminal than the pirates, was to be guardian of the sea coasts within Roman rule.

3. Arusianus Messius, 476. 7/Ps.-Asc. 239 St.

born to squander money, and indifferent to worries unless they were urgent.

4.* Donatus, Ter. *Hecyr.* 759

(those) who had come in their capacity as allies to prevent the war, caused even more trouble in the fighting.

5.* Audax, exc. 353. 27

Antonius, a few days before, burst forth from the city.

6. Fleury MS col. 17 (A)

Antonius was having difficulty in preventing the Ligurian forces from reaching his ships, because the narrowness of the entrance made it possible for missiles to reach their target; for his part, Mamercus on the right flank of the combined fleet was encountering danger in pursuing the enemy ships on the open sea in the summer calm. Some days were wasted because of indecision. When, on the summons of the Terentuni, the Ligurian detachments had withdrawn into the Alps, the question was raised about sailing on to join Sertorius. Since it seemed a good idea to Antonius and the others to hasten their voyage towards Spain, they reached the territory of the Aresinarii after four days with their whole force of warships, both those

which had been repaired and those which had not been damaged by storms . . .

6 **7.** Fleury MS col. 18 (A)

[separated] from the enemy by the river Dilunus which was deep enough to make a crossing impossible even against just a few defenders, he pretended to be attempting other crossings elsewhere. Not far from his first position, however, he transported his army across to the other side using the fleet he had especially summoned and rafts hurriedly put together for the purpose. He then sent his lieutenant Manius on ahead with the cavalry and some of the warships and reached the island town of [Emporiae], thinking that by a surprise attack the city, which was conveniently situated for the reception of supplies from Italy, could be recaptured. But the inhabitants, relying on the strength of their position, remained unshaken in their resolve; indeed they [fortified with a double wall] a small hill whose sides rose steeply on both its seaward and landward sides and had in addition a narrow and sandy approach from the front.

17 **8.** Priscianus 2. 249. 13

already wickedly practised in all the strengths of disputation.

19 **9.*** Servius, *Aen.* 5. 408

. . . [persuade] the army to return to the traditional Roman way of conducting itself.

20 **10.** Priscianus 2. 236. 1

equipped with horses and splendid weaponry.

21 **11.*** Servius, *Aen.* 1. 476

Both Livy and Sallust inform us that the ancient Romans used scythed chariots.

23 **12.** Servius, *Ecl.* 2. 4

But those who had the strength to do so all ran towards the gates and advanced in a disorganized way.

13. Priscianus 2. 236. 2 24

stripped of all dignity and showing no resistance, they were being struck on the back by the enemy.

14. Arusianus Messius, 475. 10 26

strengthened in his resolve, he moved towards Cyzicus.

15. Nonius, 323. 4 28

Although the two camps were positioned close to each other, fighting was being hindered because of the nature of the terrain.

16.* Servius, *Aen.* 11. 421 29

It is for this reason that Sallust praises leaders who have won a victory without shedding the blood of their soldiers.

17. Arusianus Messius, 503. 11 30

whence a bridge is extended in the direction of the town.

18. Nonius, 489. 17 31

and there was heard the din of Bacchanalian festivities.

19. Nonius, 553. 21 33

The marauders of the Valerian legions seized one of these letters, along with the messenger, and dispatched it into the camp by means of a scorpion.

20.* Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 576 34

and with the ships unsteady because of the weight of the towers.

21. Arusianus Messius, 487. 8 35

they threw on grappling irons and other implements capable of taking a grip.

22. Nonius, 554. 29 36

Huge boulders and wheels joined by an axle were being pushed down the slope; from the axles throwing spears, each two feet long, projected after the manner of a (military) hedgehog.

37 **23.** Nonius, 186. 17

He placed the two largest inflated skins he had under a light plank so that, by keeping his whole body perfectly still, he might by shifting each foot in turn play the part of a helmsman; on this contraption, taking action to avoid the enemy fleet, he reached the town by sailing the sea between the mole and the island.

38 **24.*** Donatus, Ter. *Hecyr.* 337

and serious illnesses in the case of those who, because of the lack of food, were feeding themselves on unusual fare.

39 **25.*** Servius, *G.* 3. 481

Virgil followed the same order as that of Lucretius and Sallustius—that first the air, then the water, and finally the pastures were infected.

78 **26.*** Adnot. super Luc. 6. 104

because it juts out, it has, thanks to the north winds, air which is less infected than that of other regions.

43) **27.*** Servius, *G.* 3. 482

nor were they dying the normal kind of death.

40 **28.** Arusianus Messius, 478. 26

so that most of them, not being able to bear the weight of their bodies, were relying on the support of their weapons to keep upright.

42 **29.*** Plutarch, *Luc.* 11. 6

To my amazement, Sallust says that camels were then seen by the Romans for the first time.

43 **30.*** Servius, *Aen.* 7. 728

Cales is a town in Campania; again, the town which is in Flaminia is called Cale. The town of this name which Sallust records as captured by Perperna is in Callaecia.

44 **31.*** Servius, *Aen.* 1. 267

to which they had given the name Oblivion.

32.* Adnot. super Luc. 1. 552

While Metellus was wintering with two legions in Corduba, for some reason, or perhaps, as learned men maintain, because of the force of the wind in cavities of the earth, some mountains and hills, after being burst open, caved in.

33. Nonius, 314. 26

For in their case, besides the customary irregularities among corrupt administrators, since throughout the province because of the infertility of the last two years, the price of produce was excessive . . .

34. Codex Vaticanus Lat. 3864 (*V*) Speech of the tribune Macer to the Roman people

(1) If you did not already have a clear understanding, fellow-citizens, of the difference between the rule of law handed down to you by your forefathers and this system of slavery imposed on you by Sulla, I would have been obliged to make a long speech and to inform you of how often the plebeians took up arms and seceded from the patricians, and of the reasons for their action. I would also have had to describe how they provided for themselves tribunes of the people as the defenders of all their rights. **(2)** But as matters stand, all I have to do is to urge you on, and to precede you on the road which, in my opinion, leads to the recovery of your liberty. **(3)** Nor do I overlook the vast resources of the nobility whose domination I am seeking to overthrow, single-handed and powerless, armed only with the empty shell of a magistracy; I also know how much more secure a faction of wicked men is than upright men acting on their own. **(4)** But apart from the expectation I hold of your support, which has dispelled my fear, I have decided that for a brave man defeat in a struggle for liberty is better than never to have struggled at all. **(5)** And yet all the others who were elected to defend your rights have been induced by favour, received or expected, or by bribery to turn all their power and authority against you; they consider it better to do wrong for payment than to do right

without recompense. **(6)** And so they have now, every one of them, submitted to the mastery of a few men, who, under the pretext of carrying on a war, have taken over the treasury, the armies, the kingdoms, and the provinces. They have made for themselves a stronghold from the spoils they have taken from you. Meantime you, the multitude, submit yourselves like sheep to their individual service and enjoyment. You have been stripped of every privilege which your forefathers left you except your ballots, and by them, you who once chose your defenders now choose your masters. **(7)** And so everyone has gone over to them, but soon if you take back what is rightfully yours, most of them will return to you. The courage to defend what they hold dear is a quality possessed by few men; the rest are pawns of the stronger. **(8)** Are you still inclined to believe that those who were afraid of you even when you were weak and apathetic will in some way be able to impede you if you proceed with a united purpose? Unless, perchance, it was from a motive other than fear that Gaius Cotta, a consul from the inner circle of the ruling faction, restored some of their rights to the people's tribunes; and even though L. Sicinius, the first to raise the question of tribunician power, was circumvented while you only muttered about it, yet they feared your indignation even before you were disgusted by the wrong being done to you.

(9) I cannot adequately express my astonishment at this attitude of yours, fellow-citizens, for you realized that in the past your expectations had not been met. On the death of Sulla, who had imposed this infamous slavery on you, you believed that your troubles were over; but then emerged Catulus, far more savage. **(10)** In the consulship of Brutus and Mamercus an outbreak of violence intervened; then Gaius Curio played the despot to the extent of ruining a guiltless tribune. **(11)** Last year too saw the ferocity with which Lucullus attacked Lucius Quintius; look now at what a turmoil is being roused against me. But these sorts of attack were certainly to no purpose if it was their intention to put an end to their tyranny before you put an end to your slavery, especially

since in this civil unrest, although other motives were alleged, the real object of the conflict on both sides was to decide who should be your masters. **(12)** Other disagreements have flared up from time to time inspired by unruliness, or hatred, or greed. Only one issue has remained constant; it has been sought by both sides and has been taken away from you for the future: the tribunician power, a weapon fashioned by our ancestors to defend freedom. **(13)** I remind you of this fact; I beg you to keep it in mind; do not change the names of things to suit your own cowardice and give to slavery the title of peace. There is no bargain that you will enjoy peace if wickedness triumphs over right and honour; there would have been had you remained entirely passive. Now they are on their guard, and if you do not gain the victory they will hold you in tighter bonds, since the greater the injustice inflicted the more protected it is from retribution.

(14) 'What, then, do you advise?' one of you will interpose. First of all you must give up this habit you have, you men active of tongue but weak of spirit, of not keeping the thought of liberty in mind outside the place of assembly. **(15)** Secondly—without attempting to urge you to those manly deeds by which your forefathers gained tribunes for the plebs, and then a patrician magistracy, and a right of vote independent of the sanction of the patricians—since all the power is in your hands, citizens, and you are certainly well able to carry out or not to carry out, in your own interests, the orders to which you are now submitting for the advantage of others, are you waiting for the advice of Jupiter or one of the other gods? **(16)** It is you yourselves, citizens, who ratify the pompous powers of the consuls and the decrees of the Senate by carrying them out; you hasten of your own accord to increase and strengthen the abuse of their power over you. **(17)** And yet I am not urging you to avenge your wrongs, but rather to seek a respite from strife; and it is not because I desire discord, as they charge, but because I wish to put an end to it, that I demand restitution according to the law of nations. If they stubbornly hang on to what they have acquired, I

will not recommend war or secession, but simply that you should refuse any longer to shed your blood for them. **(18)** Let them hold and exercise their commands in their own way, let them seek triumphs, let them, with those ancestral portraits of theirs, harry Mithridates, Sertorius, and what is left of the exiles, but let those who have no share in the profits be free from the danger and the toil. **(19)** Unless, perchance, your services are being paid for by that hastily enacted law, which you regard so highly, for the distribution of corn; by this law they have valued the liberty of all of you at five measures per man, an allowance not much greater than prison rations. For just as in the case of prisoners that meagre supply keeps death away, yet their strength wanes, so this small amount does not relieve you from domestic cares and deceives with the slenderest of hope the cowardice of each recipient. **(20)** But even if the allowance were a generous one, what a mark of apathy it would be, since it was offered as the price of your slavery, to be deceived and actually to owe gratitude to your oppressors for your own property! You must guard against trickery: for there is no other way by which they can prevail over the people as a whole, and in that way only will they attempt to do so. **(21)** It is for this reason that they are making plans to ingratiate themselves with you, and are putting you off until the coming of Gnaeus Pompeius, the very man whom, when they were in a state of fear, they bore on their necks, but presently, their fear dispelled, they tear to pieces. **(22)** Nor are these self-styled defenders of liberty, many as they are, ashamed to admit dependence on one man before they dare to right a wrong or are able to defend a right. **(23)** For my own part, I have had ample opportunity to get to know that Pompeius, a young man who has won such glory, prefers to be the leading man in the state with your consent than to share in their despotism, and that he will take the initiative in restoring the power of the tribunes. **(24)** There was a time, citizens of Rome, when each of you found protection in the collective strength of the community, not the community in one man; a time when no single mortal was able to give or take away such things.

(25) And so, enough of words. **(26)** For it is not ignorance of what is going on that is your problem, but a kind of torpor which has laid hold on you; because of this you are stirred neither by glory nor by disgrace. You have given up everything in exchange for your present slothfulness, thinking that you have plenty of freedom because your backs are spared, and you are allowed to go here and there by the grace of your rich masters. **(27)** Yet these same privileges are now allowed to the country people; they are cut down in the quarrels of the powerful and are sent as gifts to magistrates in the provinces. **(28)** Thus we fight and conquer for the benefit of the few; whatever happens, the plebs are treated as the conquered. This will be more so as the days go by so long as they make greater efforts to retain their mastery than you do to regain your freedom.

35. Arusianus Messius, 475. 5 52

they advance into the sea up to their groins.

36. Arusianus Messius, 469. 29 53

after he had passed through the straits.

37. Nonius, 406. 10 54

For those who had attempted to save themselves by swimming, having been struck repeatedly by pieces of wreckage or flung against the hulls by the force of the waves, eventually, with bodies horribly mutilated, met their deaths like the others.

38. Nonius, 22. 17 56

and it could no longer be kept afloat because the sea had swelled enormously and the wind was increasing in force.

39.* Probus, 28. 24 57

I have read one Greek word in Sallust ending in [sos] *of the second declension with the genitive ending in* [si], Amisos *and* Amisi.

40. Charisius 137. 5 58

that they should accept the surrender of the fortresses in which the treasures of the king were kept under guard.

59 **41.** Nonius, 553. 30

But Oppius, when he saw that he was making no headway with his entreaties, attempted timidly to withdraw the dagger he had hidden in his clothing, but was prevented from doing so by Cotta and Volscius.

60 **42.*** Servius, *Aen.* 12. 844

he says that he will not make use of his services and discharges him from the army.

62 **43.*** Servius, *Aen.* 2. 312

wide because there, as Sallust said, the strait of Hellespont spreads over a wider area.

63 **44.*** Servius, *Aen.* 3. 533

it takes the shape of a Scythian bow.

65 **45.*** Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 228

The Black Sea is certainly fresher than the other seas.

66 **46.*** Servius, *Aen.* 4. 132

at that time of the year when a vast number of fish breaks free of the Pontus.

67 **47.*** Adnot. super Luc. 9. 960

(. . .) had acquired for the sea the nickname Inhospitable.

68 **48.** Priscianus 2. 246. 5

that Jason, by following a new sea-route had been the first to violate the hospitality received in the house of King Aeetes.

69 **49.*** Servius, *Aen.* 1. 96

that Achilles was the first of the Greeks . . .

70 **50.*** Servius, *Aen.* 5. 373

Towards the interior, therefore, the first part of Asia to present itself is Bithynia, called in former times by many names. For it was first called Bebrycia, then Mygdonia, and later Bithynia from King Bithynus.

51.* Porphyrion on Hor. *Carm.* 1. 17. 18 71

from the city of Tieum which Sallust considers to be in Paphlagonia when he speaks of the Pontic region.

52. Adnot super Luc. 3. 272 72

Through their territories flows the Halys, which once divided the kingdom of Lydia from the Persians.

53.* Servius, *Aen.* 11. 659 73

then the plains of Themiscyra, formerly the domain of the Amazons who for no known reason departed from the river Tanais.

54.* Schol. in Iuv. 15. 115 74

For of them all the most fierce are still the Achaei and the Tauri; as far as I can judge it must be because they are forced by the poverty of their territory to live from what they pillage.

55.* Schol. Philarg. *G.* 4. 293 75

(which) beyond the watery plain, the whole (region?) down to the river . . .

56.* Porphyrion on Hor. *Carm.* 3. 24. 9 76

the nomads of Scythia live there, a people who use their wagons as houses.

57.* Nonius. 524. 4 77

The ancients used to describe as 'closest' (proximum) *not only what was attached or linked up, but also what was far distant, provided that nothing came between the two separate objects . . . thus, in his treatment of the Pontic region, Sallust used the word* proximum *of the promontories of Paphlagonia and that which he called Criumetopon*

58. Porphyrion on Hor. *Carm.* 4. 4. 38 79

It has the name Danube in the section where it forms the boundary of the territories of the Germans.

59.* Gellius, 10. 7. 1 80

Of all the rivers that flow into the seas included within the

Roman empire . . . it is agreed that the Nile is the greatest. Sallust wrote that the Ister is next in size.

90 **60.** Ps.-Acron on Hor. *Epod.* 16. 5

Spartacus, leader of the gladiators, seventy-four in number, who, having escaped from their school (*as Sallust records in the third book of the Histories*) waged a fierce war with the Roman people.

91 **61.** Arusianus Messius, 480. 21

He was endowed with an outstanding measure of strength and courage.

93 **62.*** Servius, *Aen.* 3. 265

. . . if on the other hand they were to encounter resistance, they would die by the sword rather than by starvation.

94 **63.*** Cledonius, 59. 11

Cossinius was washing himself in spring water at the nearest villa.

96 **64.** The Vatican Fragment (1) [*Vat. Reg.* 1283]

(A) . . . to harden their spears in the fire and with these, apart from giving the required warlike appearance, wounds could be inflicted hardly less effectively than with iron-tipped spears. While the fugitives were engaged in this task, Varinius, given that some of the soldiers were sick because of the unhealthiness of the autumn, and no one, though ordered to do so by a severe edict, returned to the standards from the last desertion, and the remaining soldiers were very mutinous and refusing to perform military duties, had sent his quaestor, C. Toranius, to Rome to present in person a true report of the situation. **(B)** In the meantime, with four thousand willing troops Varinius pitched camp near the enemy, fortifying it with rampart, ditch, and extensive earthworks. By now the runaways had exhausted their food-supply, and were afraid that the enemy would attack them from close at hand when they went out on a foraging raid. Since they made a practice of mounting in military fashion sentries,

patrols, and other precautions, in the second watch they all moved out in silence, leaving only a trumpeter in the camp. To give onlookers from a distance the impression of sentries they had propped on stakes in front of the gate the bodies of recently slain men; they had also lit a series of fires to frighten the soldiers of Varinius into flight . . . a journey . . . [*four lines are missing*] **(C)** [*a gap of a little more than two lines*] . . . to turn aside from impassable routes (?) But Varinius, it now being full daylight, noticing the absence of the customary abuse from the fugitives and the throwing of stones into his camp, and in addition the absence of the clamour, the uproar, and the noises of an enemy moving around in various directions, sent cavalry to a small hill which dominated the surrounding countryside with orders to pick up and follow their tracks without delay. But believing that the fugitive slaves were now far away, yet fearing an ambush, he withdrew in defensive formation in order to double his forces with new troops. But when he reached Cumae . . . [*five lines missing*] **(D)** [*a gap of two lines*] . . . after some days, contrary to their usual attitude, the confidence of our men began to grow and to find expression in words. Influenced by this in spite of the observed facts, and even though his soldiers were raw and untried and demoralized by the misfortunes of others, Varinius nevertheless rashly led by rapid marches against the fugitives' camp a force which was now not so loquacious or so boastful about undertaking the battle as they had been in demanding it. For their part, the fugitives, because of a disagreement over a plan of action, were close to revolt. Crixus and his fellow Gauls and the Germans wanted to go forth and offer battle of their own accord while Spartacus . . .

65. Arusianus Messius, 498. 26

they encountered the farmers of Abella who were keeping watch over their fields.

66. The Vatican Fragment (2) [*Vat. Reg.* 1283]

(A) . . . in the fear that wandering about disbanded as they were at that time they would be surrounded and cut

down . . . at the same time . . . the worry . . . hence it was necessary to leave as quickly as possible. A few men of foresight and good sense felt that it was necessary to retire in the way Spartacus advised . . . and those who were liberal of mind and noble in character . . . approved of his plan. Others, however, stupidly relying on the reinforcements pouring in and on their own fighting spirit, some dishonourably unmindful of their country, but the majority, induced by their servile nature, looked for nothing more than booty and the opportunity to indulge their cruelty. **(B)** [*about two lines missing*] . . . seemed the best plan. Then he told them that they should go out into more open country, particularly grazing lands, where they could increase their number with select recruits before the coming of Varinius with his army made up to strength again. Hastily acquiring a suitable guide from the Picentine captives, he advanced unobserved by way of the Eburine chain of hills to Nares Lucanae; from there he reached Forum Anni at dawn, unknown to the rural inhabitants. And straightaway the fugitives disobeyed the orders of their leader and raped the girls and the women, and others of them . . . **(C)** [*two lines missing*] they dealt in heinous fashion with those who resisted, inflicting wounds on them from behind in an outrageous way and sometimes discarding a half-dead lacerated body; others set fire to the houses, and many slaves from the place, whose natural temperament made them their allies, dragged out from hiding the treasures hidden by their masters, or their masters themselves; in short, nothing seemed inviolate or sacrilegious to the fury and slave mentality of the foreigners. Spartacus, being completely powerless to prevent these excesses, when he begged them repeatedly to make haste and forestall . . . the reports . . . **(D)** [*two lines missing*] . . . and not to (incur?) their hatred. And the greater number of them . . . those who were cruelly engrossed in slaughter and . . . But having delayed there that day and the following night, with the number of fugitives now doubled, he moved his camp at dawn and took up position in a fairly spacious level area where he drove away the peasants who had emerged from

their houses; and the autumn crops were ripe in the fields at that time. But the inhabitants, now that it was full daylight, learnt from the flight of their neighbours that the fugitives were coming upon them and hurried with all [their possessions into the neighbouring mountains(?)]

67. Priscianus 2. 236. 14 99

in all the territory of Lucania there was only one man, Publipor by name, who had knowledge of the place.

68.* Servius, *Aen.* 3. 104 10

medio ponto *('in the middle of the sea') can indeed be understood, according to Sallust, as* longe a continenti *('far from the mainland').*

69.* Servius, *Aen.* 6. 23 11

He described it as well-positioned; for, as Sallust says, Crete is higher on its eastern side.

70.* Martianus Capella, 5. 20 12

The whole island is of moderate size and produces a variety of crops.

71.* Servius, *Aen.* 3. 578 13

Unless we accept as fabulous what we read about the Giants, a descriptive account does not succeed; for since they are said to have fought in Phlegra, a place in Thessaly, how is it that Enceladus is in Sicily? Otus fought in Crete, according to Sallust, whence the plains of Otus.

72.* Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* 21. 41 14

that antiquity, exaggerating as in other things, honoured them (because they were the first to have the notion of the divine), as the foster-parents of Jupiter.

73.* Servius, *Aen.* 8. 725 15

The Carians were an island people famous for piracy and were subdued by Minos, as both Thucydides and Sallustius tell us.

8

74. Nonius, 534. 18

During the voyage it happened that one cohort, travelling

on a passenger vessel, wandered away from the rest and was surrounded during a calm by two pirate galleys.

9 **75.** Nonius, 366. 12

among whom all the most prominent were either flogged when hanging from the yard-arm or with body unmutilated were nailed to a cross-shaped gibbet projecting from the prow.

16 **76.*** Servius, *Aen.* 4. 271

having wasted three years there to no purpose.

81 **77.*** Donatus, Ter. *Adelph.* 312

and so Tarquitius refuted this [letter].

82 **78.** Arusianus Messius, 488. 25

. . . that the general be on his guard against the deceitful Celtiberian

83 **79.** Servius, *Aen.* 1. 698

And so they took their places at the table, Sertorius on the lower side of the middle couch with L. Fabius Hispaniensis, one of the proscribed senators, above him; on the couch to the left of the middle couch were Antonius and Sertorius' secretary Versius; the other secretary, Maecenas, was on the bottom couch between Tarquitius and the master of the house, Perperna.

84 **80.** Nonius, 116. 25

As usually happens in desperate situations, he adopted different courses of action: some scattered in secret flight, relying on their knowledge of the locality, others attempted break-outs in closely packed groups.

85 **81.*** Porphyrion on Hor. *Ep.* 2. 2. 72

By chance the mule driver of a contractor recognized Perperna.

86 **82.*** Priscianus, 3. 46. 1

where they had dared and allowed many abominations in eating.

83. Priscianus, 2. 546. 12 67

that after consuming a part they should salt what was left of the corpses for an extended period of future use.

84. Nonius, 239. 3 88

But Pompeius from his early manhood, being influenced by the flattery of his admirers, believed that he would be the equal of king Alexander; what is more, he sought to rival his deeds and his plans.

85.* Servius, *Aen.* 11. 6 89

On the upper slopes of the Pyrenees he set up trophies of his victories over the Spaniards.

86. Arusianus Messius, 481. 14 100

that the only place which would be safe for them would be that in which they had established a fortified position.

87.* Servius Dan., *Aen.* 11. 80 101

. . . that they should deprive them of their weapons and their horses.

88.* Isidorus, *Etym.* 19. 23. 4 104

The Germans cover their bare bodies with skins.

89.* Servius, *G.* 3. 383 105

. . . *for, as Sallust says in the Histories, garments made from skins are called* renones.

90. Nonius, 538. 34 106

And at the same time Lentulus . . . an elevated position which he had defended with a double battle-line and at the cost of many of his men, when from the soldiers' baggage military cloaks began to catch the eye and selected cohorts began to be discernible . . .

91. Nonius, 358. 16 49

And Curio after praising him and kindling his eagerness with the hope of rewards, orders him to set out with the men that he himself had chosen.

50 **92.** Nonius, 489. 28
Because of his uneasiness with regard to the festival of Vulcan, Curio delayed there for one day.

25 **93.** Nonius, 235. 14
After the failure of this attempt the soldiers began to march in a more careless fashion, no longer with arms at the ready as before, and in looser formation.

27 **94.** Nonius, 489. 9
For it was then the third hour, and a high mist was obscuring the sky.

32 **95.** Priscianus, 2. 514. 16
(. . .) is hampered by the intrigue.

95 **96.** Nonius, 137. 7
And then especially, as happens in times of crisis, each man recalled the one most dear to him left behind in his home, and everyone, of all ranks, carried out his final duties.

107 **97.** Arusianus Messius, 487. 29
They hasten to assist those who were demoralized after being attacked.

108 **98.** Arusianus Messius, 485. 15
they had advanced up to the walls.

109 **99.** Eutyches, 485. 7
In reply, thinking that he was being deceived, he asked if the treasure was being indicated by extispicy or by a dream.

110 **100.** Arusianus Messius, 468. 12
uncertain about the plan.

BOOK 4

1 **1.** Gellius, 18. 4. 4
But his colleague of patrician stock Cn. Lentulus, surnamed Clodianus—it is not easy to say whether he was

more churlish or more unreliable—proposed a bill for exacting the money which Sulla had remitted to purchasers of property.

2. Nonius, 535. 8

The senate was searching everywhere with great diligence for him and Metrophanes, since throughout the so many boats which they had sent to the river mouths with a few trustworthy men for the purpose of making enquiries . . .

3. Arusianus Messius, 507. 16

He orders a squadron of cavalry to approach close to the king's camp and to test the plan of action from close quarters.

4. Priscianus, 2. 535. 8

He therefore summoned the legions which had been placed on the mountains the previous day.

5.* Servius Dan., *Aen.* 10. 370

Under the gaze of the leader each man was all the more eagerly showing himself as loyal and keen.

6. Priscianus, 2. 382. 4

Within a brief space of time the shortage of food which the king had cunningly contrived was worrying Lucullus.

7.* Schol. Stat. *Theb.* 3. 2

He himself was beset by doubts on that night.

8. Arusianus Messius, 488. 14

In this way the camp was entered without a blow being struck.

9. Nonius, 321. 25

And having returned on the following day and taken possession of many things which in their haste they had left behind in the camp, when they were merrily regaling themselves there with wine and food . . .

10.* Pompeius, 180. 5

Lucullus held the king's treasures and the strongholds in which they were kept.

(3.51) **11.*** Servius, *Aen.* 3. 16
Aenum and Maronea and the military road.

18 **12.*** Servius, *Aen.* 7. 604
It was a fierce tribe of the Getae even in ancient times; for these are the Moesii, a people which Sallust says were defeated by Lucullus.

19 **13.*** Probus, 11. 20
Bizone

(3.102) **14.** Nonius, 554. 18
These men were very familiar with the region and accus-
(3.105) tomed to weaving their rustic wickerwork baskets; in the existing circumstances, given the shortage of shields, each man was by the same skills arming himself with a shield woven in the shape of the cavalry shield.

20 **15.*** Servius, *G.* 3. 156
Skins, recently stripped off, were adhering to them as if glued on.

21 **16.** Nonius, 258. 33
Having once again acquired beasts of burden, they hasten on their way to the town.

22 **17.** Priscianus, 2. 484. 5
All of those who, though advanced in years, still pos-
23 sessed a martial spirit.

18.* Servius, *Aen.* 2. 201
He causes those designated by lot to be beaten to death.

19.* Servius, *Aen.* 3. 400
24 All of that part of Italy which contracts into a narrow strip is divided into two promontories, Bruttium and Sallentinum.

20.* Servius, *Aen.* 3. 522
Areas of Italy which are level and gently undulating.

21. Arusianus Messius, 500. 17

Stretching towards Sicily, it [Italy] at its narrowest point does not extend more than thirty-five miles.

22.* Servius, *Aen.* 3. 414

It is known that Sicily had once been joined to Italy, but that the joined section had either been submerged because of its lowness or worn away because of its narrowness. The curvature of the strait is due to the greater friability of the Italian coast, on to which the ruggedness and height of the Sicilian coast drove the breakers.

23.* Isidorus, *Etym.* 13. 8. 4

The inhabitants call a rock, which overhands the sea, Scylla, because from a distance it presents a shape similar to that legendary creature. And they gave to it the monstrous outward form of the mythical being, that is, the body of a human engirdled with dogs' heads because the waves which clash there seem to utter a barking sound.

24. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 117

Charybdis, a sea-whirlpool, which sucks in ships which happen to be driven on to it, and carries them by undersea currents for sixty miles to the shores of Tauromenium; there they emerge again from the deep as shattered remains.

25.* Servius, *Aen.* 4. 11

Sicily's promontory, Pelorus, takes its name, according to Sallust, from Hannibal's helmsman who was buried there.

26. Arusianus Messius, 509. 14

When they had placed the containers under the beams, they tied them in place with vine branches or strips of hide.

27. Priscianus, 2. 473. 8

The entangled rafts were hindering the provision of help.

28.* Arusianus Messius, 500. 28

C. Verres strengthened the coastline close to Italy.

35 **29.*** Schol. Bern. *G.* 4. 104
On a cold night . . .

36 **30.** Arusianus Messius, 487. 19
a military garrison of ours that was below strength and at that time off its guard.

33 **31.*** Servius, *Aen.* 12. 715
They were in the forest of Sila.

37 **32.** Arusianus Messius, 482. 28
They began to disagree among themselves and not to consult together.

38 **33.** Arusianus Messius, 510. 12
A taste as good as that of the clearest of springs.

40 **34.** Nonius, 492. 27
In the meantime, in the still uncertain first light of dawn, two Gallic women ascended the mountain to spend their menstruation period there in solitude.

39 **35.** Arusianus Messius, 450. 11
Having been made only the more eager to hasten the task.

41 **36.*** Donatus, Ter. *Andr.* 205
He met his death while defending himself vigorously, and selling his life dearly.

42 **37.*** Nonius, 186. 22
From many indications it was believed that he would carry out the wishes of the people.

43 **38.*** Quintilianus, *Inst.* 4. 2. 2
M. Lollius Palicanus, a native of Picenum of humble stock, verbose rather than eloquent.

44 **39.** Arusianus Messius, 494. 7
embarked on a long speech.

40. Priscianus, 3. 52. 10 45

If nothing had been agreed upon between the plebs and the senate before his arrival, he himself would devote his attention to the matter.

41. Festus, 490. 34 46

which practice, indeed, has penetrated the city and spread like a disease.

42. Arusianus Messius, 494. 7 47

demonstrating to the people, whom he had decided to court as much as possible so that he might soon have them as a ready instrument of his wishes, that . . .

43. Arusianus Messius, 462. 26 49

He discharged his army as soon as he had left the Alps behind.

44. Arusianus Messius, 487. 5 50

This had been sufficiently provided for but only for the time being.

45. Arusianus Messius, 461. 10 48

expecting a junior colleague and one who made up to him.

46. Priscianus, 2. 435. 14 13

He kept hearing that Amisus was being besieged without any battles being fought.

47. Arusianus Messius, 500. 2 14

ladders which were equal to the walls in height.

48. Arusianus Messius, 503. 15 15

because the pillagers, lighting their way with torches, had carelessly left them inside the houses.

49. Arusianus Messius, 499. 24 3

having shortened sail by about a third.

50. Nonius, 138. 3 16

There was almost equal haste in the town, and there was a great dread that the new fortifications might be

weakened at the sides by dampness: for all quarters of the city were inundated with stagnant water, since the sewers were overflowing with matter being pushed back by the incoming tides.

17 **51.** Nonius, 318. 10

and the ground opened into a chasm of enormous extent and depth.

(3.47) **52.** Arusianus, 476

After the return of those to whom the senate had granted an amnesty for their participation in the Lepidan war.

52 **53.*** Gellius, 2. 17. 7

He was loaded with debt.

53 **54.** Nonius, 257. 44

He was suspected of having come to an agreement with the robbers concerning a share of the booty; it is not known whether this was truly the case or whether he was at fault through negligence.

55 **55.** Arusianus Messius, 488. 3

L. Hostilius Dasianus, of a restless temperament.

51 **56.** Arusianus Messius, 496. 30

Crassus concerned himself rather with criticizing his colleague than with diligently assessing what was good and what was bad for the people.

56 **57.** Arusianus Messius, 470. 23

He strengthened the morale of the tetrarchs and kings who were frightened.

57 **58.*** Donatus, Ter. *Andr.* 907

unaccustomed to hearing the truth.

58 **59.** Priscianus, 2. 487. 4

Then, their anger by now abated, they were calmed down by a magnanimous speech.

60. Nonius, 535. 13 59

By forced marches he hastened through the kingdom of Ariobarzanes to the river Euphrates where it forms the boundary between Cappadocia and Armenia; and although there were available five hundred barges which had been built secretly during the winter . . .

61.* Donatus, Ter. *Eun.* 875 60

that such a suddenly occurring change seemed to have been due to a divine intervention.

62. Probus, 29. 8 61

Naphtha, a type of oil similar to the oil of the cedar by which . . . fires are fed.

63. Nonius, 95. 22 63

He cuts away the protecting screens, demolishes the fortifications, and gains possession of the summit.

64.* Servius, *Aen.* 11. 770 64

And the mail-clad cavalry was following.

65.* Servius, *Aen.* 11. 770 65

The horses had matching coverings, for they had attached metal plates to the cloth in the manner of plumage.

66. Nonius, 556. 15 66

The armoured cavalry which was passing in front of them was in outward appearance totally iron-clad.

67. Codex Vaticanus Lat. 3864 (*V*): Letter of Mithridates to Arsaces 69

(1) 'King Mithridates sends greetings to King Arsaces. All those who in the time of their prosperity receive an invitation to join an offensive alliance should first of all consider whether it is possible for them to remain at peace at that time; and secondly, if what is asked of them is legitimate and safe, honourable or dishonourable. (2) If you could enjoy lasting peace, if such a wicked enemy were not near at hand, if it were not that you could win undying glory by defeating the Romans I should not

venture to ask for your alliance, and it would be in vain for me to hope to unite my misfortunes with your prosperity. **(3)** And yet those very factors which it seems could hold you back—resentment against Tigranes on account of the recent war, and my lack of success—if you but consent to regard them in the right light, will be special incentives. **(4)** For Tigranes, exposed to danger, will accept an alliance on any terms you may desire; as for me, although Fortune has deprived me of much, she has equipped me with the experience necessary for giving good advice; and since I am no longer at the height of my power, I provide an example, something to be wished for by those who are enjoying good fortune, of how you may conduct your own affairs with more prudence.

(5) 'The Romans have one inveterate motive for making war on all nations, peoples, and kings; namely, an insatiable desire for dominion and riches. For this reason they first began a war with Philip, king of the Macedonians, after pretending to be his friend as long as they were being hard pressed by the Carthaginians. **(6)** When Antiochus came to Philip's aid they cunningly diverted him from his purpose by surrendering Asia to him. A short time afterwards Philip was crushed; Antiochus was stripped of all his territory west of the Taurus and of ten thousand talents. **(7)** Next, after many battles of varying results, they formally took Perseus, the son of Philip, under their protection before the gods of Samothrace; then, since they had committed themselves to grant him his life, these experts in cunning and in finding ways of breaking faith killed him by never letting him sleep. **(8)** Eumenes, whose friendship they now ostentatiously parade, they first betrayed to Antiochus as the price of peace; then, having made him the overseer of captured territory, they reduced him by exactions and insults from king to the most wretched of slaves. Next, having concocted a counterfeit and impious will, they led his son Aristonicus in triumph like an enemy because he had tried to regain his father's kingdom. **(9)** They occupied Asia, and finally, on the death of Nicomedes, they seized Bithynia, even though Nysa,

whom Nicomedes had called queen, had undoubtedly given birth to a son.

(10) 'Why should I mention my own case? Although I was completely separated by other kingdoms and tetrarchies from their empire, yet because it was reported that I was rich and would not be a slave, they provoked me to war through Nicomedes. And I was not unaware of their villainy; I had beforehand given warning of what afterwards happened both to the Cretans, who alone retained their freedom at that time, and to King Ptolemy. **(11)** And so, in revenge for the wrongs inflicted upon me, I drove Nicomedes out of Bithynia, recovered Asia, the spoil taken from King Antiochus, and freed Greece from the yoke of servitude. **(12)** Archelaus, the basest of slaves, frustrated further progress by betraying my army; and those whom cowardice or misplaced cunning kept from taking up arms, in the hope that they would be saved by my efforts, are suffering most cruel punishment. For Ptolemy, using bribery, is merely postponing attacks against him from day to day, while the Cretans who have already been attacked, will find no relief from war until they are wiped out. **(13)** For my part, when I realized that the Romans had not so much granted me peace as put off the struggle because of their own internal troubles, I took up the war again even though Tigranes refused to join me (now, too late, he admits the truth of my prediction) and you were far away, and all the rest had submitted. At Chalcedon I routed Marcus Cotta, the Roman commander, by land, and caused him the loss of a first-class fleet at sea. **(14)** During the siege of Cyzicus, which lasted a long time and involved a large number of troops, I ran short of supplies, since no one in the neighbourhood rendered me aid; at the same time winter kept me off the sea. And so, not compelled by the enemy, I made an attempt to return to my kingdom, and in so doing I lost the flower of my army and my fleets by shipwrecks at Parium and at Heraclea. **(15)** Then when I had re-formed my army at Cabeira, and fought several battles of varied outcome against Lucullus, we were again interrupted by a shortage of supplies. For him there was

available the kingdom of Ariobarzanes, untouched by war. Because I was left in the midst of devastation, I withdrew to Armenia. The Romans followed me, or rather they followed their custom of overthrowing all monarchies. Because they kept at bay a huge force hemmed in by narrow defiles, they are now boasting of the outcome of Tigranes' imprudence as if it were a victory.

(16) 'Do you really think, I ask you, if we are defeated that you will be in a better position to resist the Romans or that there will be an end to the war? I am well aware that you have great strength in men, in weapons, and in gold; it is for that reason that I am seeking an alliance, that the Romans are seeking your spoils. However, my advice [to you] is, while Tigranes' kingdom is still intact, and while I have soldiers who have been trained in warfare with the Romans, to finish far from your territory, without any great trouble to you, and at the expense of our bodies, a war in which we cannot conquer or be conquered without danger to you. **(17)** Are you overlooking the fact that the Romans, blocked by the Atlantic from expanding to the west, have turned their armies in this direction? That they have owned nothing since the beginning of their existence except what they have stolen: their home, their wives, their lands, their empire? Once wanderers without fatherland, without parents, destined to be the scourge of the whole world, whom no laws, human or divine, prevent from plundering and destroying allies and friends, those near them and those far off, weak or powerful, and from considering every government which is not subject to them, especially monarchies, as their enemies. **(18)** For few men desire freedom, most are content with masters who are just; we are being suspected of being their rivals, who will at some future time exact vengeance on them. **(19)** But you, who possess Seleuceia, greatest of cities, and the realm of Persis famed for its riches, what can you expect from them except treachery now and war later? **(20)** The Romans turn their weapons against all men, the sharpest against those whose defeat yields the greatest spoils; by

daring and deceit, by breeding war from war, they have grown powerful. **(21)** Following this policy, they will destroy everything or they will themselves perish. This latter outcome is not impossible if you from Mesopotamia and we from Armenia surround their army, which is without supplies and without allies, and has remained safe thus far only by good fortune or through our own shortcomings, **(22)** And you will gain the fame of having gone to the aid of great kings and of having crushed the plunderers of all nations. **(23)** This is my advice and this course I urge upon you: do not choose by our ruin to postpone your own ruin for a time; choose rather, in alliance with us, to conquer.'

68.* Schol. Gronov. 320. 17 St. 71

As Sallust says, Lucullus gave money to Quintius that he might not be succeeded in office.

69. Arusianus Messius, 470. 19 70

Apart from the immoderate desire that his command should be prolonged, he was considered outstanding in other respects.

70.* Plutarch, *Lucullus*, 33 (5.

Sallust in fact says that his soldiers were ill-disposed towards him from the very outset of the war, before Cyzicus, and again before Amisus, because they were forced to spend two successive winters in camp.

71.* Philargyrius on *G.* 4. 49 72

In the region of Gordyene amomum and other aromatic spices are produced.

72. Arusianus Messius, 500. 27 74

Just then the Bithynii, approaching the river Arsanias . . .

73. Nonius, 132. 21 76

More cohorts and then, as happens when things are progressing favourably, the whole army attacked with equal enthusiasm those [troops], and all the rest already forced to give way because of the spaciousness of the area.

77 **74.** Isidorus, *Etym.* 13. 21. 10
Moreover Sallust, a very reliable authority, states that the Tigris and Euphrates rise from one and the same source in Armenia. *These rivers which* flow in different directions, leave a space of many miles between them; the land which is encircled by them is called Mesopotamia.

78 **75.** Schol. in Iuv. 1. 104
The men of Mesopotamia exercise unbridled lust on both sexes, *as Sallust records.*

79 **76.** Arusianus Messius, 456. 10
enclosed by sides a foot high.

73 **77.*** Arusianus Messius, 495. 17
He was headstrong and over-confident.

81 **78.** Arusianus Messius, 498. 10
He settled on the sum of three million sesterces with C. Piso.

68 **79.** Arusianus Messius, 456. 11
Worried and irresolute.

82 **80.** Arusianus Messius, 498. 19
Those who were closest to the positions of the enemy.

83 **81.** Arusianus Messius, 510. 6
having stupidly come close to the camp.

84 **82.** Arusianus Messius, 4. 53. 1
Weak in judgement.

85 **83.** Festus, 376. 2
[Fearing] lest [the river had acquired enough force] to burst through the bridge and . . . had been cut through by the wooden piles.

BOOK 5

1 **1.*** Philargyrius on *G.* 3. 469
He suddenly invaded territories which were undefended.

2.* Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 298

A very great number of men from many places together attacked [cities] which were open to attack and off their guard as in times of peace.

3.* Servius, *G.* 4. 211

to such an extent was the sacrosanctity of the royal title ingrained in those people.

4.* Donatus, Et. *Eun.* 783

and in battles he was quick to respond to a situation.

5. Arusianus Messius, 488. 16

and even when he was over 70 years old he was able, armed, to leap on to his horse.

6.* Probus, 31. 15

with a dislocated foot.

7.* Caper, 593. 15

[The antidote] will counteract the poison which is being given to you.

8. Nonius, 138. 7

The others were attending to the private business interests of legates or tribunes, some were conducting their own business by providing supplies and by trading.

9. Arusianus Messius, 474. 10

who was his wife's brother.

10. Servius, *Aen.* 9. 341

Because of a lack of moderation he was too eager to commit evil deeds.

11. Priscianus, 3. 225. 17

The soldiers of the Valerian legions, when they learnt that Bithynia and Pontus had been given to the consul by the Gabinian law, and that they had been discharged . . .

12. Priscianus, 3. 225. 15

But Lucullus, when he heard that Q. Marcius Rex the

proconsul was heading for Cilicia through Lycaonia with three legions . . .

15 **13.** Arusianus Messius, 489. 16

But when he pleaded the state of mind of his soldiers as an excuse . . .

16 **14.** Arusianus Messius, 456. 24

He was rejecting the king.

18 **15.*** Charisius, 125. 6

The outlets of rivers into the sea are expressed by the neuter plural ostia. *But if you want to indicate the city, you will adhere rather to the singular number, even though Sallust often indicates the city with the plural number as well.*

20 **16.** Nonius, 236. 18

that it was for reasons such as these that Sulla when dictator used to dismount from his horse, to rise from his seat, and to uncover his head before him alone.

21 **17.** Priscianus, 3. 225. 20

I realize that he had misgivings about the outward form of and the fame attached to the title . . .

22 **18.** Priscianus, 3. 226. 1

I see that he, being needy, is hurrying in his quest for rewards.

23 **19.*** Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 195

On that occasion he clearly showed himself a man of integrity in his stance against the dangers [of the proposal] and the ambition [of Pompeius].

24 **20.** Arusianus Messius, 470. 25

For if some human accident befell Pompeius . . .

FRAGMENTS OF UNCERTAIN REFERENCE

1. Fronto, 143. 20

Many take delight in the gentle utterances of those who speak in the grove of eloquence.

2. Servius Dan., *Ecl.* 8. 27

In these books over a long period of time he wrote in an even more malicious way falsehoods concerning honourable men.

3. Diomedes, 447

The commanders being of the highest calibre and their subordinates brave and keen.

4. Servius, *Aen.* 2. 27

The gates were lying open and the fields filled with farmers.

5. Seneca, *Ep.* 114. 17

He recruited an army with his own money.

6. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 8. 557

to bring about the appearance of a captured city.

7. Frag. Bob. 5. 561. 2

of the Samnites.

8. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 146

But at the time of the year when the sea was accessible to ships.

9. Cledonius, 76. 23

which within a few days would be united under arms.

10. Priscianus, 3. 305

He spoke in the following manner.

11. Schol. in Iuv. 10. 1

by a very narrow strait.

12. Pap. Rylands III 473

. . . bursting with anger and grief at the loss of such allies. Armed men hurry out of the ships either in skiffs or by swimming, while others drove their ships on to a shore covered by seaweed; the enemy, a cowardly band of half-armed Greeks and Africans, did not withstand them any longer. After burying their comrades as best they could, they seized everything in the vicinity that was of use to them. Then, since there was no prospect of accomplishing their objective, they headed for Spain [or Sardinia].

13. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 456

Thus he hopes that the engagement will be an omen for the war.

14. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 281

to alleviate in some small way their condition of servitude.

15. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 4. 290

which had been (*fuerat*)—(or) will turn out to be (*fuerit*)—-the cause of revolutionary activity.

16. Donatus, Ter. *Andr.* 94

and although situated at a high level it is nevertheless [fortified?] on all sides by three walls and great towers.

17. Servius, *G.* 1. 3

[a woman] endowed with exceptional physical beauty.

18. Isidorus, *Etym.* 2. 11. 1

Metrophanes won the favour of Mithridates by humouring him.

19. Servius, *Ecl.* 8. 4

When the soldiers had been rested for a short time.

20. Donatus, Ter. *Phorm.* 192

But Metellus in the farther province . . .

21. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 116

by a threefold wave.

22. Servius, *Aen.* 2. 325

'for Dardania' (Troy) named after either Dardanus the son of Jupiter and Electra or, according to Sallust, after the king of the Dardani, Midas, who ruled over Phrygia.

23. Servius, *Aen.* 1. 116

by the frequency of the waves, which usually occurs when the north wind is blowing.

24. Schol. Stat. *Theb.* 3. 116

He approached the foot of the mountain.

25. Servius, *Aen.* 12. 282

['Thus a single desire seized them all—to settle the conflict with the sword']. *Thus, i.e. while gradually in turn individuals come to the aid of their fellows, all have been brought together into the battle; thus Sallust.*

26. Servius, *G.* 1. 287

They worked day and night without respite.

27. Nonius, 60. 17

He used what Appius describes as a barking kind of delivery.

28. Diomedes, 447. 9

on to bodies naked and uncovered.

29. Servius, *Aen.* 11. 619

now retreating, now advancing, as usually happens in cavalry engagements.

30. Servius, *Aen.* 2. 286

[Clouds] dimmed the light.

31. Donatus, Ter. *Adelph.* 302

surrounded on all sides by a large number of the enemy.

32. Servius, *Aen.* 1. 2

who were wandering around with no fixed place of exile.

33. Diomedes, 311. 28

most eager for the law.

34. Servius, *Aen.* 2. 169
with things developing beyond all expectation.

35. Schol. Veron. *Aen.* 5. 80
that, since he was returning home, he might be given a formal welcome at the temple of Bellona.

36. Placidus, Gloss Lat.
stretching his hand towards his face.

37. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 12. 661
Pickets hurriedly organized from a section of the cohorts were stationed in front of the camp.

38. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 9. 486
In the second [line] he had stationed the fast-moving cohorts.

39. Pompeius, 293. 23
A certain Ligurian, having departed to answer a call of nature.

40. Servius, *Aen.* 9. 746
They were giving ground, having withdrawn to a position where blows were easier to inflict.

41. Donatus, Ter. *Phorm.* 141
[since] the legate Publius had been dismissed by mutual consent.

42. Isidorus, *Etym.* 18. 2. 7
. . . the enemy would either have been overwhelmed or would have run away.

43. Servius, *Ecl.* 2. 17
They had sufficient confidence in the ability . . .

44. Servius, *Aen.* 2. 157
Neither any serving soldier nor any ex-regular.

45. Schol. Stat. *Theb.* 10. 573
That action rather than words might be brought into play, they had positioned their parents and children on the walls.

46. Donatus, Ter. *Phorm.* 98

They were not only not offering resistance, but had not even issued ⟨arms out of fear of provoking a war⟩.

47. Glossa Vaticana 7. 584

a trireme as high as the crest of the wave.

48. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 3. 520

and with only the small reefs of the sails having been lowered.

49. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 3. 128

The singing and shouting of the sailors were hindering . . .

50. Macrobius, *ex. Parisina* 626. 22

Since, being less able, he was pursuing his objective by every possible means.

51. Porphyrion on Hor. *Sat.* 2. 2. 66

and the smart appearance itself of the accused man.

52. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 1. 307

They were prostrating themselves before the knees of the senators.

53. Charisius, 280. 7

at the first rumour.

54. Sergius, *Expl. in Donat.* 559. 28

extremely unreliable.

55. Servius, *Aen.* 5. 626

[Orion] which rises, as Sallust says, close to the setting in motion of the summer sun.

56. Servius Dan., *Aen.* 12. 425

Quickly, fetch sandals!

57. Schol. Bern. *G.* 3. 13

A well-positioned city.

58. Schol. Stat. *Theb.* 5. 384

Strength is ineffective so long as it depends on . . .

59. Donatus, Ter. *Eun.* 164
Apathy was by no means lacking.

60. Donatus, Ter. *Eun.* 467
. . . these agreements would not have prevailed in the assembly.

61. Donatus, Ter. *Hecyr.* 536
and that they were being implicated not as individuals forced to participate in these matters, but as active promoters of them, and as guilty of criminal activities rather than as people to be pitied.

62. Donatus, Ter. *Adelph.* 582
that I assign it to the anger of Jupiter.

63. Schol. Bemb. Ter. *Haut.* 490
The Latin text of this fragment . . . *publicum studiis corruperant me vere u.* . . *unum p.* . . . is very corrupt. Maurenbrecher suggests ⟨*datis in*⟩ *publicum studiis* ('support given for the public good' or 'policies formulated for public welfare').

64. Glossa Vaticana, 7. 567
But since he believes that he was commanded (or assigned?)

65. Charisius, 255. 2
immediately.

66. Servius in Donat. 432. 21
lights (days?)

67. Probus, *Inst.* 126. 12
This man as proconsul.

68. Arusianus Messius, 498. 5
of gaining control over everything.

69. Arusianus Messius, 509. 25
familiar with these [men? / places?]

70. Quintilianus, *Inst.* 9. 3. 12

To justify . . . to the leader.

71. Quintilianus, *Inst.* 9. 3. 12

that he would not feel regret—or (that he would not give reason for complaint).

72. Quintilianus, *Inst.* 9. 3. 12

[those sent?] to see.

73. Servius, *Aen.* 2. 433

(exchanges) battles, because, as Sallust says, battles involve mutual action and reaction.

74. Servius, *G.* 1. 43

so that spring in its first month is called early spring (ver novum), *in its second month, mature spring* (ver adultum), *in its third month, advanced spring* (ver praeceps), *as Sallust also regularly describes it.*

75. *Cornucopiae*, 406

After all gathered together into one place.

76. *Cornucopiae*, 517

In that battle three hundred soldiers were lost.

77. *Cornucopiae*, 518

A large part of the soldiers had departed from that place.

78. *Cornucopiae*, 568

These (men) had about thirty fast passenger vessels and ten cargo ships.

79 *Cornucopiae*, 599

When the soldiers had been laid low, he fled.

80. *Cornucopiae*, 600

The enemy were elated by this victory; our men, terrified and profoundly shocked, ran away.

81. *Cornucopiae*, 707

In the middle was a plain gushing everywhere with water.

82. *Cornucopiae*, 713

Provided that you consider yourselves safe until such time as the rest of the crowd has arrived.

83. *Cornucopiae*, 625

Having hesitantly and submissively spoken a few words, he went away.

84. *Cornucopiae*, 836

Then apprehensive about their crimes and especially about their complicity in the conspiracy, they did not know where to turn.

85. *Cornucopiae*, 302

Before he attacked the enemy . . .

86. *Cornucopiae*, 721

and he sails towards the open sea in a small fishing craft.

87. *Cornucopiae*, 86

than whom no man is better or more outstanding.

88. *Cornucopiae*, 280

With the infantry scattered and overwhelmed, they began gradually to retire.

89. *Cornucopiae*, 278

. . . soldiers who had twice been routed.

90. *Cornucopiae*, 292

before he handed over the citadel to the enemy.

91. *Cornucopiae*, 879

But the enemy were really superior in manpower and in effective strength.

92. *Cornucopiae*, 276

When he was besieging a mountain which had been surrounded on all sides.

93. *Cornucopiae*, 284

A little later he took control of the glades that had been surrounded with troops.

94. *Cornucopiae*, 8

He had already transported the whole army across.

95. *Cornucopiae*, 626

Shortly after these words were spoken they joined battle.

96. *Cornucopiae*, 692

From here, where the plains extended far and wide, he dispatched his army without risk of harm.

97. *Cornucopiae*, 151

Armed men were blockading the doors.

98. *Cornucopiae*, 759

lest, perchance, reduced to despair, they might prefer death to life.

99. *Cornucopiae*, 295

While he is contriving ambushes against the soldiers.

100. *Cornucopiae*, 150

Many perished in that encounter.

101. *Cornucopiae*, 868

As it happened, when they made an attack on him they were easily repelled.

102. *Cornucopiae*, 216

Since he was advancing clad in a military cloak, he intended to join battle as soon as possible.

103. *Cornucopiae*, 29

After those who were carrying the standards halted when they recognized the dangerous situation . . .

104. *Cornucopiae*, 108

Then the consul speedily led forth his army.

105. *Cornucopiae*, 104

They all arose and attacked him simultaneously.

COMMENTARY

BOOK 3

Maurenbrecher (3. 1–16M) put the operations of M. Antonius in the period 74–72 BC into a single context under the heading 'The pirate and the Cretan war waged by Antonius'. This arrangement was based on his assumption that Sallust dealt in a single combined context with 'minor matters' which covered more than one year. A consequence of my rejection (Introd. pp. 13–14) of Maurenbrecher's views on the structure of the *Histories* is that my ordering of the fragments of Book 3 differs markedly from his. I present the material of this book in the following sequence: frr. 1–7 deal with M. Antonius' extraordinary command against the pirates in 74 and the subsequent operations in Ligurian and Spanish waters as part of the plan to clear the western seas; frr. 8–29 are what remains of Sallust's narrative of the first phase of the Third Mithridatic War (74–73 BC); frr. 30–3 refer to the Sertorian war during 74; fr. 34 presents the speech of C. Licinius Macer, a tribune of 73; frr. 35–42 deal with the 73 BC campaign of the Mithridatic War; frr. 43–59 are part of an excursus on the Black Sea (*Pontus Euxinus*) region; frr. 60–7 deal with the escape of the gladiators under Spartacus and other leaders in 73; frr. 68–76 provide part of an excursus on the topography of Crete followed by a meagre description of the second phase of Antonius' command against the pirates (73–72 BC); frr. 77–85 are concerned with the final phase of the Sertorian War (73–72 BC); frr. 86–90 are part of a treatment of the campaign waged by L. Gellius Publiocola and Cn. Lentulus Clodianus against the fugitive armies under Spartacus and Crixus (72 BC); frr. 91–2 are what remains of a description of the activity of C. Scribonius Curio, governor of Macedonia in 73–72 BC; frr. 93–100 are fragments *incertae sedis* ('of uncertain placement') of Book 3.

That Book 3 begins with a change of war-theatre

(Introd. p. 14) emerges clearly from the content of frr. 6 and 7 which represent the continuation of the Fleury MS from the end of Book 2 and deal with the operations of M. Antonius against the pirates.

3. 1–4. (74 BC) The successful operations of P. Servilius Vatia (Isauricus) on the northern side of Taurus (Comm. 2. 63–9) marked the completion of necessary preliminaries for a combined land and sea attack against Cilicia Tracheia, headquarters of the pirates. The year 74, therefore, saw the creation of a new command, the *imperium infinitum* conferred on M. Antonius for three years, with orders to clear the Mediterranean coast of pirates. The land operations, however, were delayed by the death of Servilius' successor, Octavius (see Comm. on 3. 8) and then postponed indefinitely because of the outbreak of the Third Mithridatic War.

The amount of writing space involved in the loss of one or possibly two folios between the end of Book 2 and the beginning of Book 3 (Introd. pp. 10–11) suggests that Sallust could have dealt at some length with preliminary material connected with the appointment of Antonius. This will undoubtedly have included reference to the dubious circumstances surrounding the appointment: it is reported that Antonius owed his command to the influence of the consul M. Aurelius Cotta and the faction in the senate led by the political manipulator Cethegus (see on 1. 67. 20; cf. Ps.-Asc. 259 St.). He also provided a portrait of M. Antonius sharply critical of the praetor of 74, and apparently (fr. 4) dealt with the circumstances which made imperative a systematic operation against the pirates.

The appointment of Antonius held significance for Sallust in other important ways. In every respect it anticipated the command conferred on Pompeius seven years later by the Gabinian law of 67 BC, in spite of the opposition of the senate. It therefore marked a crucial stage in what Sallust perceived as an inexorable progress towards the collapse of the republican system. Secondly, the praetor of 74 was the son of M. Antonius the orator, who had

commanded against the Cilicians in 102 BC (see on note 2. 69. D, **much experience of Roman strength**) and, more pertinently, the father of Marcus Antonius the triumvir about whom Sallust appears to have had misgivings (Introd. pp. 18–19). My suspicion, therefore, that the acerbity of his treatment of the father was in part induced by his dislike of the rule of the Second Triumvirate is not totally without foundation.

3. 1. during the recent subjugation . . . Pisidians. The successful campaign of Servilius against leading haunts of pirates in Isauria and Pisidia had made it possible to tackle the pirate problem systematically by land and sea. This development, presumably, was part of the justification for the extraordinary command conferred on Antonius.

3. 2.* more of a criminal. Maurenbrecher suggested ⟨*nocent*⟩*ior piratis* ('more harmful than the pirates') for *contrarius* of codices *PS*; Wessner printed *peior piratis* ('worse than the pirates'), the version of codex *W*. My translation covers both possibilities.

A shortage of ships (see note on 2. 44. 7, **the fleet . . . is much smaller**), worsened by the need to employ part of the existing Roman fleet against Mithridates, meant that Antonius had to see to the procuring and manning of ships from among the provincials. This was an exercise which provided opportunity for extortion which Antonius and his officers—apparently worse than he (Ps.-Asc. 202 St.)—are reported to have exploited. Ps.-Asc. 259 St. reports that Antonius plundered Sicily and all the provinces; Dio. 36. 23 observes that the allies suffered more at the hands of the Roman generals sent against the pirates than from the pirates themselves.

guardian of the sea-coasts within Roman rule. Velleius Paterculus (2. 31. 3–4) draws an explicit parallel between Antonius' command and that conferred on Pompeius by the *lex Gabinia* (see introductory note to 5. 15–20); his statement that Antonius was, like Pompeius, granted *imperium aequum* (power equal with that of the proconsular governors of the Roman provinces in the region)

seems to fit in with Cic. *Div. Caec.* 55 which refers to *praefectus Antonii quidam* ('one of Antonius' commanders'). However, Cicero's use of the term *imperium infinitum* ('unlimited power') as in 2 *Verr.* 2. 8 and 3. 213 is a rhetorical exaggeration.

3. 3. born to squander . . . indifferent to worries. Ps.-Asc. on Cic. 2 *Verr.* 1. 60 (239 St.) describes Antonius as *dissolutissimus largitor* ('a most corrupt spendthrift'); an inscription from Gytheion (*SIG*^{3} 748) makes reference to the hardships that beset the town 'when Antonius was present'.

3. 4.* (those) . . . caused even more trouble. The whole fragment is seriously corrupt. I have translated the version which results from conjectures by Maurenbrecher. Gerlach, Kritz, and Dietsch put the fragment among those of uncertain reference. De Brosses suggested a reference to the Fimbrian legions (see note on 2. 90, **As a result of the Fimbrian revolt**) who caused distress in the province of Asia. Maurenbrecher, however, drew attention to a general statement in Dio, 36. 23. 1–3 concerning the slackness of the Roman response to the growing pirate menace. This fragment repeats in summary version a part of Dio's statement: 'they (the Romans) paid no attention to it at the proper time. Instead, they would send out fleets and generals only as they were stirred by individual reports, but accomplished nothing; on the contrary, they caused their allies all the greater distress by these very means.' I take the fragment to be part of a Sallustian treatment of the circumstances which gave rise to a demand for a more organized handling of the pirate threat.

3. 5–7. The content of these fragments suggests a fairly detailed treatment of operations in Ligurian and Spanish waters, probably part of a plan to clear the western seas. But the meagre extant evidence concerning Antonius' triennium of command gives little indication of an organized strategic plan such as characterized the operations of Pompeius in 67. Most of this evidence consists of brief statements on the nature of the command, the corruption

alleged to have marked Antonius' treatment of allies and provincials, his death shortly after his failure to take Crete. For a picture of the activity between the operations in Spanish waters and the campaign against Crete we have to make deductions from statements such as that of Cicero (2 *Verr.* 3. 213): 'Antonius while doing much and planning to do more to ruin our allies and damage our provinces, in the midst of his career of greed and injustice died suddenly.' The activities of Antonius and his admirals in Sicily (Cic. *Div. Caec.* 55; 2 *Verr.* 3. 213–16) and in Greece (*SIG*^{3} 748) were connected with preparations for his operations against Crete.

The criticisms directed against Antonius' conduct in the provinces, the implication of incompetence and corruption in command should be weighed in the light of the circumstances under which he was forced to exercise his *imperium*. His command was conferred by a senate which was sharply divided on the matter. The official resources available to him were inadequate and this led to his placing added burdens on the provinces. The antipathy from the outset among conservative elements in the senate to commands equipped with extraordinary powers could have involved a lack of willingness if not downright refusal to give the commander the support which success for his commission demanded. The bias discernible in senatorial historiography on this topic may also have arisen from this factor. Comparison with the remarkable success of Pompeius is unfair (E. Maróti, *A. Ant. Hung.* 19 (1971), 259–72). Pompeius derived his *imperium* from a *plebiscitum*, a resolution of the plebs in the *concilium plebis* which had the force of a law. His victory was the result of military forces and resources on a scale such as had never been available to Antonius. See the introductory note to 5. 15–20.

3. 5.* Antonius . . . burst forth from the city. Maurenbrecher applied this to Antonius' departure from Rome during 74 after he had taken up his command. A. La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 41) pointed out that the Latin verb *erupit* carries the connotation of a military-type sortie and is not used of a normal departure; in addition the

word *urbs* need not mean Rome, but can apply to any city which figured in the context, just as *urbs* is used for Isaura Nova in 2. 96C. La Penna suggested reference to some episode in the campaign of Antonius.

3. 6–7. These two fragments (= 3. 5 and 6M) together with frr. 2. 40 and 41 (= 42 and 43M), 2. 69 (= 87M), 2. 75 and 76 (= 92 and 93M), 3. 64 and 66 (= 96 and 98M) have been preserved in the Fleury MS, on which see Introd. pp. 6–7. They are also present among the selected fragments from the *Histories* in L. D. Reynolds' edition of the works of Sallust (Oxford 1992). Mr Reynolds kindly discussed with me, to my benefit, the content of my frr. 2. 40 and 41 before the publication of his edition. His text of these fragments in Book 2 and the above two fragments of Book 3 is close to that provided by Maurenbrecher. Unlike Maurenbrecher, however, Reynolds does not attempt to provide conjectures for the lacunose opening and ending lines of these fragments. There are differences in the body of the text in some instances; I hope I have detected those which have a bearing on the interpretation of the passage in question. In the case of the extremely lacunose fragments which I have identified as Vatican Fragment 1 and 2 respectively (= 3.96 and 98M), Reynolds provides versions far more conservative than those of Maurenbrecher; this aspect I discuss ad loc.

3. 6. Antonius was having difficulty. The immediate problems facing the senate were the removal of the threat to Rome's supply-lines, especially the traffic of food supplies from Sicily (see Comm. on 2. 44. 6–8), the need to respond adequately to the complaints aired in Pompeius' letter (2. 82), and the provision of the help which had been promised (2. 82. D). Hence Antonius' first operations were around the coastline adjacent to Italy; the Cilician pirates had a base in Dianium on the Spanish coast (Comm. 1. 114) and together with Sertorius had control of the northern part of the east coast of Spain, the major city of which, Valentia, stayed loyal to Sertorius to the very end (Flor. 2. 10. 9).

in preventing the Ligurian forces. The fragment deals with a raid by Antonius on the coast of Narbonensis inhabited by Ligurians, a tribe obviously acting in concert with the pirates. During Pompeius' march from Italy in 77 he had clashed with Narbonese tribes (see Comm. on 2. 22) and even in 74 M. Fonteius, governor of Gallia Narbonensis, had to deal with insurgent activity (Cic. *Font.* 12, 26, 49).

the narrowness of the entrance. Antonius was in the course of attempting to storm a Ligurian stronghold on the coast.

Mamercus . . . in the summer calm. The other component of an amphibious operation. It appears that Antonius did not begin operations until the second half of 74 BC. Broughton (*MRR* 2. 105) lists two men named Mamercus, neither of whom is mentioned in *RE*, under legates/lieutenants of 74. The second named served under Lucullus in Asia (Oros. 6. 2. 16–18). One of them, in Broughton's opinion, may possibly be identified with Mam. Aemilius Lepidus, *cos.* 77 (ibid. 109 n. 7).

When, on the summons of the Terentuni . . . had withdrawn into the Alps. A translation from Maurenbrecher's text. Reynolds has not attempted to repair this lacunose segment of the fragment. Maurenbrecher's use of a comma after *Alpis* has the effect of connecting 'the summons of the Terentuni' with the holding of a debate. The initiative of these people has to do with the Ligurian withdrawal; see A. Schulten, *Hermes* 60 (1925), 69 n. 2.

to hasten their voyage towards Spain. The chief arena of pirate activity in this region. The objective, presumably, was the setting up of the secure bases from which to safeguard the transports from Italy.

Since it seemed a good idea . . . they reached the territory of the Aresinarii. My translation here is based on Reynolds' punctuation of the Latin text at this point. Since Antonius was moving towards Spain, the identification by Schulten (ibid.) of the Aresinarii with the Airenosii, named by Polybius (3. 35. 2) as living between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, strongly recommends itself.

From his discussion of fr. 7 Schulten would place the Aresinarii in the vicinity of the Gulf of Rosas, the site of the island city which dominates the context of the next fragment.

after four days. a translation of Reynolds' *post qua⟨drid-uom⟩*; Maurenbrecher has *postquam vero* ('After') based on Hauler's conjecture of *postquam* to which he added *vero* to fill up the space in the MS.

3. 7. I present the text which includes the conjectures made by Hauler and Maurenbrecher; Reynolds' text omits these additions. It describes an amphibious operation involving the landing of a land-army near the river Dilunus, the sending in advance of his lieutenant Manius (who receives no other mention in history) with cavalry and part of the fleet to an island town the name of which is missing from the manuscript, in the hope of recapturing it by a surprise attack. The chief interpretation problems of the fragment are the restoration of the missing town name and the identification of the river called Dilunus.

his lieutenant Manius. Hauler suggested either *Manio legato* or *Afranio legato*. Maurenbrecher chose Manius about whom nothing else is known; Reynolds chose Afranius. An L. Afranius is attested as serving as *legatus* under Pompieus in Spain in 75 and 72 and it is very probable that he was on Pompeius' staff in the years 74–73.

the island town of [Emporiae]. Maurenbrecher did not venture a conjecture concerning the name of the town or the modern identity of the Dilunus. Schulten (*Hermes* 60 (1925), 66–73) has presented a clearly argued and convincing case for his view that the island town was Emporiae on the site of the modern landlocked island S. Martin de Ampurias on the southern shore of the Gulf of Rosas, and that the Dilunus is the modern Muga.

From the outset Massilia, from which Emporion was established as a trading post around 500 BC, was in league with Rome. From 218 BC Emporion, which because of its Graeco-Roman character took on the name Emporiae, was the most important base for the Roman conquest of the Iberian peninsula. Thus in 218 Cn. Cornelius Scipio

(Calvus) was sent to Spain to prevent reinforcements reaching Hannibal in Italy. He landed at Emporiae and used the strategy of advancing southwards along the coast, winning adequate bases and command of the sea (Polyb. 3. 76. 4; Liv. 21. 60. 1–2). In 195 as consul, Marcus Porcius Cato (Censorius) landed at Emporiae and undertook extensive campaigns; he settled the administration and initiated the development of Roman rule (Liv. 34. 8–9).

Schulten based his case for Emporiae primarily on a comparison between the topographical details provided in the final sentence of Sallust's fragment and a thorough archaeological survey of the site at S. Martin de Ampurias. He used the same data to dismiss E. Hauler's contention (*WS* 44 (1924–5), 188–210; see Introd. p. 7) that the missing name was Deanium, a variant of Dianium, the modern Denia (*Hermes* 63 (1928), 366–8).

The description of the Dilunus indicates a wide and deep river, fast-flowing even in the summer months. The fact that Antonius sent an advance party to Emporiae suggests that the river Dilunus was some distance from the island city. Of the three rivers which flow between the Pyrenees and the Ebro, Schulten decided that the Muga, as by far the largest and the first river which had to be crossed by anyone advancing from the north, is to be identified with the Dilunus of Sallust's narrative.

3. 8–29. Deal with the first phase of the Third Mithridatic War (74/73 BC). Maurenbrecher allotted twenty-six fragments to this section (frr. 17–42M). I have transferred three of his fragments (18*, 22*, 41*) to the final section of this volume, Fragments of Uncertain Reference, and relocated three others (25, 27, 32M) among fragments of uncertain placement (*incertae sedis*) of Book 3. See the Commentary ad loc. in each case. I have added two fragments to this segment, namely 26* and 27* (= 3. 78 and 1. 43M respectively).

Cotta's defeat at the hands of Mithridates, whom he was supposed to hold in check in Bithynia, led to a situation in which the crucial operation of this opening campaign was the siege of Cyzicus. Given the pressure which

Lucullus was able to exert and the determined resistance put up by the besieged, the operation at Cyzicus lasted through the winter and into the early months of 73.

3. 8. already wickedly practised . . . disputation. Kritz referred this general description to a turbulent tribune or a trained agitator, but did not specify any individual. Dietsch applied it to L. Licinius Macer, a tribune of 73 (see the introductory note to 3. 34); Maurenbrecher, on the strength of Cicero's description of L. Quinctius (*Clu.* 77 and 79) applied it to this tribune of 74 who did agitate for the restoration of tribunician powers. Plutarch, however, reports that discussion of differences between the consul Lucullus and the tribune Quinctius was marked by restraint on both sides (*Luc.* 5. 5).

I believe the argumentation implied in this fragment is concerned with the appointment of a commander to oppose Mithridates. Lucullus, who desired the command, strove to eliminate competition from Pompeius by endeavouring to deal quickly and satisfactorily with the latter's demands concerning the Spanish campaign (Comm. 2. 82. D). But constitutional and other problems remained. Lucullus had been allotted Cisalpine Gaul as his province, an appointment that would deprive him of his chance for glory. When Octavius, governor of Cilicia, died early in 74 (Plut. *Luc.* 6. 1) Lucullus realized the opportunity it presented. Because of the hostility of the power-broker Cethegus (see introductory note to 3. 1–4), 'the man who at that time controlled the course of political affairs by virtue of doing and saying everything to court the favour of the people' (Plut. *Luc.* 5. 4), and obviously the man referred to here by Sallust, Lucullus resorted to intrigue. He persuaded Praecia, mistress of Cethegus, to use her influence over her lover to secure for him the province of Cilicia. That achieved, he had little trouble in gaining his major objective. The wide experience and favourable reputation he had acquired during his service in the East under Sulla (86–85 BC) and L. Licinius Murena (84–81) made him the obvious, indeed the only choice for the command against Mithridates.

3. 9.* the army to return to the traditional Roman way . . . Transmitted without book-number and relegated to fragments of uncertain reference by editors before Maurenbrecher, a decision approved by La Penna. Nevertheless I agree with Maurenbrecher's application of it to Lucullus' attitude to the army he took over for the campaign against Mithridates. Plutarch provides the probable context: 'Lucullus crossed into Asia and there assumed command of the rest of the Roman forces. All these had long been spoiled by habits of luxury and greed, and the Fimbrians, as they were called, had become unmanageable, through long lack of discipline. . . . They were self-willed and lawless, but good fighters, hardy and experienced in war. However, in a short time Lucullus pruned off their insolent boldness, and reformed the rest' (*Luc.* 7. 1–3). For the Fimbrians see note on 2. 90, **as a result of the Fimbrian revolt**; cf. *Iug.* 55. 1.

3. 10. equipped . . . splendid weaponry. Plutarch, very probably drawing on Sallust, says that Mithridates in earlier encounters opposed the Romans with forces which were magnificently equipped for parade purposes but ineffective as a fighting force. Having learnt his lesson, on this occasion 'he provided no more armour inlaid with gold and set with precious stones, for he saw that these made rich booty for the victors, but gave no strength whatever to their wearers; instead, he had swords forged in the Roman fashion and heavy shields welded; he collected horses that were well trained rather than richly caparisoned, and 120,000 infantry drilled in the phalanx formation, and 16,000 horsemen, not counting the scythed, four-horse chariots, which were 100 in number.' (*Luc.* 7. 5).

3. 11.* Both Livy and Sallust. In addition to Servius, the scholiast on Statius, *Theb.* 10. 544 mentions Sallust's description of this type of weaponry. In what remains of Livy's work I can find only two references to scythed chariots (*falcatae quadrigae*)—37. 40. 12 and 37. 41. 5.

scythed chariots. *Currus falcati*, used in warfare by both eastern and western peoples (Lucr. 3. 642–56; *BAlex.* 75.

2; Val. Fl. 6. 105). Descriptions of such chariots, differing in points of detail, occur in Xen. *An.* 1. 8. 10; Liv. 37. 41. 6–7; Curtius, 4. 9. 5; Vegetius, 3. 24. Scythe-blades were affixed to the sides of chariots at right angles to the axles, or fixed pointing to the ground, under chariot bodies, or inserted, parallel to the axles, into the felloes of the wheels so that, when the chariot was in motion, the blades revolved at a speed much greater than that of the chariot. The scythed chariot used by the Celtic tribes in Gaul and Britain was called *covinnus* (Mela 3. 52: Luc. 1. 426; Silius, *Pun.* 17. 417).

3. 12–13. The Roman plan for the opening campaign of the war was that Cotta should hold Mithridates in check in Bithynia, and with the help of a fleet collected from allies, close the Bosphorus against Mithridates' navy. Lucullus was to add the veteran legions of Servilius in Cilicia and the Fimbrian legions in Asia to the fresh legion he had brought with him and advance through Phrygia against Mithridates' flank. Delayed by problems in Asia, Lucullus had only reached the river Sangarius when news reached him that Cotta, who had been foolish enough to offer battle to Mithridates' main force and had suffered total defeat, had been forced to fall back on Chalcedon (Liv. *Per.* 93; Plut. *Luc.* 8. 1–2; App. Mith. 71; Memnon, 37–9; Eutrop. 6. 6. 2S). Fragments 12 and 13 deal with Cotta's misadventures.

3. 12. ran towards the gates . . . in a disorganized way. A fragment transmitted with corrupted text and a disputed book-number. The version I have translated is that of Dietsch and Maurenbrecher who accepted the strong manuscript support for *inconditi* and Gerlach's correction of *temnere*, *tempnere* of the codices to *tendere*, thus producing *inconditi tendere*, meaning 'and advanced in a disorganized way'. The book-number is more contentious: the codices report book II or V or VI and the vulgate suggested *in Iugurthino*. Given these factors, editors have in general favoured relegation to Fragments of Uncertain Reference. On grounds of content and a passage in Appian (*Mith.* 71) I follow Maurenbrecher in opting for a

reference to Cotta's army in the neighbourhood of Chalcedon.

3. 13. stripped of all dignity . . . struck on the back. Appian gives the gist of Sallust's description of the panic among Cotta's troops: 'He (Cotta) . . . fled to the gates of Chalcedon over many walls which obstructed his movement. There was a struggle at the gates among those trying to gain entrance simultaneously, for which reason no missile cast by the pursuers missed its mark' (*Mith.* 71).

He goes on to report that the enemy destroyed four Roman ships and captured sixty. The Roman loss was about 3,000; the rest with Cotta took refuge inside the fortress Chalcedon, which was to hold out until Mithridates was forced to raise the siege.

3. 14–23. Deal with details of the siege operation at Cyzicus. Mithridates persisted with his plan to complete the conquest of the Propontis and enter the province of Asia from the north. He dispatched a force under the Sertorian general Marius to keep an eye on Lucullus who was advancing from the Sangarius. The armies came into contact at Otryae, near Lake Ascania (Plut. *Luc.* 8. 6; Strabo, 12. 4. 7). Marius offered battle but the impending conflict was broken off by the appearance of a thunderbolt and Marius was forced through lack of provisions to retire. In the meantime Mithridates was hastening towards Cyzicus, the capture of which, in his view, would open the way into Asia (Cic. *Mur.* 33). Evading Lucullus' army, Mithridates arrived first before Cyzicus and occupied the high ground which faces the city across the narrow strait separating it from the mainland.

Mithridates' mistake of allowing Lucullus to take up a position which controlled all supply-routes by land meant that only the early capitulation of Cyzicus could save his army from disaster; his situation would become acute if the siege lasted into the winter when he would also be cut off from sea-borne supplies.

Lucullus quickly grasped the significance of the position he had been allowed to occupy; his letters to the people inside Cyzicus probably stressed that the success of the

Roman strategy depended upon their stout resistance against the investing army; it would allow the Roman blockade to exert its influence on the physical hardships and the morale of the enemy.

3. 14. he moved towards Cyzicus. All editors except Maurenbrecher assumed that this referred to Lucullus' pursuit of Mithridates. Pointing to the clear indication of Mithridates as the subject in Memnon 40, Maurenbrecher rightly applied it to the king who had been emboldened by his victory over Cotta which had also cost Cyzicus heavy losses in men and ships (Plut. *Luc.* 9. 1).

Cyzicus. A city situated on Arctonnesus, an island roughly triangular in shape with the apex towards the mainland. At the time of the siege the island was separated from the mainland by a narrow strait spanned by a single causeway. (Frontin. *Str.* 3. 13. 6). The city itself lay at the apex of the triangle largely on low land facing the shore. Mithridates transferred the bulk of his forces to the island and settled his troops in camps around the town (Plut. *Luc.* 9. 4).

3. 15. the two camps were positioned close to each other. Lucullus, arriving after Mithridates, took up position near a village called Thracia, in a spot best suited to command the roads and regions from which the Pontic army must receive its supplies. Lucullus' opportunity to occupy so favourable a position was due to a combination of treachery on the part of the renegade Magius (2. 90 n. **there were present at the court**) and Mithridates' overconfidence. By supplying plausible but fictitious detail concerning the morale of Lucullus' army, Magius persuaded the king that victory could be attained without bloodshed. Accordingly, 'Mithridates allowed the Romans to go through the pass unmolested and to fortify the great hill on his front, the possession of which would enable them to draw supplies themselves from their rear with security, while Mithridates would be cut off by a lake, by mountains, and by rivers from all provisions on the landward side . . . he would no longer be able to overcome Lucullus on account of the

impregnability of his position, which he had overlooked when he himself was in possession of the ground' (App. *Mith.* 72).

3. 16.* a victory without shedding the blood of their soldiers. It appears that Sallust, when dealing with the nature of the positions taken up by the opposed commanders, commented on Lucullus' choice in terms of the eventual outcome of the confrontation at Cyzicus. This is summarily described by Orosius: '[at Cyzicus] Lucullus both witnessed the disaster of his opponent's army and achieved a new kind of victory, one which involved no loss of life among his own troops' (6. 2. 20). Lucullus had in fact immediately perceived the advantages of his position and had promised his troops a victory without bloodshed (Plut. *Luc.* 9. 3; cf. App. *Mith.* 72).

3. 17. whence a bridge is extended in the direction of the town. Kritz at first agreed with Gerlach that this referred to the bridge projected from a tower erected on two quinqueremes against the walls of the besieged city (cf. App. *Mith.* 73). He later changed his mind and joined other editors in assuming that it was part of Sallust's description of the site of Cyzicus (Comm. 3. 14). Strabo (12. 8. 11) speaks of two bridges; the second bridge was either added at a later date or was not linked with the town. Dietsch felt that *unde* ('whence') indicated the place occupied by Mithridates whence from a narrow approach a bridge, wider and easier to cross, stretched towards the town.

3. 18. the din of Bacchanalian festivities. In the vicinity of Cyzicus stood Dindymus (Strabo, ibid.; App. *Mith.* 75), a mountain sacred to Cybele (see note on 2. 6. 9. D **the Great Mother**) whose cult under her local name Dindymene was very strong in Phrygia (Catull. 63. 13 and 91; Hor. *Carm.* 1. 16. 5; Mart. 8. 81. 1). Her worship was marked by ecstatic states of rapture and insensibility to pain (Catull. 63) hence the generic term 'Bacchanalian' which in its precise usage refers to frenetic celebrations in honour of the wine god Bacchus (Dionysus).

3. 19. The marauders of the Valerian legions . . . by means of a scorpion. Attempts to explain this deceptively

simple statement have produced conflicting scenarios. According to de Brosses and Gerlach it concerned a letter by Magius to Lucullus revealing his change of allegiance from Mithridates; the seized letter was projected by artillery into the Roman camp. Maurenbrecher had a more complicated interpretation: since Mithridates had already been led to believe that Valerian elements in Lucullus' army were ready to defect to him, the king was sending a written report of this development to Romans whose loyalty was suspect; the intercepted letter was projected back into the royal camp by Valerians who had no intention of defecting and wished to confuse the king's planning. Dietsch's reconstruction recommends itself as uncomplicated and convincing: the intercepted letter was written by Mithridates to allies, seeking help and supplies. It was thrown back to depress the king with the realization that the relief he looked for would not be forthcoming.

Valerian legions. See note on 2. 90 **as a result of the Fimbrian revolt** for the identity of this segment of Lucullus' army.

scorpion. A piece of light artillery used for projecting arrows and the like. On the Roman penchant for calling various types of weaponry by animal names see Comm. on 2. 106.

3. 20. the ships unsteady . . . weight of the towers. App. *Mith.* 73–4 deals with the variety of ways by which Mithridates pushed the siege of Cyzicus and the tactics used by Cyzicenes to thwart these attempts. In addition to a siege tower one hundred cubits high which supported a smaller tower used for projecting missiles, another tower was erected on two quinqueremes joined together from which a bridge could be projected against the walls of the town. The Cyzicenes reacted to this engine of war by pouring burning pitch on to the ships supporting it.

3. 21. they threw on grappling irons . . . taking a grip. One of several devices used by the defenders to protect their walls against the king's siege-engines. Appian provides detail concerning other measures: 'They knocked off the heads of the rams with stones, or broke them off with

the aid of nooses, or deadened their blows with baskets of wool. They extinguished the enemy's fire—bearing missiles with water and vinegar, and broke the force of others by means of garments or linen cloths held loosely in front. In short, they left nothing untried that was within the compass of human energy' (*Mith.* 74).

3. 22. Huge boulders and wheels . . . of a (military) hedgehog. Dietsch rejected Kritz's allocation of this measure to the siege of Cyzicus and applied it to Calagurris in Celtiberia (see introductory note to 3. 30–3). Maurenbrecher pointed out that Calagurris was surrounded but not attacked. This fragment indicates an attack in mountainous terrain; on the basis of the fact that part of Cyzicus was on high ground (Strabo, 12. 8. 11), Maurenbrecher agreed with Kritz that it describes measures used by the besieged of Cyzicus defending the higher part of the town.

hedgehog. The Latin word *ericius* ('hedgehog') was used also for a military engine full of sharp spikes. It was placed according to Caesar (*BCiv* 3. 67. 5), by the gates of the camp to prevent the approach of an enemy. See on **scorpion** (3. 19).

3. 23. inflated skins . . . between the mole and the island. The ingenuity displayed in this story attracted the attention of several sources; these added extra details of significance. Frontinus (*Str.* 3. 13. 6), Florus (1. 40. 16), and Orosius (6. 2. 4) note that the occasion was when Lucullus wished to inform the besieged Romans and citizens of Cyzicus of his approach and his plan to have the siege raised. Frontinus adds the detail that Lucullus had sewn up some letters inside the skins; Orosius noted that the soldier selected for the task covered a distance of seven miles.

3. 24*–7.* There is evidence that Mithridates' army was forced to conduct the siege under conditions so extreme that their enterprise did not have any chance of success (App. *Mith.* 76; Strabo, 12. 8. 11; Plut. *Luc.* 11. 1–1; Flor. 1. 40. 17; Oros. 6. 2. 19; *Schol. Gronov.* 318 St.). A series of factors—the failure of their siege tactics; the ever-

increasing scarcity of food because of Lucullus' blockade; the effects of cramped living conditions, extremes of weather, unburied corpses—led to enormous loss of life through starvation, disease, and plague.

3. 24.* serious illnesses . . . unusual fare. The effect of the blocking of overland supplies by Lucullus. Shortage of food became acute when the approach of winter affected the sea-borne supplies as well. The eating of strange plants, animal entrails, and, eventually, human corpses led to disease and a spread of infection (App. *Mith.* 76; Plut. *Luc.* 11. 1–2; *Schol. Gronov.* 318 St.)

3. 25.* Virgil. Devoted nearly 100 lines of his third *Georgic* (*G.* 3. 474–566) to a description of an animal plague. It is abundantly evident that he got the idea and much of the detail from Lucretius.

Lucretius. Devoted nearly 150 lines of his *De Rerum Natura* (6. 1138–286) to a description of the human plague in Athens (430 BC), based on Thucydides and Theophrastus. It is likely that Sallust devoted a detailed narrative to the plague at Cyzicus, strongly influenced, no doubt, by the powerful scenes depicted by Thucydides (2. 48–52) and by Lucretius.

first the air. It was supposed that poison was in the air, which is then spoken of as itself being diseased or infected. In a passage (1090–102) in which he explains the cause of diseases, Lucretius talks of noxious weeds which collect together and corrupt the air, either from above by means of clouds and mists or from below by being infected by the diseased earth. Virgil accepts the sky as being infected: 'On this land from the sickened sky there comes a piteous season' (*G.* 3. 487–8); in *Aen.* 3. 138 he speaks of *corrupto caeli tractu* ('from a tainted quarter of the sky') and in *Ecl.* 7. 57 has *vitio aeris* ('by the taint of the air').

3. 26.* because it juts out . . . air which is less infected . . . Maurenbrecher (3. 78*M) was the first editor to include this fragment. The Latin version: *quia prominens minus gravescit quam cetera* can be legitimately interpreted in more than one way. Maurenbrecher, apparently interpreting it as:

'because it juts out it suffers the effect of the north winds less than other localities of the region', i.e. a promontory or peninsula which juts out from the mainland in a southerly direction in such a way that the mainland itself shelters it from the north winds. He therefore made the fragment part of the excursus of the topography of the Black Sea region, deeming it to refer most aptly to the Tauric Chersonnese (the Crimea).

Maurenbrecher, however, as La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 43) noted, failed to take into account the context of Lucan being commented upon by the scholiast. After describing the pestilence which broke out in Pompeius' camp at Durazzo, Lucan concludes with the passage: 'Nevertheless these calamities were lessened by the sea at their backs and the air set in motion by the north wind, by the shore and the ships laden with foreign corn' (6. 103–5). After having cited Sallust in connection with this passage, the scholiast adds: 'therefore the sea close by and the blowing of the north wind mitigated the diseases to some extent.'

Allocation of the fragment as I have translated it to a part of the peninsula of Cyzicus exposed to the north winds and hence less subjected to the effects of the pestilence at Cyzicus seems more appropriate.

3. 27.* the normal kind of death. I have used this translation to embrace a number of interpretations that can be applied to the Latin phrase *simplici morte*. The basic meaning of *simplex* is 'single', 'not accompanied by anything else'—thus *simplex an iuncta* (Cato *Agr.* 77: Cic. *Inv.* 1. 17). In a legal or quasi-legal sense *simplex mors* was established as meaning a death not accompanied by torture used as an instrument of judicial inquiry or punishment (e.g. Seneca, *Ep.* 70. 11; Suet. *Iul.* 74. 1). Using this interpretation, Maurenbrecher applied the fragment (as 1. 43*M) to the murder of Sulla's opponents in 82 BC. He justified this placement with Orosius' use of Virgil's phrase *nec via mortis erat simplex* (*G.* 3. 482) when describing the execution of M. Marius Gratidianus in 82 (Comm. 1. 36). Maurenbrecher, however, overlooked the similarity of phrasing and the likelihood that Orosius, like

Virgil, was thinking about deaths caused by plague, that is, by more than one means.

Servius interpreted Virgil's *via mortis simplex* as meaning a death marked not just by the normal phenomenon of 'breathing one's last', but as accompanied by a wasting of the body through a variety of causes. Conington on *G.* 3. 482 interprets: 'nor was the way to death uniform', i.e. the progress of the disease was marked by opposite symptoms succeeding each other. The combination of these latter interpretations seems to support the allocation of the fragment to the plague of Cyzicus.

3. 28–9.* By winter the rapidly deteriorating state of his army finally became plain to Mithridates who had been kept in ignorance of the famine in the camp throughout the autumn months. Eventually he consented to a gradual raising of the siege and secretly sent almost all his cavalry together with the baggage animals and disabled infantry soldiers back to Bithynia. Lucullus overtook and decimated this retreating force on the river Rhyndacus (Plut. *Luc.* 11. 3–5; App. *Mith.* 76). Plutarch reports that 6,000 horses and 15,000 men were captured in addition to an untold number of beasts of burden. All these followed in the train of Lucullus as he marched back past the camp of the enemy.

3. 28. relying on the support of their weapons to keep upright. On learning of the secret withdrawal towards Bithynia of part of Mithridates' force, Lucullus took ten cohorts of infantry and his cavalry and set out to prevent their escape. The pursuit was seriously hampered by snow storms; the extreme cold so affected the troops that many had to be left behind (Plut. *Luc.* 11. 4).

3. 29.* that camels were then seen by the Romans for the first time. Plutarch follows up this remark with the comment: 'He must have thought that the soldiers of Scipio who conquered Antiochus before this (a reference to the battle of Magnesia 190/89 BC) and those who had lately fought Archelaus at Orchomenos and Chaeronea (engagements fought by Sulla in 86 against two Mithridatic armies commanded by Archelaus) were unacquainted with the camel.'

The camel of the Graeco-Roman and Iranian worlds, was the dromedary, the one-humped Arabian species. The two-humped Bactrian camel belonged to India, China, and central Asia. Antiochus III had a camel corps as had the Romans and the Parthians later. The camels were dromedaries and quite familiar to the Romans. The note of surprise in Plutarch's statement can perhaps be explained by Ammianus Marcellinus' comment on camels (23. 56). Speaking of the people of Bactria, Marcellinus remarked that the herds which graze on their plains and mountains are thickset, with strong limbs, as appears from the camels brought from there by Mithridates and 'seen for the first time by the Romans at the siege of Cyzicus'. These camels may have been the two-humped Bactrian type or simply sturdier and shaggier animals than the normal dromedary.

3. 30–3. Deal with the Sertorian War during 74 BC. At the beginning of that year the Roman armies in Spain had, in response to Pompeius' ultimatum (Comm. 2. 82. D), been assisted with money and reinforced with two fresh legions. The developments brought about changes in the conduct and the progress of the war.

Since Sertorius' combination with the pirates guaranteed control of the east coast and made a Roman victory in the plain of Valentia highly improbable, the Roman generals adopted a new strategy—a continuous attack on the highlands of Celtiberia which involved a series of sieges. Operating in the mountains south-west of the middle Ebro, Metellus captured towns such as Bilbilis and Secobriga, while Pompeius was occupied around the headwaters of the Douro. But Sertorius' generalship had not deteriorated: he forced Pompeius to abandon the siege of Pallantia, and at the end of the year before Calagurris, the key to the upper Ebro, he defeated the combined armies of Pompeius and Metellus. Pompeius' only recorded victory in this campaign was his capture of the town of Chauca near Pallantia (Frontin. *Str.* 2. 11. 2). Withdrawing from Calagurris, Pompeius headed for winter quarters in Gaul; Metellus went back to his province,

Further Spain (Cic. *Font.* 16; Liv. *Per.* 93; Strabo, 3. 4. 13; App. *BC* 1. 111–12).

Only four Sallustian fragments relating to the campaign of 74 have survived. None of them touches on any of the engagements mentioned in the sources noted above. Maurenbrecher also associated four fragments with this campaign (3. 43*–46M). I have transferred his 3. 45* to Fragments of Uncertain Reference and replaced it with fr. 32* which was Maurenbrecher's 2. 28*M.

3. 30.* Cale . . . captured by Perperna. Sallust is the only extant source to record activity by Perperna in this campaign. Sertorius' lieutenant went into Callaecia in the north-west of the Peninsula possibly (Schulten 129) to incite a fresh insurrection against the old enemy, Rome. He captured Cale (mod. Gaia) a suburb of Oporto on the left bank of the Douro.

3. 31.* the name Oblivion. Perperna apparently also operated north of the Douro. The river Limaea (mod. Limia) was given the name λήθη (forgetfulness) because it was believed to cause loss of memory (Strabo, 3. 3. 4; App. *Hisp.* 72; Flor. 1. 33. 12; Mela, 3. 10).

3. 32.* While Metellus was wintering . . . in Corduba. Maurenbrecher placed this fragment, as 2. 28*M, in the narrative of the Sertorian War in 76 BC. His placement was occasioned by a report, in Obsequens 59, of an earthquake in Reate in central Italy in that year. Obsequens, however, speaks only of destruction in Reate itself; it is unlikely that the earthquake was accompanied by similar upheaval as far away as Spain. The reference, therefore, could be to a different winter passed by Metellus in his province; that of 74/3 seems to be the most likely (Liv. *Per.* 93). Cf. La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 33–4.

3. 33. For in their case, besides the customary irregularities, . . . The MSS of Nonius have *namque eis* or *namque his*; Reynolds in *Hist.* 3. 46 has substituted *iis* for *eis*; Maurenbrecher chose *namque his*, but did not comment on the identity of the people referred to. I found Mercier's conjecture *namque is* ('for he'), which Lindsay put in his text of Nonius, attractive as a possible reference

to M. Fonteius who figures in the following note, **among corrupt administrators.** The MS reading, however, can be defended as referring to the provincials suffering hardships.

among corrupt administrators. It is known that M. Fonteius governed Transalpine Gaul, probably *pro praetore*, for three years (Cic. *Font.* 11, 16, 32). He aided Roman commanders in Spain with troops and supplies, and armies elsewhere with troops (ibid. 13, 16); he also carried on military activity in Gaul itself (ibid. 12–14, 26, 46, 49). Most or all of these measures were at the expense of the provincials. Cicero tells us that Fonteius was in command in Gaul when Pompeius wintered there with his army. Pompeius wintered there in 77/6 and 74/3, but a drawback of Cicero's account is its lack of precise dating. Maurenbrecher (227–8) placed the beginning of Fonteius' triennium of governorship in 77; Cicero's remarks on the provision of cavalry, corn, and money from Gaul to Roman wars in several parts of the world caused Broughton (*MRR* 2. 109 n. 6) to suggest that Fonteius was in command in Gaul during the winter 74/3 and in *MRR* 3. 93 to suggest 75–73 as possibly the triennium of his governorship.

throughout the province . . . the last two years. Maurenbrecher rightly referred this to Gallia Narbonensis (see on 1. 23) to which Pompeius had retired to winter quarters in 74/3. Pompeius' remarks in 2. 82. 9 and the wording of this fragment indicate great hardship in the province after crop failures over the two-year period.

3. 34. The speech which Sallust puts into the mouth of C. Licinius Macer, a tribune of 73, deals with the topic of *libertas* of the Roman people; the rights of the plebs had been seriously impaired by the *Lex Cornelia de tribunicia potestate*, and the issue of the restoration of the powers of the tribunes, the defenders of the people's freedom, figured in urban politics practically every year from 76 to 70, the year in which the consuls Pompeius and Crassus passed a law restoring the legislative powers of the tribunate.

Macer, author of a history which gave prominence to the struggle between patricians and plebeians (*HRR* 1², pp. cccIv–cccIx n.; 2. 298–312), was also an orator of some quality as Cicero, somewhat grudgingly, admits: 'he bestowed extraordinary care on the invention and arrangement of matter . . . but one would call it the fruit of experience rather than innate oratorical skill' (*Brut.* 238). Priscian (2. 532. 24; cf. fr. 5 Malcovati) refers to a collection of Macer's speeches, one of which, the *Pro Tuscis*, a defence of the interests of the Etruscan cities damaged by the quartering of Sullan veterans in their territory, was probably also delivered during his tribuneship. For a concise yet full treatment of Macer see R. M. Ogilvie, *A Commentary on Livy 1–5* (Oxford 1965), 7–12.

Both the content and the form of the speech reported by Sallust probably reflect in a significant way the oration delivered by Macer; the simplicity of its structuring into two practically equal parts (§§1–13 and 14–28), the one historical, the other exhortatory, and a content which is symmetrically arranged even down to small detail bear out Cicero's judgement on Macer's style. Sallust, who thought on similar lines and who took care to arrange his material to produce desired effects on his readers, undoubtedly contributed to the speech as we now have it.

3. 34. 1. plebeians took up arms . . . reasons for their action. See notes on 1. 10, **secessions of the plebs** and **debt.** Cf. Sall. *Cat.* 33. 3.

tribunes . . . defenders of all their rights. See note on 1. 10, **tribunes of the people.**

3. 34. 2. recovery of your liberty. The leitmotiv of this speech; as such, *libertas* is used not so much in the manner of Lepidus (1. 48. 2, 4, 6, 9, 26, 27) and of Philippus (1. 67. 3, 6, 11) where it is a slogan in the propaganda war of the opposed factions. Here, Macer, a duly appointed defender of the rights of the plebs is referring to the people's conception of liberty which involves the citizens' right of appeal to the people (*ius provocationis*) from sentences of execution, flogging, and heavy fines, and to the right of tribunes to intervene between a magistrate and a

citizen whom he sought to coerce. Democratic freedom also involved electoral, judicial, and legislative rights of the popular assemblies; the most important of these, the right of the tribunes to initiate legislation, had been removed in Sulla's constitutional reforms of 81. See P. A. Brunt, *The Fall of the Roman Republic and Related Essays* (Oxford 1988), ch. 6, esp. XI–XVI.

3. 34. 3. armed . . . empty shell of a magistracy. The first two words of Sallust's phrase *inani specie magistratus* recall Velleius Paterculus' description of the tribunate after Sulla as *imago sine re* 'shadow without substance' (2. 30. 4). Sallust's use of *magistratus* can be misleading: the tribunes were not magistrates appointed by statute, equipped with *imperium* and insignia. Their power depended on an oath of the plebeians to uphold their sacrosanctity or inviolability. Tribunes elicited resolutions (*plebiscita*) from the *concilium plebis*, the people's assembly. The recognition through the *Lex Hortensia* (*c.*286 BC) of *plebiscita* as laws with binding force on the whole people had the effect of granting acknowledgement of the powers of the tribunate. The term *magistratus* is thus used here in the meaning 'officer of the state'.

faction. As opposed to 'men acting on their own'. Sallust (*Iug.* 31. 15) describes a banding together of good men as friendship (*amicitia*) and of wicked men as a faction (*factio*); at *Iug.* 41. 6 he observes that the nobles had the more powerful organization (*factione magis pollebat*) while the strength of the commons, loose-knit and divided among many (*soluta atque dispersa in multitudine*) was less effective.

3. 34. 4. defeat in a struggle . . . better than never to have struggled. A rhetorical flourish similar in sentiment to that of Lepidus in 1. 48. 15.

3. 34. 5. all the others . . . elected to defend your rights. In §§3 and 4 Macer has stressed the dangers inherent in his lone stand against the authority of the senate. If the terms *vim cunctam et imperia sua* ('all their power and authority') are being used in a strictly legal sense, that would support Kritz's view that here 'all the others' refers

to the curule magistrates to whom the law cited by Cic. *Leg.* 3. 8 *ollis salus populi suprema lex esto* ('the safety of the people shall be their highest law') was applied.

Tribunes involved in attempts to win restoration of tribunician powers after the fall of Lepidus in 77 seem also to have acted on their own—Sicinius in 76, Quinctius in 74, Macer in 73. No mention is made of the contribution of fellow-tribunes; in fact we know the identity of only one tribune each for the years 76–73 (*MRR* ad loc.). It is possible that Macer is stating that he is *solus* (§3) in the sense that his fellow tribunes of 73 have been induced not to join him in fulfilling the *raison d'être* of their appointment.

3. 34. 6. And so they have now . . . submitted to the mastery. This summation of the history of the conflict between patricians and plebeians echoes phrases used elsewhere on this topic: thus, for 'under the pretext of carrying on a war' cf. *Cat.* 38. 3; for 'have taken over the treasury . . . provinces' cf. *Cat.* 20. 7; *Iug.* 41. 7; for 'a stronghold from the spoils' cf. *Cat.* 20. 8; *Hist.* 1. 48. 7.

3. 34. 8. Unless, perchance . . . See Comm. 1. 48. 23 for Sallust's use of expressions selected to introduce, for purpose of rejection, ideas which are impossible or absurd.

Gaius Cotta. See notes on 2. 40, **C. Cotta** and **but was through ambition . . . of individuals**.

consul from the inner circle of the ruling faction. Sallust's phrase *ex factione media consul* was understood by Kritz as: 'belonging to the moderate section of the nobility', a view he believed to be consonant with the content and tone of Cotta's speech. The phrase has also been rendered as: 'from the middle faction'. As M. I. Henderson (*JRS* 42 (1952), 115) pointed out, both here and in §3 Sallust/Macer is pointing to The Nobility. The Aurelii Cottae had by a variety of means attained a position of power and influence in political and social circles. The thrust of Macer's argument is that the political position of the plebs was improving to the point where a consul representing the most conservative section of the ruling nobility

was motivated through fear to make some concession. For the Aurelii Cottae see E. Badian, *Historia* 6 (1957), 320–1 = *Studies* 63–4.

some of their rights. The provisions of Cotta's law, the *Lex Aurelia de tribunicia potestate*, and the reception it received are discussed under 2. 45.

L. Sicinius. The *praenomen* is a matter of dispute: Cicero calls him *Cn. Sicinius* in *Brut.* 216. The only sources which refer to Sicinius' agitation for the restoration of tribunician powers are this statement by Macer and Ps.-Asc. 189 St.

the first to raise the question. This statement of Macer clearly indicates that the statements on this topic ascribed by Sallust to Lepidus (cf. 1. 48. 24) and to Philippus (1. 67. 14) are proleptic. Lepidus' speech is overtly anachronistic, designed to introduce all of the problems of the decade; Philippus is made to attribute such a design to Lepidus because he is meant to be seen to be exaggerating the danger from that quarter.

was circumvented. See on §10.

3. 34. 9. Catulus, far more savage. On Sallust's probable attitude to Catulus see note on 1. 48. 3, **Lutatii**. The use of the words *longe saevior* probably reflects Macer's opinion of Catulus' opposition, as one of the most conservative upholders of senatorial domination, to Lepidus' attempt to modify the excesses of the Sullan constitution.

3. 34. 10. an outbreak of violence intervened. An attempt to restore by a process of legislation the powers of the tribunate did not take place in 77 because of the outbreak of the rebellion led by Lepidus.

then Gaius Curio . . . to the extent of ruining a guiltless tribune. The reference is to Sicinius, mentioned above in §8. The Latin version of the last part of this fragment is: *ad exitium usque insontis tribuni*, where the keyword is *exitium*. The few commentators who have explicitly remarked on this statement have assumed that *exitium* here means 'death'. That is certainly one meaning of the word, but a primary meaning is 'destruction', 'ruin' (phys-

ical, political, and the like). In §2 Sicinius is described as having been circumvented; the verb *circumvenire* which basically means 'surround' also carries the meaning 'prosecute or convict unjustly'. Thus. Cic. *Flac.* 45; *Clu.* 9, 90; Sall. *Cat.* 34. 2; Tac. *Ann.* 1. 13. 3.

The Latin wording of this fragment can signify anything from assassination to judicial murder, meaning banishment (see note on 2. 44. 3, **twice born**). I have chosen the wider meaning of *exitium* to suggest that Curio's attack may have taken the form of a trumped-up charge against Sicinius leading to a trial which took place after Sicinius' relinquishment of office in December 76. On the use of sanguinary metaphors to describe court actions on charges involving the loss of civil rights, political death and the like see E. Wistrand, *Sallust on Judicial Murders in Rome* (Göteborg 1968).

Commentators have noted but not commented on the absence of Q. Opimius, tribune of 75, from this list of tribunes who agitated for the restoration of tribunician powers. It is known that Opimius was active in his year of office: he urged the opening up of other magistracies to ex-tribunes (Ps.-Asc. 255 St.); Cicero, in the course of his speech against Verres, remarks: 'a charge involving a fine was brought before him (Verres) as praetor against Q. Opimius who was nominally prosecuted because, when tribune of the people, he had used his veto in violation of the Cornelian law, but really because during his year of office, he had made a speech offensive to some man of high rank' (2 *Verr.* 1. 155).

In a detailed examination of Macer's silence on Opimius' activity, V. Vedaldi Iasbez (*MEFRA* 95 (1983), 139 ff.) has argued that Macer's theme at this point is the contrast between the inactivity of the consuls and the zeal of the tribunes on the matter of the restoration of tribunician powers. In 75 Opimius had worked in tandem with the consul Aurelius Cotta who played the leading part in the promulgation of the *Lex Aurelia de tribunicia potestate*. In the second case, Opimius' activity, so vaguely reported by Cicero, had been directed against a leading oligarch and not specifically aimed at helping the plebs.

3. 34. 11. with which Lucullus attacked Lucius Quintius. A tribune of 74, Quintius (Quinctius) was checked by the consul L. Licinius Lucullus from proceeding with his agitation for the restoration of tribunician powers. Cf. Cic. *Clu.* 110–11; Plut. *Luc.* 5. 4; Ps.-Asc. 189 St. The form Quinctius is far more widely used than Quintius.

sorts of attack . . . to no purpose if it was their intention. They have not embarked on this type of activity without purpose and well-calculated reflection. One can deduce therefore that they never thought of surrendering their rule of their own free will.

especially since . . . the real object of the conflict. The meaning is clarified by the statement in Sall. *Hist.* 1. 12: 'civil wars . . . during which powerful men, to whose influential position most people had lent their support, were attempting to win absolute rule, masquerading as champions of the senate or of the people'; and *Cat.* 38. 3 describes the party strife which arose after the restoration of full tribunician powers in 70: 'all who after that time assailed the government used specious pretexts, some maintaining that they were defending the rights of the commons, others that they were upholding the prestige of the senate; but under pretence of public welfare each in reality was working for his own advancement.'

although other motives were alleged. Probable allusion to the use of slogans such as *libertas*, *otium*, *concordia*, *ius*, etc. Cf. the speeches of Lepidus and Philippus.

3. 34. 12. a weapon fashioned . . . to defend freedom. The tribunate was not originally conceived of as an offensive weapon, but as a watch committee, or, as Livy, 2. 33. 1, puts it, a shield (*scutum*) to safeguard the interests of the plebs, the rights granted to them over the years; cf. Cic. *Leg. Agr.* 2. 15; Liv. 3. 37. 5; Diod. 12. 25. 2. See note on 1. 10, **tribunes of the people**, and Comm. on §3 above.

3. 34. 13. do not change the names of things. Cf. *Cat.* 52. 11: 'we have long since lost the true names for things'; Thuc. 3. 82. 4: 'to fit in with the change of events, words, too, had to change their usual meanings.'

there would have been had you remained entirely passive. That is, the *condicio* or bargain they could have achieved would remain in force.

since the greater the injustice . . . the more protected it is from retribution. A familiar Sallustian concept, succinctly expressed in *Iug.* 31. 14: 'the more atrocious the conduct, the greater the safety'; it is used several times in Lepidus' speech (1. 48. 1, 6, 24).

3. 34. 14. the thought of liberty . . . outside the place of assembly. Demosthenes made much the same accusation: 'there is nothing, men of Athens, more vexing at the present time than the way in which you detach your thoughts from public affairs, and display an interest only so long as you sit there listening, or when some fresh item of news arrives; after that each man goes home, and not only pays no attention to public business, but does not even call it to mind' (Phil. 4. 1).

3. 34. 15. without attempting to urge you to those manly deeds. This type of negative exhortation is even more strongly employed in §17. The cleverly employed parenthesis is here designed to arouse his hearers, not to similar acts of armed resistance, but to the passive resistance which should induce an embattled government to restore to the people the rights they had enjoyed before Sulla.

gained tribunes for the plebs. Cf. §§1 and 3.

a patrician magistracy. That is, the consulship, which was open only to patricians down to 367 BC when the tribunes Gaius Licinius Stolo and Lucius Sextius Lateranus succeeded in having passed the *Leges Liciniae Sextiae* which established that one consul might be a plebeian (G. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae Populi Romanae* (Milan 1912), 216; cf. Liv. 6. 42. 9). Later, plebeians gained entry to the censorship on the proposal of Q. Publilius Philo in 339 (Rotondi, ibid. 227–8; Liv. 8. 12. 16) and to the praetorship in 337 (Liv. 8. 15. 9).

a right to vote independent of the sanction of the patricians. Originally, the validity of the deliberations and the elections of the popular assemblies in Rome depended on *patrum auctoritas*, the consent given by the *patres* (senators). Q.

Publilius Philo, who was to become the first plebeian praetor in 337, carried two laws concerning resolutions passed by the plebs: (1) that *plebiscita* should be binding on the whole community (anticipating the *Lex Hortensia*); (2) that the *patrum auctoritas* should be reduced to the formal ratifying of proposals before they went forward to the centuriate assembly (Rotondi, *Leges Publicae*, 226–7; Liv. 8. 12. 14–15). As pointed out in §3, it was the *Lex Hortensia* of *c.*286 (Rotondi, *Leges Publicae*, 238; Liv. *Per.* 11; Gai. *Inst.* 1. 3) which granted absolute parity between *plebiscita* and *leges*.

orders . . . for the advantage of others. The *iussa* referred to here are explained by the proposal expressed in §17, namely, that the plebs should refuse to carry out military service which carries advantages only for the nobles.

3. 34. 17. I demand restitution according to the law of nations. *Ius gentium* was the universally recognized code of behaviour between nations or individuals. The phrase used by Macer: *iure gentium res repeto* was the formula used by the *fetialis* (a member of the priestly college which conducted international relations) in demanding from a foreign state reparation for goods stolen or redress for injuries sustained.

Macer does not desire discord, as the nobles claim, but the ending of discord involves the handing back of the rights unjustly taken from the people.

3. 34. 18. Let them . . . exercise their commands in their own way. The irony here is very strong. Men of ancient lineage and many ancestral portraits (*Iug.* 85. 10) who would have learnt from these memorials the meaning of true glory (Val. Max. 5. 8. 3) will have to manage without the common soldiers.

with those ancestral portraits of theirs. See note on 1. 77, **the greatest delight in these disfigurements.**

what is left of the exiles. This must refer to those exiles not already dead or defeated. Macer is belittling the opposition because he believes that these wars are a pretext (cf. §6).

3. 34. 19. Unless, perchance . . . See on §8.

hastily enacted law. Emphasis is placed on the fact that the law was suddenly enacted by consuls forced to act under the pressure of events; a conciliatory measure, it is interpreted by Macer as motivated by fear of a new outbreak of popular unrest as in 75.

which you regard so highly. An interpretation of *ista* in the Latin version *ista frumentaria lege*; Macer proceeds to disparage the law, attacking the apparently well-disposed attitude of its sponsors, and questioning the scope and genuineness of its alleged benefits.

for the distribution of corn. The law was sponsored by the consuls of 73, M. Terentius Varro Lucullus (brother of the consul of 74 L. Licinius Lucullus, and adopted son of M. Terentius Varro) and Gaius Cassius Longinus. Known as the *Lex Terentia Cassia frumentaria*, it distributed 5 *modii* of corn a month to a limited number of recipients in Rome. Cf. Cic. 2 *Verr*. 3. 72, 163; 5. 52; *Sest*. 55.

not much greater than prison rations. The Roman prison (*carcer*; *vincula publica*) was used only for short periods of detention (incarceration) applied as *coercitio*, the infliction of summary punishment by a magistrate or other person to secure obedience to orders. Cf. the note on I. 48. II, **the rations of slaves**.

and deceives with the slenderest of hope the cowardice of each recipient. The manuscript *V* provides the meaningless *ignam quiusque tenuissimas spes perfrustratur* corrected by Gronovius to *ignavi cuiusque tenuissimas spes frustratur*, a version accepted by Maurenbrecher, Ernout, Kurfess and rendered into English as 'disappointing the slenderest hopes of the idle' (or 'low-born'). I join Opitz (Teubner 1897), Paladini, Frassinetti, and Reynolds in preferring the correction proposed by Orelli: *ignaviam cuiusque tenuissima spe frustratur*, which I have translated above. Paladini has cogently argued that on compositional grounds the comparison made between the modest allocation of corn granted in terms of the *Lex Terentia Cassia* and prison rations employs stylistic features characteristic of Sallust: a perfect correspondence of

advantage and drawback in each case. Prisoners are kept alive but steadily deteriorate in health; distribution of corn gives a slender hope to the cowardly but does not ease their domestic problems. This comparison also fits in most satisfactorily with what follows in §20: the point made in the comparison is that recipients in both situations are deceived in their expectations. In the case of the plebs, especially those reluctant to join in a struggle for their rights, the warning is against trickery on the part of the nobles, against the accepting of an offer at the cost of their freedom.

On the line of thought in this section cf. Dem. *Olynth.* 3. 33: 'Like the diet prescribed by doctors, which neither restores the strength of the patient nor allows him to succumb, so these doles that you are now distributing neither suffice to ensure your safety nor allow you to renounce them and try something else; they only confirm each citizen in his apathy.'

3. 34. 21–4. This group of statements which deals with the role of Pompeius in the matter of the restoration of tribunician powers, and hence of the freedom of the people, raises points concerning the views of Macer/Sallust on the part played by Pompeius. What is stated concerning the counter-hopes of nobility and commons in regard to Pompeius' attitude on his return would not be far removed from Sallust's way of thinking; but it is also likely that he puts into Macer's mouth both an expectation and a warning based upon his knowledge of Pompeius' subsequent career.

3. 34. 21. Gnaeus Pompeius . . . they tear to pieces. In stressing the ambivalence of the attitude of the nobles to Pompeius, Macer is thinking of the earlier use of Pompeius against Lepidus, of the way in which subsequently Pompeius extorted the Spanish command which gave rise to the pressures occasioned by the fluctuations of the Sertorian war.

they bore on their necks. *Sublatum in cervices*, just as *servi lecticarii* (litter-bearing slaves) bow their necks to the weight of their masters.

3. 34. 23. I have had ample opportunity to get to know. *Mihi quidem satis spectatum est*—a similar usage in *Cat.* 20. 2: *ni virtus fidesque vestra spectata forent* ('If I had not already tested your courage and loyalty.'). This probably exaggerated picture of his relationship to Pompeius suits Macer's objective of showing himself conversant with Pompeius' thinking, and of presenting him as a supporter of the restoration of tribunician powers. The picture of Pompeius as demagogue is certainly much more favourable than in Sallust's own narrative, but the reminder concerning the practice of the early Republic in §24 puts Macer's thinking on the matter in its proper perspective.

that he will take the initiative in restoring the power of the tribunes. An inspired guess on Macer's part, or a Sallustian prophecy *post eventum*? Cf. *Cat.* 38. 1.

3. 34. 24. there was a time . . . able to give or take away such things. A recall to the republic of the Catonian type, a constitution based on collective power and courage, before the emergence of the powerful individuals of the revolutionary age. Thus the Macer/Sallust summons to the people to defend their freedoms is placed within the sound republican traditions dear to both men.

3. 34. 26. because your backs are spared. An allusion to the *Leges Porciae de provocatione* or *de tergo civium* which gave the citizens the right to appeal against corporal punishment. There were three such laws: (i) The tribune P. Porcius Laeca extended the right of *provocatio* in capital cases to Roman citizens in Italy and the provinces (199 BC). (ii) M. Porcius Cato, as praetor (198) or, less probably, as consul (195) prohibited the scourging of citizens without appeal. (iii) Military officers were deprived of the right of summary execution by the consul M. Porcius Licinus (184) or more probably later (*c.*150–135). Cf. Rotondi, *Leges Publicae*, 268–9; Liv. 10. 9. 4; Sall. *Cat.* 51. 22; *Iug.* 69. 4.

3. 34. 27. these same privileges are not allowed to country people. Sulla left to tribunes the *ius auxilii*, the right of intervention on behalf of citizens, although he may have

deprived them of the right to bring charges before the assembly; this would mean that citizens outside Rome, where the *ius auxilii* did not extend, had no protection against magistrates. If that was the case, protection was restored in 70 by the *Lex Pompeia Licinia*, since it was exercised in 63 by the tribune Labienus against Rabirius. Cf. Brunt, *Fall of the Roman Republic*, 332.

cut down in the quarrels of the powerful . . . sent as gifts to magistrates. The first statement is contrasted with 'because your backs are spared', the second with 'allowed to go here and there' (§26).

Away from Rome and the courts, citizens were deprived of the direct protection of the law, especially in times of unrest, such as during the revolt of Lepidus. In addition, many Italians were through Sulla deprived of their citizenship (1. 48. 12 n. **debarred . . . from the citizenship**). Citizens on war-service or resident in the provinces were also at the mercy of ruthless governors or commanders. Thus Cicero's exclamation against Verres' execution of a citizen (2 *Verr.* 5. 163): 'Does freedom, that precious thing, mean nothing? nor the proud privileges of a citizen of Rome? nor the law of Porcius, the laws of Sempronius? nor the tribunes' power, whose loss our people felt so deeply till now at last it has been restored to them?'

3. 34. 28. so long as they make greater efforts. Macer's speech did not have the hoped for results, but the restoration of tribunician powers did take place three years later (*Cat.* 38. 1) when the consul Pompeius, with the co-operation of C. Julius Caesar and after the programme of agitation conducted by M. Lollius Palicanus (see on 4. 38), tribune of 71, was joined by his consular colleague of 70, M. Licinius Crassus, in promulgating the *Lex Pompeia Licinia de tribunicia potestate* (cf. Asc. *Corn.* 76. 7–9C).

3. 35–42. The 73 BC campaign of the Mithridatic War is marked by two distinct phases: the Pontic king's push westwards is decisively thwarted and as a consequence he is forced to retreat back to his own territory in order to replenish his forces and regroup for another attempt to defeat the Romans.

Abandoning his attempt to take Cyzicus (see on 3. 29–30), Mithridates headed with his fleet to Parium, ordering his army to proceed by land to Lampsacus. About 30,000 of his infantry were caught at crossings of the rivers Aesepus and Granicus which were in flood (Plut. *Luc.* 11. 8; App. *Mith.* 76; Memnon, 40); the remainder reached Lampsacus and were embarked on the Pontic fleet. Still convinced that he could maintain himself in the Propontis, Mithridates sent the Sertorian general Marius with 50 ships and 10,000 troops to create a diversion in the Aegean (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 21; *Mur.* 33; App. *Mith.* 77); he himself sailed to Perinthus, hoping to open communication with his European allies. Failing to take Perinthus, he fell back on Nicomedeia. Lucullus, provided with a fully equipped fleet by the cities of Asia, decided to deal with Marius himself. He placed a portion of his fleet under the command of C. Valerius Triarius and Barba, with orders to reduce the Propontis and the cities held by Mithridates in western Bithynia. These commanders are credited with the reduction of Apamea Myrleia and Cius on the coast and of Prusa and Nicaea inland (App. *Mith.* 77; Memnon, 41). Lucullus himself annihilated the forces under Marius in two engagements off Tenedos and Lemnos.

Mithridates' position at Nicomedeia was no longer tenable; he could expect little from the Propontis, and Cotta's arrival from Chalcedon to link up with Triarius threatened a blockade of the town by land. Anticipating Mithridates' movements, Lucullus, after his victories in the Aegean, had sent forward Voconius with part of the fleet to close off the entrance to the Bosphorus. But Voconius, engrossed in the mysteries of Samothrace, allowed the king to escape into the Black Sea (Plut. *Luc.* 1–2). After surviving a fierce storm, Mithridates reached Amisus in safety. With a large part of his army destroyed, his fleet damaged and scattered, he sought help in vain from various eastern rulers. His only stroke of luck was the winning over of Heraclea which he garrisoned. This fortress, the towns of the Paphlagonian coast, and Sinope would detain at least part of a Roman force advancing on

Pontus. Relying on a network of strongly fortified positions, notably Amasia, Amasis, Themiscyra, and Eupatoria, Mithridates set about the building up of a new force at Cabeira, where he assembled about 40,000 foot and 4,000 horse (Plut. *Luc.* 15. 1; App. *Mith.* 7. 8).

Lucullus, Cotta, and Triarius prepared to mount an invasion of Pontus. Cotta's force was detached to deal with the resistance expected from towns on the Paphlagonian coast; he was to receive naval support from Triarius when the latter had dealt with what remained of the king's fleet in the Aegean (cf. Memnon, 48). Aware of the need for speed and surprise, Lucullus began to advance before the end of the summer of 73. He took a southerly route through Galatia; crossing the Halys and leaving Amasia and Eupatoria on his right, he marched between the Halys and the Iris on Amisus. Having plundered the country up to Themiscyra, he started on the siege of Amisus. Mithridates, however, was able to provision Amisus through the winter of 73/2 from Cabeira.

Maurenbrecher allocated nine fragments (52–60M) to this campaign. Of these I have relegated his fr. 55* to Fragments of Uncertain Reference. The remaining eight fragments unfortunately contribute very little to our knowledge of the campaign. None of them deals with any of the important incidents referred to in the above summary. Apart from a fleeting reference to Triarius' naval campaign in the Aegean, two incidents of peripheral significance only are referred to: the storm damage suffered by Mithridates' fleet in the Black Sea, and the allegedly treasonous conduct of M. Cotta's lieutenant, P. Oppius.

3. 35. they advance into the sea up to their groins. Though this could be part of a narrative dealing with pirates, I follow Maurenbrecher in applying it to Lucullus' engagement against the Pontic fleet in the Aegean. Plutarch provides the probable scenario; reporting Lucullus' successful attack on 13 royal galleys intercepted on their way to Lemnos, he goes on: '[He] then sailed in pursuit of the other captains whom these were seeking to join. They chanced to be lying at anchor close

to shore, and drawing all their vessels up on land, they fought from the decks and sorely frustrated the crews of Lucullus. These had no chance to sail round their enemies, nor to make onset upon them, since their own ships were afloat, while those of their enemies were planted upon the land and were securely fixed. However, Lucullus at last succeeded in disembarking the best of his soldiers where the island offered some sort of access. These fell upon the enemy from the rear . . .' (*Luc.* 12. 2–4; cf. App. *Mith.* 77).

3. 36. after he had passed through the straits. Dietsch, maintaining that the word *angustiae* used here could apply to a narrow pass through mountains, referred the fragment to Lucullus' campaign around Cabeira, citing App. *Mith.* 80. But operations of the type dealt with there belong to 72 and are dealt with in Book 4. Both Kritz and Maurenbrecher refer it to Mithridates' escape into the Black Sea, occasioned by the negligence of Voconius who had been sent to intercept the king's flight. Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 13. 1–2.

3. 37. For those who had attempted . . . met their deaths just like the others. While sailing through the Black Sea on his flight to Amisus, Mithridates was overtaken by a storm which destroyed some of his vessels and disabled others (Plut. *Luc.* 13. 2).

or flung against the hulls. A translation of *adflicti alveis*, the second word being Mercier's correction for the manuscript readings *asuis* (Nonius) *alveos* (Arusianus). Maurenbrecher printed Dietsch's conjecture *alvos* which would mean 'struck in their bellies'.

3. 38. And it could no longer be kept afloat . . . increasing in force. Plutarch reports that the ship in which Mithridates was sailing was also affected by the storm. It was too large to be beached in such conditions: the heavy swell caused it to wallow and it would not respond to the helm. The king abandoned it for a light pirate craft which landed him safely in Heraclea (*Luc.* 13. 3). Sallust's narrative seems to have reported on the eventual sinking of the abandoned vessel.

3. 39.* **Amisos.** The Latin form is Amisus; a major port of the coast of Pontus. This city was undoubtedly referred to several times in Books 3–5. Cf. 4. 46. Probus' introductory statement implies that he is referring to Sallust's first mention of the city.

3. 40. accept the surrender . . . in which the treasures of the king were kept under guard. Since the fragment is transmitted with book-number, its referral to Book 4 by some earlier editors, who assumed reference to the treasures seized by Lucullus in the capture of Cabeira and other strongholds (Plut. *Luc.* 18. 1), is not acceptable. On this march through the Pontic kingdom Lucullus sent detachments to ravage various regions and to attack strongholds (W. Drumann and P. Groebe, *Geschichte Roms in seinem Übergange von der republicanischen zur monarchischen Verfassung*, 6 vols. (Leipzig 1899–1929), 4. 134). I assume that special orders were given concerning the treasures believed to be stored in some fortresses. I therefore reject as unfounded Maurenbrecher's assumption, based on Plut. *Luc.* 14, that it refers to demands for access to rich booty made by Valerian contingents of Lucullus' army. On the Valerians cf. 2. 90 n. **as a result of the Fimbrian revolt.**

3. 41–2. Refer to the conduct of P. Oppius quaestor of 74 who was serving, presumably as pro-quaestor, under Cotta's command in Bithynia. Aspects of the rift between the two men emerge from comments, made by writers of a much later time, concerning the speech made by Cicero in his defence of Oppius. The speech itself is no longer extant.

The remarks in Amm. Marc. 30. 8. 7 throw little light on the incidents described here by Sallust, but comments by Dio and Quintilian are more relevant, though they should be interpreted with care. Dio, 36. 40, 3, reports that M. Cotta dismissed Publius Oppius because of bribery and suspicion of conspiracy. He alludes to the fact that Oppius' accuser, Cotta, was himself later accused of appropriation of the booty of Heraclea Pontica in 70. His accuser C. Papirius Carbo in 67 or shortly thereafter was

rewarded with consular insignia; cf. Val. Max. 5. 4.; Memnon, 60. In his comments on aspects of Cicero's conduct of the defence of Oppius Quintilian points to Cicero's way of handling the contradictory charges laid against his client: that of embezzling supplies intended to feed the troops, and that of attempting to corrupt the army by bribes (*Inst.* 5. 13. 17).

3. 41. attempted timidly to withdraw the dagger. It appears that Oppius tried to persuade Cotta not to send the letter of accusation to the senate (cf. Quint. *Inst.* 5. 13. 20). It is not clear for whom the dagger, which he was attempting to use, was intended. According to Quintilian (*Inst.* 5. 10. 69) Cicero, in his *pro Oppio* made use of this uncertainty: 'Was the weapon snatched from his hands when he had attacked Cotta, or when he was attempting suicide?' The report in fr. 42 indicates that neither Cotta nor Oppius suffered injury. Oppius was discharged from the army and presumably returned to Rome, there to await trial on the charges laid.

3. 43*–59*. Are part of an excursus on the geography of the Black Sea (*Pontus Euxinus*) region. Even from the few fragments that have survived it is evident, as in the case of the Sardinia–Corsica excursus in 2. 1–20, that material on the mythical history and ethnography of the region was also included. The description starts with the Hellespont, Propontis, and the Bosphorus. Passing through into the Black Sea he turned eastward to describe the coasts of Bithynia, Paphlagonia, and Pontus; then sweeping north and west he came to the Crimea, the Scythian shore and the mouths of the Danube, and so on to his point of departure.

This, Sallust's longest and most famous description, was widely admired and was copied by writers after him. The treatments by Pomponius Mela (*De Chorographia*, 1. 93–2. 15), Pliny (*NH* 7. 75–91; 6. 1–22), Ammianus Marcellinus (22. 8. 4–48), and Valerius Flaccus (*Argonautica*, 4. 714–43) provide material useful for explaining Sallust's surviving statements and for indicating parts of his description which are no longer extant.

Thus I have made extensive use of Mela at fr. 44* below to indicate the considerable material which Sallust may also have dealt with in his treatment of the Hellespont. Strabo's treatment of the geography of specific areas is also most helpful.

Maurenbrecher allocated twenty fragments (3. 61*–80*M) to this segment. Of these, I have relegated his frr. 61* and 64* to the section Fragments of Uncertain Reference and have already used his 3. 78* as my fr. 3. 26* (q.v.). Of the seventeen fragments remaining only one deals with the Hellespont (43*); six (frr. 44*–9*) are part of a general overview of the Black Sea; the next four (frr. 50*–3*) deal with the south coast from Bithynia eastwards to Themiscyra in Pontus, which leaves only six to cover the northern and western shores of the sea (54*–9*).

3. 43.* wide because there . . . the strait of the Hellespont spreads. Isidorus (*Etym.* 14. 7. 2) identifies 'there' (*illic*) as Sigeum. Mela (1. 93) also mentions Sigeum; cf. Strabo, 13. 1. 30; Plin. *NH* 5. 125. Mela adds other places of interest in the vicinity: the anchorage of the Greek fleet (cf. Strabo, 13. 1. 31; Plin. *NH* 4. 49), the two rivers of the Trojan plain which empty into the Hellespont, the Scamander and the Simois, 'rivers greater in fame than in size' (cf. Hom. *Il.* 773–7; 21. 211–382). Outside the strait (Mela, 1. 96) are the Rhoetean coasts, occupied by the towns of Rhoeteum and Dardania (Troy).

From here Mela notes that the sea-passage becomes narrower and once more the lands through which it flows becomes its banks. On the coast lie the Greek cities Abydus, Lampsacus, Parium, Priapus. Then (id. 1. 98) once more the passage widens into the Propontis (Plin. 5. 141) into which flows the Granicus, the scene of the first great encounter between the Persians and Alexander. Beyond the river lies Cyzicus in the neck of the peninsula.

Once again, however, lands block its passage and the channel through which it flows into the Pontus (Black Sea) narrows and separates Europe from Asia by just a few stades (Mela, 1. 101; Plin. *NH* 4. 76; 5. 149). This is called the Thracian Bosphorus. Inside the strait is the city of Chalcedon.

3. 44.* it takes the shape of a Scythian bow. The Scythian bow consisted of a central bar of pliable wood to whose ends were fitted the curved horns of an ibex or goat, the horns being tipped with metal and joined by a bowstring of oxhide or sheepskin. When drawn, the horns were bent down and the handle remained immovable. Hence the description: 'according to the testimony of all geographers it (the Black Sea) has the form of a drawn Scythian bow' (Amm. Marc. 22. 8. 10). The bow describes the north coast of the Black Sea, the central grip being the Criumetopon (the Crimea). The more or less straight south coast is the bowstring. Cf. Strabo, 2. 5. 22; Plin. *NH* 4. 76; Manil. 4. 753; Mela, 1. 102; Val. Fl. 4. 728. On the Scythian bow see Daremberg–Saglio, *Dict. Ant.* i (Paris 1875), 389, and for an interpretation of Mela's treatment of the topic see A. Grilli, *RIFC* 107 (1979), 179–81 and P. Perroni, *Pomponii Melae, De Chorographia* (Rome 1984), ad loc.

3. 45* The Black Sea is certainly fresher than the other seas. Mela (1. 102) points out that on account of its shallows the Black Sea is dangerous in places; and because it is nowhere very deep it is billowy and turbulent, being exposed to the north winds. There are compensations however: 'The entire Pontus throughout its circuit is misty, has fresher waters than the other seas . . . and is tempered by the great masses of water which flow into it' (Amm. Marc. 22. 8. 46; cf. Isidorus 13. 16. 4).

3. 46. at that time of the year when a vast number of fish breaks free of the Pontus. The phrase 'at that time' could refer to the annual tunny season described by Pliny: 'In the channel of the Thracian Bosphorus joining the Propontis with the Euxine . . . there is a rock of marvellous whiteness that shines through the water from the bottom to the surface near Chalcedon on the Asiatic side. The sudden sight of this always frightens them and they make for the opposite promontory of Byzantium in a headlong shoal; this is the reason why that promontory has the name of the Golden Horn.' (*NH* 9. 50–51; Tac. *Ann.* 12. 63). Alternatively, it could be part of a Sallustian treatment of the riches of the Sea of Azov, the huge fish

which the Lake Maeotis conceals beneath the ice (Iuv. 4. 41–2).

3. 47.* had acquired for the sea the nickname Inhospitable. Strabo describes the two causes usually cited for the use of this nickname: 'at this time the sea was not navigable and was called Axine (*Axenos*: "hostile to strangers") because of its wintry storms and the ferocity of the tribes that lived around it, and particularly the Scythians, in that they sacrificed strangers, ate their flesh, and used their skulls as drinking cups' (7. 3. 6). Ovid, *Tr.* 4. 55–60, mentions both of these factors; Diodorus, 4. 40. 4, and Pliny, *NH* 6. 1, blame only the climatic features, while Ammianus Marcellinus, 22. 8. 33, and Mela, 1. 102, speak of the fierceness of the inhabitants as the only cause. Ammianus also reports: 'but in irony it is called by the contrary name of Pontus Euxinus' ('hospitable'). Strabo points out that this was a euphemism introduced when the Ionians founded cities on the seaboard.

3. 48–9*. There is a concentration here of the literary topos of naming the first man to do something; three 'firsts' are mentioned in fr. 48 and one in fr. 49.

3. 48. Jason by following a new sea-route. The story of the voyage of the Argonauts, led by Jason, son of Aeson, is one of the oldest Greek sagas. It survives in the accounts of Pindar, *Pyth.* 4; Apollonius Rhodius, *Argonautica*; Valerius Flaccus, *Argonautica*; Apollodorus, 1. 107 ff.; Hyginus, *Fab.* 12 ff.

The goal of the voyage was Colchis on the east coast of the Black Sea and that necessitated their passing through the Symplegades ('the Clashing Rocks') at the entrance to the Euxine via the Bosphorus.

the first to violate the hospitality. When Jason demanded back from Pelias the kingdom which the latter had usurped from Aeson, Pelias promised to surrender it to him provided he brought back the golden fleece which was in the possession of Aeetes, king of Colchis. When in answer to his request Jason was set an impossible task by Aeetes, the Argonaut used the magic powers of Aeetes' daughter Medea, who was infatuated with him, to get

possession of the golden fleece. Jason with Medea and the fleece then fled from Colchis. All his actions at Colchis amounted to a serious breach of the laws of hospitality by which social contacts were made possible in a civilization rarely free from armed conflict.

3. 49.* that Achilles was the first of the Greeks . . . I take this to refer to the cult of the epic hero Achilles. The chief and earliest attested centre of Achilles-worship was the Black Sea, in the island of Leuke at the mouth of the Danube (Alcaeus, fr. 48[b]; Pind. *Nem.* 4. 76; Eur. *Andr.* 1258; Paus. 3. 19. 11; Arr. *Peripl. M. Eux.* 21, 22). There were other centres at the mouth of the Borysthenes (Dnieper) (Dio Chrys. *Or.* 36. 14; *CIG* 2076; Strabo, 7. 3. 19), and near Panticapaeum (Strabo, 11. 2. 6).

3. 50.* the first part of Asia to present itself is Bithynia. The voyage on which Sallust's narrative is based followed a route east after going through the Bosphorus. That is also the route followed by Strabo, 12. 32; Solinus, 42. 1; Amm. Marc. 22. 8. 14. Ammianus adds mythological data on the Bebrycians who were delivered from the cruelty of Amycus through the prowess of Pollux, a member of the Argo's crew. Mela, who in 1. 103 speaks of the Mariandyni as the people closest to the Bosphorus, speaks of them at 1. 97 as a people from the interior and reports that they inhabit a city, given them by the Argive Hercules, which is called Heraclea; Strabo (12. 3. 4) states that Heraclea in the country of the Mariandyni was founded by the Milesians. Ps. Scylax, 91 (*GGM* 1. 67) and Xen. *An.* 6. 2 also ascribe Heraclea to the Milesians.

3. 51.* the city of Tieum. The scholiast's description is supported by Mela (1. 104), 'then the town Teos, a colony of the Milesians but now belonging to the Paphlagonian people'. He goes on to add that almost in the middle of the Paphlagonian coast lies the promontory of Carambis (cf. Strabo, 7. 4. 3).

3. 52. Through their territories flows the Halys. Closest to the Paphlagonians were the Chalybes who had the famous cities of Sinope and Amisus, and the rivers Halys and Thermodon (Mela, 1. 105).

3. 53.* the plains of Themiscyra. The plains country athwart the rivers Thermodon and Iris which was situated near the city, Themiscyra. Strabo gives a fuller description: 'Themiscyra is a plain; on one side it is washed by the sea and is about sixty stades distant from the city, and on the other side it lies at the foot of the mountain country' (12. 3. 15).

formerly the domain of the Amazons. 'And Themiscyra and the plains about the Thermodon and the mountains that lie above them are by all writers mentioned as having belonged to the Amazons; but they say that the Amazons were driven out of these places' (Strabo, 11. 5. 4; cf. Curt. 6. 5. 25; Amm. Marc. 22. 8. 17).

the river Tanais. The modern river Don in Sarmatia which empties into the north-eastern corner of the Sea of Azov.

3. 54.* the most fierce are still the Achaei and the Tauri. The Achaei were a people of the Black Sea and Caucasus region; the Tari were the inhabitants of the Chersonesus Taurica (the Crimea).

3. 55. beyond the water plain, the whole (region?) down to the river. I take the word *stagnum* ('water plain') to refer to the lake Maeotis (Sea of Azov) which is also called Maeotis Palus (swamp, marsh, fen). The river referred to is the Tanais (Don) and the fragment may refer to the Maeotae, the people inhabiting the shore which stretches from the Cimmerian Bosphorus to the Tanais. Strabo reports: 'the Maeotae live along the whole of this coast; and although farmers, they are no less warlike than the nomads. They are divided into several tribes, those who live near the Tanais being rather ferocious, but those whose territory borders on the Bosphorus being more tractable' (11. 2. 4).

3. 56.* a people who use their wagons as houses. The excursus on the Pontus is now dealing with the peoples who inhabit the northern shores of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea. The first group dealt with are the Scythian tribes of the cost such as Sarmatians and Essedones. Ammianus gives a list of the tribes (22. 8. 30); he agrees

with Mela (2. 2) in locating the Agathyrsi, a nomadic people, close to the Maeotis, but other sources (Hdt. 4. 125; Dionys. Per. 310–11 (*GGM* 2. 120)) place them much further west of the Maeotis between the Borysthenes (Dnieper) and the Hister. Mela calls the Sarmati, also a nomadic Scythian tribe, and hence located by the sources at different places, *αμαξοβιοι* (Hamaxobii, 'living in wagons'); Strabo speaks of Scythians further north than the Sarmatians as nomads and wagon-dwellers (11. 2. 1) and at 2. 5. 26 mentions wagon-dwellers living close to the Tanais, the Maeotis, and the Borysthenes.

3. 57.* the promontories of Paphlagonia and that which he called Criumetopon. This latter promontory which the Greeks called *Κριοῦ Μέτωπον* ('Ram's forehead') is described by Strabo as 'a promontory which extends far out towards the high sea and the south in the direction of Paphlagonia and the city Amastris' (7. 4. 3). It is now Cape Karadje. Strabo also states that Criumetopon lies opposite the Paphlagonian promontory Carambis (Cape Keremebe); cf. Plin. *NH* 4. 86; Mela, 1. 104. Among other promontories on the Paphlagonian coast Sallust very probably had in mind that on which the city of Sinope was situated.

3. 58. has the name Danube in the section . . . of the Germans. The name Danube (*Danuvius*) originally referred to the upper course of the river only, and remained unknown to the Greeks to whom the river from its mouth to the Iron Gate (a gorge between Turnu Severin and Orsova in Romania) was known as the Ister. Several theories as to the source of the Ister were put forward by the Greek sources: in Pyrene—presumably the Pyrenees (Herodotus); in the Pillar of the North—presumably the Alps (Ephorus); in the Hercynian Forest (Timaeus); in a Celtic lake (Timosthenes); in the Rhipaean mountains (Apollonius Rhodius).

The Danube in fact has its source in the German mountain range Abnoba (the Black Forest) opposite a Gallic town Rauricum (possibly Augst, near Basle). Cf. Plin. *NH* 4. 79; Tac. *Germ.* 1; Avien. *Descr. Orb.* 437 (*GGM* 2. 181).

3. 59.* Sallust wrote that the Ister is next in size. From their knowledge of the Ister's estuary where they had established the colony Istria between 650 and 600 BC, the Greeks drew conclusions concerning the river's size. Hesiod (*Theog.* 337) nominated it as one of the four great rivers of the world; Herodotus (4. 47–51) regarded it as the largest river of Europe and a counterpart to the Nile. Pliny (*NH* 4. 79) states that there were 60 tributaries of the Ister; cf. Solin. 13; Amm. Marc. 22. 8. 44; Mart. Cap. 6. 662.

The identity of the Ister with the Danuvius was probably established during Octavian's Illyrian campaign of 35 BC (F. G. De Pachtere, *MEFRA* 28 (1908), 79–87). Gellius remarks that Varro in his discussion of Europe placed the Rhone among the first three rivers of that quarter of the earth, by which he seems to make it a rival of the Danube. This was true in Varro's time; Sallust was the first to record the identity of the Ister and the Danube.

3. 60–7. Sallust's *Histories* appears to have been the primary source for the career of Spartacus and the war of the gladiators, an event which, from late 73 to 71 BC caused serious internal difficulties for a Roman government already faced with the crisis of a Spanish war against Sertorius and an eastern war against Mithridates. Unfortunately, the surviving fragments of Sallust's account, while indicating a narrative of considerable detail, are too meagre in content to enable us to reconstruct a satisfactory picture of the conflict or to settle problems posed by statements in other sources. Thus the reason for Spartacus' abandoning his plan to cross the Alps, or the reliability of the statement that he contemplated an attack on Rome itself remain matters for conjecture.

The most detailed of the other sources are Plutarch, *Crassus*, 8–11 and Appian, *BC* 1. 116–21; these provide summaries of some length, but that of Appian has to be used with caution, particularly with regard to his chronology of events and the omission of important elements. The rest of the sources provide brief reports, and reflect

the Livian (senatorial) tradition; Liv. *Per.* 95–7; Flor. 2. 8. 1–14; Eutrop. 6. 7. 1S; Oros. 5. 24. 1–8. Information on some episodes of the armed conflict is found in Frontin, *Str.* 1. 5. 20–2, 7. 6; 2. 4. 7, 5. 34.

While Spartacus was from every perspective a truly tragic figure, the significance of his career for Roman history as such is very limited. Nevertheless, from the outset the episode of Spartacus and the gladiators received an historiographical treatment out of proportion to its intrinsic lack of importance. The senatorial sources are dominated by an ideological bias which seeks, by selective exaggeration or concealment of facts, to justify the elevation of this minor outbreak of violence, the gravity of which was underestimated from the outset and hence handled in disastrous fashion for a year and a half, to the status of a *iustum bellum*, a properly declared war, and so to give constitutional propriety to measures of repression which ultimately involved the conferment of an extraordinary command on the *privatus*, Crassus. Devices used included the amplification of enemy numbers and losses, the concealment of Roman figures and reverses, and, chiefly, the magnification of the character and military skills of Spartacus, a distortion which was to put him, in later Roman memory, on a par with Hannibal. See on 3. 62.

A process of mythification developed in modern times because of the Marxist idealization of Spartacus as the champion of the underprivileged classes and the leader of the only genuine social revolution in Roman history. Soviet scholars who had to accept the Marxist-Leninist view of historiography were faced from 1917 down to recent times with a bewildering set of problems consequent upon periodic changes in the official party-line interpretation of the Spartacus incident. For a full treatment of this state of affairs see W. Z. Rubinsohn, 'Der Spartakus-Aufstand und die sowjetische Geschichtsschreibung' *Xenia* (Konstanz 1983). Rubinsohn's article is reviewed in *CR* 35 (1985) 325–7 by J. G. Griffith who published an English translation of the article in 1987.

Reaction to distortion on ideological grounds brought

forth A. Guarino's *Spartaco—analisi de un mito* (Milan 1979). The basic thrust of this book was recognized in varying degrees by Gabba, Christ, and Stampacchia but was strongly condemned by K. Meister's paper in *Studien zur alten Geschichte* (Rome 1986). Meister, with some justification, felt that Guarino had gone to the opposite extreme of stripping Spartacus of all claim to nobility of character and quality of leadership.

There is no doubt about Sallust's admiration of the character and military talent of Spartacus; it was a viewpoint inherited by Plutarch. The fragments reveal that he dealt with the Spartacus episode as yet another example of the incompetence and weakness of a government which hastened the inevitable decline of the republican constitution. This simple story of an escape from confinement which led to the unexpected developments of uprisings among the slave and free labourers and the depressed farmers of rural Italy, was allowed to develop to the stage where once again the senate had to resort to extraordinary measures in order to retain its control of the state.

The nature of the sources inhibits the attaining of totally satisfactory conclusions concerning important aspects of the Spartacus story. Nevertheless, to warrant serious consideration hypotheses have to be based on the information provided by the sources. Among the ever-growing number of treatments of this topic, many of which are repetitive and some of which present conjectural material without evidence to support it, I believe the most balanced and comprehensive treatment of the source material is G. Stampacchia's *La tradizone della guerra di Spartaco da Sallustio a Orosio* (Pisa 1976).

3. 60. Spartacus. Described by Plutarch (*Crass.* 8. 3) as Thracian of nomadic stock (*νομαδικοῦ*) which K. Ziegler (*Hermes* 83 (1955), 248 ff.) changed to *Μαιδικοῦ* (i.e. belonging to the Maedi, a people of western Thrace). Appian gives more detail: 'a Thracian by birth who had once served with the Romans, but had since been a prisoner and sold for a gladiator.' Florus (2. 8. 8) described him as one 'who from being a Thracian mercenary, had become a soldier, and from a soldier a

deserter, then a bandit, and finally, thanks to his strength, a gladiator.'

leader of the gladiators. The majority of the sources join Sallust in naming Spartacus as C-in-C of the rebel force from the outset: thus Cic. *Att.* 6. 2. 8; Vell. Pat. 2. 30. 5; Frontin. *Str.* 1. 5. 21 and 22; Plut. *Crass.* 8. 3; Flor. 2. 8. 7. Sallust names Crixus as commander of the Germans and Gauls (*Hist.* 3. 65D); Plutarch (ibid.) speaks of three leaders of whom Spartacus is the chief; Florus (2. 8. 3) names three leaders in the order Spartacus, Crixus, Oenomaus; Appian (*BC* 1. 116) names Oenomaus and Crixus as commanders subordinate to Spartacus. Some sources seem to place Crixus and Oenomaus as commanders of equal rank beside Spartacus—e.g. Liv. *Per.* 95; Eutrop. 6. 7. 2S.

seventy-four in number. This number is repeated in Frontin. *Str.* 1. 5. 21; Liv. *Per.* 95; Eutrop. 6. 7. 2S; Oros. 5. 24. 1; *Schol. super Luc.* 2. 554. Plutarch (*Crass.* 8. 2) reports that out of the 200 gladiators who planned to escape, 78 succeeded in getting away. A number in the seventies, which is also supported by the evidence of Appian (*BC* 1. 116) seems the most probable. Cicero (*Att.* 6. 2. 8) talks of much less than fifty at the outset, while for Florus (2. 8. 3) they amounted to about thirty or more.

who, having escaped from their school. This training-school for gladiators (*ludus*) has been identified on the combined evidence of Plut. *Crass.* 8. 2; Flor. 2. 8. 3; Liv. *Per.* 95; Oros. 5. 24. 1 and *Comment. Luc.* 2. 554 as that of Cn. Lentulus Batiatus in Capua. Only Plutarch (ibid.) is explicit about the nationality of the gladiators: he states the majority were Gauls and Thracians. Other references to their nationality (Sall. *Hist.* 3. 66D; 3. 90–1; 4. 34; Plut. *Crass.* 9. 7, 9; Liv. *Per.* 97; Oros. 5. 24. 6) indicate that they were Gauls, Germans, and Thracians. See A. Demain and M. T. Raepsaet-Charlier, *ACD* 17–18 (1981–2), 83–7. The date of the break-out is provided by Oros. 5. 24. 1: 'in the consulship of Lucullus and Cassius' i.e. 73 BC. The time was probably early autumn of that year.

3. 61. endowed with an outstanding measure of strength and courage. Qualities essential for success as a gladiator. The description, however, implies a measure of admiration for the man, which is reflected elsewhere in Sallust's treatment, and also in Plutarch's treatment (e.g. *Crass.* 8. 3; 9. 7; 11. 9–10). Cf. A. La Penna, *Athenaeum* 41 (1963), 256–9. The Roman attitude to Spartacus is summed up in the remark of Orosius (5. 24. 5) on the consternation caused by Spartacus' defeat of the consuls of 72, Gellius and Lentulus, and the victory over the proconsul Cassius at Mutina: 'They were thrown into a state of panic virtually as great as that which had reigned when Hannibal was threatening the gates of Rome'; cf. Eutrop. 6. 7. 2S. This feeling of what Spartacus personified persisted in Roman minds—e.g. Hor. *Carm.* 3. 14. 19; *Epod.* 16. 1–5; Lucan, 2. 554; Tac. *Ann.* 3. 73. 3; 15. 46. 1; Plin. *NH* 33. 49. Even in late Roman literature Spartacus remained a stereotype—e.g. Amm. Marc. 14. 11. 33; Augustine, *CD* 3. 26.

3. 62.* they would die by the sword rather than by starvation. The sources agree that after the break-out in Capua the fugitives took refuge on Mt. Vesuvius. Appian's brief report (*BC* 1. 116), 'They overcame the guards and ran away, arming themselves with clubs and daggers that they took from people on the roads, and took refuge on Mt. Vesuvius', is fleshed out by detail provided by Plutarch: 'the runaways seized spits and knives from a kitchen in Capua; on the road they plundered wagons conveying gladiators' weapons to another city; they then took up a strong position on Vesuvius, and repulsed soldiers sent against them from Capua, thereby getting hold of weapons used in real warfare; joined by fugitive slaves and some freemen from the farms of the region, they grew into a formidable force' (*Crass.* 8. 2–3).

3. 63.* Cossinius was washing himself . . . at the nearest villa. The Romans, underestimating the threat posed by the polyglot army of slaves and others, beset by the problems of the wars being waged against Sertorius and Mithridates, sent against them a force of 3,000 troops under the command of C. Claudius Glaber, a praetor of

73 (*MRR* 2. 109 and 115 n. 1). Glaber's plans to surround the rebels on Mt. Vesuvius was thwarted by a stratagem described in detail by Plutarch (*Crass.* 9. 2–3; cf. Frontin. *Str.* 1. 5. 21; Flor. 2. 8. 4.). The Romans were put to flight and the rebels were able to arm with captured weapons the many herdsmen and shepherds who flocked to join them. The praetor Publius Varinius (*MRR* 2. 110) was now sent against them. The fugitives, however, first encountered Varinius' legate, Furius, at the head of 2,000 men whom they routed (Plut. *Crass.* 9. 5). Then Spartacus closely watched the movements of Cossinius, another praetor of 73 (*MRR* 2. 110) who had been sent out with a large force to advise and assist Varinius, and came near to seizing him as he was bathing near Salinae (Plut. *Crass.* 9. 5). Plutarch goes on to report that Cossinius escaped with much difficulty but was pursued by Spartacus who captured his camp with great slaughter; Cossinius was among those killed.

The Sallustian narrative preserved in the direct transmission, the two folios of the Fleury palimpsest which are referred to as the Vatican Fragment, is our major source for the events which brought the campaigning season of 73 to a close. The order of the events is a matter of some dispute and is discussed in the commentary on frr. 64 and 66. With regard to these two fragments it is to be noted that Reynolds has been quite conservative in his treatment of the last few lines of 64. C, and almost the whole of 66. A and D. In this he is exercising his rights as a textual critic; the fact that my commentary is based on the fuller version supplied by Maurenbrecher does not mean that I think Maurenbrecher has solved most of the difficulties posed by the extremely corrupt nature of the MS.

3. 64. A–D. The first part of the so-called Vatican Fragment contained in *Vat. Reg.* 1283. It deals with three important points: (i) the sending of Toranius to report back to the Roman government on the loss of morale among the Roman troops; (ii) the stratagem which enables the rebels to withdraw from camp without being hindered by Varinius; (iii) dissension among the contingents of the force under Spartacus' command. In short we

are introduced to factors which were to be repeated and which account for the prolongation of this confrontation from the autumn of 73 to the spring of 71 BC.

3. 64. A. to harden their spears . . . hardly less effectively than with iron-tipped spears. Having successfully dealt with attacks from detachments under Glaber and Furius, and having crushed the force under Cossinius, the fugitives now had to face Varinius. They had no problems with manpower, but did require equipment with which to arm the ever-growing number of reinforcements. The prospect that the threat posed by Varinius, given the breakdown of morale among Roman troops, could easily be contained would not have affected the thoroughness of preparation which seems to have marked Spartacus' leadership throughout. The eventual victory over Varinius was due as much to the thoroughness of preparation of the rebel forces as to the lack of enthusiasm among their opponents.

a severe edict. The combination of a series of defeats and of unhealthy service conditions had clearly brought about a collapse of Roman morale; cf. Plut. *Cat. Min.* 8. 1–2. Varinius' decision to present a formal report to the senate was at once an appeal for reinforcement and a safeguard against possible charges of inefficiency on his part. This type of report probably also played a part in Crassus' handling of command problems when he took over the command against the fugitives in the last part of 72 BC.

Toranius. The quaestor C. Toranius is called Thoranius by Sallust here, and by Florus in 2. 8. 5. Münzer on the basis of *ILS* 47—*Inscr. Ital.* 13. 5. 75b corrected the name to Toranius (*MRR* 2. 115 n. 4).

3. 64. B. with four thousand willing troops. Sallust is the only source to deal in detail with the lack of morale among Roman troops. The number of men available to Varinius at this stage would have included remnants of the forces defeated under Glaber, Furius, and Cossinius; the combined force would have been depleted by sickness and desertion.

fortifying it with rampart, ditch, and extensive earthworks. An example of the detailed nature of Sallust's narrative. It may also indicate that, in the case of the commanders before Varinius, a fatal underestimation of Spartacus' command skills and of the do-or-die attitude of the troops under him had prevented them from carrying out the normal procedures and preparations expected from an army of well-trained Roman soldiers. This would be the situation especially in the case of the force commanded by Glaber and Cossinius respectively.

to frighten the soldiers of Varinius into flight. Frontinus was impressed enough by the operative part of the stratagem devised by Spartacus to include it among the stratagems he used to illustrate the section he entitled 'On Escaping from Difficult Situations': '(he) placed stakes at short intervals before the gate of the camp; then setting up corpses dressed in clothes and furnished with weapons, he tied these to the stakes, to give them the appearance of sentries when viewed from a distance. He also lighted fires throughout the whole camp. Deceiving the enemy by this empty show, Spartacus by night silently led out his troops' (*Str.* 1. 5. 22).

The four lines missing from the end of section B presumably dealt with the journey of the fugitives.

3. 64. C. But believing . . . yet fearing . . . he withdrew. Varinius' intention to double his forces indicates that he at least had cast aside whatever contempt he may have felt for the status and fighting potential of a force which was now developing into a major threat.

But when he reached Cumae . . . Cumae was a coastal town of Campania, south of Mt. Vesuvius. Maurenbrecher was of the opinion that the lines missing at the end of this section C might have dealt with Varinius' method of strengthening his troops, but the wording of this part of the fragment seems to suggest that Varinius' expectation of ample reinforcement was not met. The opening words of the section D suggest that much of his time was spent in raising the morale of the troops under his command.

3. 64. D. in spite of the observed facts. Clear indication that Varinius had not been able to resolve the problems of lack of enthusiasm and positive reluctance in the attitude of his troops. Such factors no doubt contributed to their eventual defeat by Spartacus.

demoralized by the misfortunes of others. Certainly a reference to the rout of part of their own unit while under the command of Furius, and very probably to the losses suffered by the contingent commanded by Cossinius.

Varinius nevertheless rashly led . . . against the fugitives' camp a force which was not now so loquacious. One of the several engagements between the armies of Spartacus and Varinius before their final encounter, the battle which brought the campaigning season of 73 to a close. Cf. Plut. *Crass.* 9. 5–7; Eutrop. 6. 7. 2S; Florus, 2. 8. 5.

disagreement over a plan of action. Sallust is the only source which provides detail concerning dissension arising from difference of opinion concerning an intention to join immediate battle against Varinius. The actual break-up of the rebel force into separate bands under Spartacus and under the combined leadership of Crixus and Oenomaus was a feature of the early campaigning season of 72.

wanted to go forth and offer battle on their own accord. Maurenbrecher held that this was a preliminary reference to the final battle against Varinius, a description of which was provided by Sallust in two folios which have fallen out between frr. 66 and 69 (i.e. frr. 96M and 98M). He believed the missing folios contained the narrative of this final battle, of the defeat of Toranius in a subsequent engagement, and of the devastation of Campania.

G. Stampacchia (*La tradizione*, 30 ff.) has pointed out that such a reconstruction cannot be reconciled with the order of events as treated by Plutarch and Florus, and above all with the fact that Varinius is mentioned in fr. 66. B in a way which clearly implies that this final battle had not yet taken place. She notes that when dealing with the areas in which pillaging occurred Florus (2. 8. 6), after naming the Campanian towns of Nola and Nuceria, adds two towns of Lucania, Thurii and Metapontum, and then

goes on to describe the rapid growth of Spartacus' army and the preparation of rudimentary weapons for these reinforcements. The final part of Florus' next statement, 'That nothing might be lacking which was proper to a regular army, cavalry was procured . . . and his men brought to their leader the insignia and the fasces captured from the praetors', is undoubtedly a reference to the capture of the lictors of Varinius referred to in Plut. *Crass.* 9. 7. The next commanders named after Varinius and Toranius by Florus are Lentulus and Crassus whom he names as *consulares* (2. 8. 10). Stampacchia suggests that it would be logical to assume that the phrase (Flor. 2. 8. 5) *inde alia castra Variniana, deinceps Torani* ('they then attacked other camps, that of Varinius and afterwards that of Toranius') is a reference not to the final battle with Varinius, but to the encounter being discussed in this part of the fragment. She therefore proposes an order of events which I find acceptable: attacks on the camps of Varinius and Toranius; sacking and pillaging in Campania and Lucania; an influx of reinforcements and preparation of weaponry; the final battle, in Lucania, with Varinius.

3. 65. they encountered the farmers of Abella. Abella was a town in Campania. This fragment refers to the devastation which began in Campania and spread into Lucania. Cf. Florus, 2. 8. 5.

3. 66. A–D. This second half of the Vatican Fragment is very lacunose and has required major reconstruction. It is clear that a sizeable amount has fallen out between the two folios that have survived. Attractive is Stampacchia's view that the missing context contained Spartacus' speech in which he opposed the Gauls and Germans under Crixus who wanted to confront Varinius straightaway. In this speech Spartacus also probably developed the proposal that they should return to the place from which they had originated. Cf. Plutarch, *Crass.* 9. 7.

3. 66. A. in the fear that . . . necessary to leave as quickly as possible. Very likely the closing part of the Spartacus speech referred to above; it clearly sums up the dangers inherent in aimless wandering about Italy.

A few men of foresight . . . approved of his plan. The plan Spartacus proposed was that they should march north as a united force and attempt a crossing of the Alps and an eventual return to their countries of origin.

Others, however . . . looked for nothing more than booty and . . . cruelty. The influx of slaves, freemen labourers, and struggling tenant-farmers was a fairly continuous phenomenon, depending on the type of countryside in which the rebels were operating. The mention of a strong flow of reinforcements at this stage (cf. §D) concurrent with the successes against Varinius and before the consuls took over the command in 72, is supported by Florus, 2. 8. 6; App. *BC* 1. 116; Oros. 5. 24. 2. Plutarch has changed the order of these events: Spartacus' plan for them to head for the Alps and return to their home countries is reported as taking place after the defeat of Varinius and before the consuls took over the command. The order of events indicated by Sallust here—the long range programme of Spartacus, the strong opposition of the rebel Gallic and Germanic contingents, and the devastation of the countryside is not met with in any other source; Appian (*BC* 1. 117) does, however, refer to Spartacus' intention to cross the Alps. See note on 3. 86, **the only place which would be safe.**

the majority, induced by their servile nature. The dissension described here and the horrendous atrocities committed by the fugitive bands who refused to adopt the moderate policy of Spartacus continued to mark the progress of this conflict to the end. The implication of 'servile nature' could well be that many of the Germanic and Gallic fugitives had lived under slave conditions in their territories of origin and saw no future for themselves in Spartacus' plan.

3. 66. B. that they should go . . . where they could increase their number . . . before the coming of Varinius. Makes quite clear the fact that Sallust's narrative placed the final battle against Varinius among the concluding activities of 73 BC campaigning season.

with his army made up to strength again. No doubt Spartacus prudently assumed that the Romans would take

special measures to ensure success in their next encounter. The outcome of the final engagement suggests, however, that Varinius had been thwarted in at least some of his preparations. See note on 3. 64. C, **But when he reached Cumae . . .** On the other hand, when, prior to the actual battle with Varinius, Spartacus led his force into regions ripe for ravaging he discovered that he had not diverted the minds of the dissident troops from their primary objectives—looting and indiscriminate acts of cruelty.

a suitable guide from among the Picentine captives. The allusion is to prisoners taken at the town of Picentia in the south of Campania. The fugitives' route continued further south; they found cover behind the hills and moved further into Lucania to the Nares Lucanas—where apparently the hill-country began to open up into plains-country—and so to the unfortunate township of Forum Annii (?).

3. 66. C. they dealt in heinous fashion with those who resisted. The litany of robbery, rape, and unspeakable acts of cruelty in sections C and D receive a summary treatment in Florus, 2. 8. 5–6: 'they ranged over the whole of Campania. Not content with the plundering of the country houses and villages, they laid waste Nola and Nuceria, Thurii and Metapontum with terrible destruction.' Cf. Orosius, 5. 24. 3.

when he begged them repeatedly to make haste and forestall. Spartacus could only continue to remind the dissidents of the threat posed by Varinius; he had to deal with them in a way that would not totally alienate them, since he needed their participation in the coming battle with the Romans.

3. 66. D. with the number of fugitives now doubled. The sources which mention figures give widely different estimates of the size of the fugitives' army in the first months of the war. Thus Florus (2. 8. 3) speaks of 10,000 at Vesuvius. Orosius (5. 24. 2) allocates 10,000 to Crixus and 30,000 to Spartacus during the ravaging of Campania–Lucania, while Appian (*BC* 1. 116) gives Spartacus' army strength as 70,000 before the campaign

of 72 BC. The fighting strengths and the casualty figures of the rebel force were highly exaggerated by the historians of the Livian–senatorial tradition: to account for the string of Roman defeats and the perceptible loss of morale in the Roman forces emphasis is placed on the unusual strategic and organizing skills of Spartacus and on his number of troops constantly swelled by the influx of volunteers both servile and free. On the other hand most of our knowledge on Roman casualty figures is derived from statements made concerning the recovery of Roman spoils in subsequent encounters. On the figures provided by the sources in the different phases of the Spartacus war see R. Kamienik, *Altertum* 16 (1970), 96–105. On problems concerning the reliability of numbers given in ancient historiography see Comm. on 2. 57.

where he drove away the peasants who had emerged from their houses. Maurenbrecher printed his reconstructed version ⟨. . . *ubi colo*⟩ *nos aedificis e*⟨*gressos videt*⟩ 'where he saw the peasants who had come out of their houses'; I have accepted Frassinetti's conjecture of *fugat* for *videt* on the grounds that it fits in better with what follows.

3. 67. only one man . . . who had knowledge of the place. The reference to the use of a guide in 3. 66. B indicates that the fugitive band had no knowledge of the Lucanian region; it continued to have need of the services of someone capable and willing to guide them. In the case of Publipor it appears to have application to a specific region which Spartacus had in mind—it may well have had something to do with the area chosen for the final encounter between Spartacus and Varinius.

The defeat of Varinius occurred at the end of the campaigning season of 73 BC. (See, however, *MRR* 2. 110 and Broughton's n. 3 on 115 together with his reference to Frontinus, *Str.* 1. 5. 22, *proconsul* on p. 119). The Romans did not undertake any further expeditions. They obviously turned to the task of planning for the opening campaign of 72.

3. 68*–76*. (73/2 BC) Deal with the second major phase of M. Antonius' command against the pirates. In the

Commentary on 3. 5–7 I have given reasons for placing it at this point in the narrative of Book 3. The narrative of the armed conflict is preceded by an excursus on the topography of the island of Crete; only three fragments which deal with the fighting have been preserved.

3. 68.* in the middle of the sea . . . far from the mainland. In explaining Virgil's use of *medio ponto* to describe the position of Crete, Servius points out that the poet did not imitate the precision of geographers who speak of Sardinia as being in the African sea, Delos in the Aegean, etc., because, depending upon which location one is looking from in Crete, one can speak of the Libyan, African, Achaean, and Ionian seas. Servius presumably assumed that Sallust's use of *longe a continenti* was based on the same circumstance; he overlooks the fact that Virgil, *Aen.* 3. 73 speaks of Delos as being *medio mari.* Maurenbrecher felt that *medio mari* was more Sallustian, and felt that his selection of this phrase was supported by Mela's use of the same phrase in his description of Crete.

3. 69.* higher on its eastern side. Other writers on Crete stress the size of the island; thus Mela (ibid.) has: 'huge, and at one time occupied by a hundred cities, Crete extends to the eastern promontory, Samonium, and to the western Criumetopon.' Solinus (11. 4) has: 'between east and west it stretches over a very long distance.'

3. 70.* produces a variety of crops. Solinus (ibid.) expands this feature thus: 'The land of Crete nowhere nurtures wolves, foxes, or other kinds of harmful quadrupeds; there are no snakes, plenty of vines, a remarkable fertility of soil.'

3. 71.* Enceladus is in Sicily? Enceladus was a member of the mythical race of Giants, monstrous in appearance and of great strength. The legend of the fight for supremacy between the gods and the Giants (the Gigantomachy) was formulated in early epics and added to by many later writers. A substantial account is provided in the *Bibliotheca* of Apollodorus (1. 34. ff.). The defeated Giants were believed to be buried under

volcanoes in many parts of Greece and Italy, Enceladus under Aetna in Sicily.

Otus fought in Crete. Otus and Ephialtes, sons of Iphimedeia, wife of Alöeus, and Poseidon are usually referred to as the Aloadae. By the time they were nine years old the boys had grown to 9 fathoms in height and 9 cubits in breadth (Hom. *Od.* 11. 310–11). Their intentions were indicated when they imprisoned the god of war, Ares, in a bronze vessel for thirteen months (Hom. *Il.* 5. 385 ff.). Their next intention was to climb to heaven by piling mountains on each other, but they were killed by Apollo before they grew up (Hom. *Od.* 11. 315 ff.). Sallust seems to have accepted a common belief that Otus was buried in Crete. Cf. Pliny, *NH* 7. 73.

3. 72.* that antiquity . . . honoured them. The reference is to the Curetes, semi-divine beings (Hesiod fr. 198 Rzach) who inhabited Crete. They were connected with the myth concerning the birth of Zeus (Jupiter), according to which the child was hidden in a cave in order that his father, the Titan Kronos, might not swallow him up. The Curetes assisted in the protection of the infant by dancing and clattering their weapons to drown out the child's cries. It is believed that the legend originated from a Cretan ceremonial in honour of Zeus Kouros (the young Zeus). Cf. M. P. Nilsson, *Minoan–Mycenean Religion and its Survival in Greek Religion* (Lund 1927), 475 ff.; H. T. Rose, *Handbook of Greek Mythology* (London 1945), 171.

3. 73. The Carians . . . were subdued by Minos. Kritz (1. 78K) placed this fragment in a context where the earliest reference to piracy occurs in connection with the campaigns of Servilius Vatia. He believed that it formed part of a Sallustian discussion on the origins of piracy. Maurenbrecher rightly notes that both Sallust and Thucydides are cited as making a similar observation on the topic of defeat inflicted on pirates and identifies the context of the fragment as the early history of Greece. Thucydides' account makes Sallust's point quite clear: 'Minos (king of Crete) according to tradition was the first person to organize a navy. He controlled the greater part

of what is now called the Hellenic (i.e. Aegean) Sea; he ruled over the Cyclades, in most of which he founded the first colonies, putting his sons in as governors after having driven out the Carians. And it is reasonable to suppose that he did his best to put down piracy in order to secure his own revenues' (1. 4).

3. 74–76*. Are what remains of Sallust's narrative of Antonius' campaign against the island of Crete. Florus provides an interesting account of the motivation of the attack and of Antonius' inept handling of it: 'The Cretan war, if the truth be told, was due solely to our desire to conquer that famous island. It was thought to have supported Mithridates, an offence which we resolved to punish by force of arms. Marcus Antonius made the first attack upon the island with such expectation of victory and confidence that he carried more fetters than arms aboard his ships' (1. 42. 1–2).

3. 74. During the voyage . . . two pirate galleys. This clear description of a naval incident does not provide any clue to a specific time or place, but since it has been transmitted with book-number it most probably refers to Antonius' operations. While the action could have taken place in any phase of the triennium, I follow Maurenbrecher in allotting it to the Cretan narrative of the high summer of 72.

3. 75. among whom . . . projecting from the prow. Florus gives a summary report on the dire results of Antonius' overconfidence and lack of preparation for the task in hand: 'And so he paid the penalty of his rashness; for the enemy cut off most of his ships and hung the bodies of their prisoners from the sails and tackle' (1. 42. 3).

3. 76.* having wasted three years there to no purpose. Late in 72 or early in 71 Antonius, having had no success whatever against the pirates (App. *Sic.* 6. 1), was forced to make a treaty with them (Diod. 40. 1). He died soon afterwards without returning to Rome (Cic. 2 *Verr.* 3. 213; Liv. *Per.* 97; Plut. *Ant.* 2. 1; Ps.-Ascon. 203 and 239 St.; *Schol. Bob.* 96 St.). He was spoken of, apparently in derision, as *Creticus* (Plut. *Ant.* 1. 1).

3. 77*–85. Deal with the final phase of the Sertorian War (73–72 BC). Though the last engagement of the 74 campaign had resulted in a victory for Sertorius at Calagurris, the worry which the war had caused for the Romans was nearing its end. The reason was not so much the military prowess of the senatorial armies as a significant change in Sertorius' relationship with his followers both Roman and Iberian.

Pompeius was the sole Roman general for the 73 campaign and he had some success against a weakened opposition. The absence of Metellus from this campaign was interpreted by Plutarch as an example of Pompeius' 'custom of alighting like a lazy carrion-bird on bodies that others had killed, and tearing to pieces the scattered remnants of wars'; he puts it on a par with Pompeius' appropriation of the victories over Lepidus and Spartacus which were actually won by Catulus and Crassus respectively (*Pomp.* 31. 11–12). However, given Metellus' appreciation of the good life in his own province (see Comm. 1. 59) and the fact that he was granted a triumph in 71, and his veterans were to be included in the agrarian law (*Lex Plautia*—see *MRR* 3. 93; R. E. Smith, *CQ* 7 (1957), 82–5) under which Pompeius' veterans were to be settled (Dio, 38. 5. 1), Plutarch's censure in this case is hardly justified. Sallust presumably makes a similar point in 4. 43 which deals with Metellus' dismissal of his troops before returning to Italy, whereas Pompeius used the Spartacus crisis as a pretext to take his army into Italy. While it is highly probable that Plutarch's view of the rivalry between Pompeius and Crassus emanates from Sallust, the report of bad relations between them, whoever was at fault, must have an element of truth.

By the time of Sertorius' death in 72 only a few towns were still holding out against the Roman army: Osca, Clunia, Uxama, Termes, and Calagurris in the upper Ebro valley; Dianium, Ilerda, Tarraco, and Valentia on or near the east coast (Strabo, 3. 4. 10; Flor. 2. 10. 9; Oros. 5. 23. 14; Exup. 5. 62Z). The outcome was primarily due to the lack of the will to resist among both the Roman troops of Sertorius' army and the Spaniards. Relations

between Sertorius and his Romans had been deteriorating since 74 (App. *BC* 1. 112); during 73 the defection of Spanish towns, some of which had been irresolute even in 74 (see Comm. 2. 75) grew apace (Diod. 37. 22a; App. *BC* 1. 113). Some of Sertorius' difficulties may have been due to the intrigues of the discontented circle of Perperna, but Sertorius' own attitude at this time undoubtedly played a part in his downfall. Both Plutarch (*Sert.* 10. 2–7; 25) and Appian (*BC* 1. 113) refer to a striking psychological change, a degeneration of character in Sertorius. He became isolated, reclusive, and exercised his power in overbearing fashion (Diod. 37. 22a; Liv. *Per.* 92 and 96). By and large the realization among both Romans and Spaniards that Sertorius could not now win the war was probably the chief reason for their decision to make provision for their own futures. On the Roman side this led to a conspiracy to murder Sertorius.

Maurenbrecher allocated nine fragments to this final phase (3. 81–9M); these I have retained. None of the extant fragments deals with incidents of the campaign itself: the emphasis is on the conspiracy led by Perperna against Sertorius and what happened after his assassination.

3. 77*–8. **Tarquitius.** One of the conspirators. He had served under Cn. Pompeius Strabo during the siege of Asculum in 89 together with Q. Hirtuleius, the brother of Sertorius' chief lieutenant, L. Hirtuleius, and L. Insteius, another of Sertorius' officers, who commanded the garrison left in Contrebia at the end of the 76 campaigning season (cf. Liv. 91 fr. 22. 14W–M and Comm. 1. 113). Tarquitius commanded 2,000 cavalry at Lauro (Frontin. *Str.* 2. 5. 31) and it is likely that he was on Sertorius' staff since 82, and had close ties with his general. Cf. Münzer, *RE* 4. 2294.

refuted this [letter]. Donatus' introduction to this fragment reads: *ut Salustius de scripto Celtiberi* ('as Sallust says of the written message of the Celtiberian'); this justifies the assumption that *hanc* ('this') refers to a letter (*epistulam*) or, possibly, to a conspiracy (*coniurationem*) and also that the two fragments 77 and 78 belong to the

same context. Maurenbrecher referred both fragments to an earlier, aborted conspiracy which is mentioned only by Appian (*BC* 1. 113): 'The conspiracy was betrayed, some of the guilty ones were punished and others fled, but Perperna escaped detection in some unaccountable manner and applied himself all the more to carry out the design.'

The fragments may thus be interpreted as indicating the way in which this earlier plot had been revealed—i.e. a message of warning from a Celtiberian. The intervention of Tarquitius, a trusted associate of Sertorius, was sufficient to discount charges laid against Perperna. The fact, however, that no other source even hints at an aborted assassination attempt, that Appian can be shown to be confused and unreliable on many other matters, that, though he states eleven people were implicated in the earlier plot, he gives no number for the conspiracy by which Sertorius was in fact assassinated, leads to a strong presumption that Appian has confused the fairly ample material available to him and was here taking rumour for fact (cf. Plut. *Sert.* 26 on Manlius).

Referral of these two fragments to the successful conspiracy reported by the other sources demands explanation of what was being refuted by Tarquitius. In his brief statement on the later conspiracy Appian (*BC* 1. 113) says: 'As Sertorius was never without his bodyguard of spearmen, Perperna invited him to a banquet.' What was required was a ploy by which Sertorius could be separated from this bodyguard. The conspirators thereupon appointed a man 'to act as the bearer of letters and introduced him to Sertorius. His letters made known a victory of one of the commanders serving under Sertorius and a great slaughter of the enemy. At this Sertorius was overjoyed and offered a sacrifice of glad tidings, during which Perperna proposed a banquet for him and his friends' (Plut. *Sert.* 26. 5–6).

But why the intervention of Tarquitius? Here one has to resort to conjecture. It has been hypothesized that the conspirators took advantage of an impending battle with Roman forces to concoct a false report of victory; a genuine report, presumably of defeat, arrived either before or

soon after the conspirators' forged report. Tarquitius was chosen to convince Sertorius that the bad news was false and so clear the way for Sertorius' acceptance of the invitation to the banquet. Thus C. F. Konrad, 'A Historical Commentary on Plutarch's Life of Sertorius' (Diss. Ann Arbor, Mi. 1985), 207. I prefer to surmise that Sertorius accepted as true the letter announcing victory delivered by a now familiar messenger, but his joy was dampened by the Celtiberian revelation of the rumours emanating from the Manlius, Aufidius, Graecinus triangle reported in Plut. *Sert.* 26. This was the part of the message that Tarquitius succeeded in discrediting. However, without clinching evidence we have to remain in the realm of conjecture.

3. 79. And so they took their places at the table. The Roman dining-area (*triclinium*) was of oblong shape with the three couches (*lecti*), from which the *triclinium* got its name, arranged around a table: the middle couch (*lectus medius*), faced the open end of the arrangement (see diagram in Schulten, 135); on the left of the *lectus medius* was the *lectus summus* (top couch) and on its right was the *lectus imus* (bottom couch). The relative positions of two persons who lay next to one another was expressed as *super* or *supra* ('above') and *inferior* or *infra* ('below'). Where a couch was occupied by three people the one in the middle was described as *medius inter* ('in between').

L. Fabius Hispaniensis. From the names mentioned in this fragment and in Plut. *Sert.* 26 nine people can be held to have been implicated in the conspiracy. L. Fabius served as quaestor in Spain under C. Annius in 81; during the Sullan proscriptions he joined Sertorius. Cf. Münzer, *RE* 6. 1771–2; *MRR* 2. 77.

Antonius. M. Antonius, was of a senatorial family. E. Gabba (*Esercito e società nella tarda reppublica romana* (Florence 1973), 307 n. 302) believed him to be related to Q. Antonius Balbus, the Marian governor of Sardinia in 83/2. See Klebs, *RE* 1. 2575; Diod. 37. 22a; Liv. *Per.* 96.

Versius . . . and Maecenas. The two secretaries (*scribae*) of Sertorius. Considered by Schulten (135) as not

implicated in the conspiracy. Konrad (Diss. 210) notes that a secretary would be in the best position to make a convincing forgery of a victory letter. That aside, their presence at the table must cast serious doubt on their innocence.

Tarquitius. See on 3. 77 above.

Perperna. M. Perperna Veiento, praetor and Marian governor of Sicily in 82. When driven out by Pompeius he fled to Sertorius in Spain (Diod. 38. 14; Plut. *Pomp.* 10. 1–2). He was proscribed and spent the troubled years, according to Oros. 5. 24. 16, in Liguria preparing for an insurrection. In 78 he joined in the revolt of Lepidus and withdrew with him into Sardinia after the defeat in Italy in 77. After the death of Lepidus he took what was left of their army to Spain where he joined Sertorius. His performance as a general was less than mediocre and his relationship with Sertorius, never cordial, had turned by 73 into a deadly hatred. Cf. Münzer, *RE* 19. 879 ff.

To the six people mentioned above we may add (i) Mallius or Manlius (Münzer, *RE* 14. 910 and 928) about whom nothing else is known; (ii) Aufidius, the only member of the conspiracy to survive the war; he ended his life alone and in poverty in a barbarian village (Plut. *Sert.* 27. 7); cf. Klebs, *RE* 2. 2288; Badian, *FC* 311; (iii) Octavius Graecinus who was in charge of twenty Iberian cohorts at Lauro (Frontin. *Str.* 2. 5. 31) and, like Tarquitius, probably a member of Sertorius' staff since 82. Cf. Münzer, *RE* 17. 1829–30; T. P. Wiseman, *CQ* 14 (1964), 127–8; *New Men*, 247 no. 288.

The actual murder at Osca is described by Plutarch in *Crass.* 26. 10–11; the first blow was struck by Antonius, who then prevented Sertorius from defending himself from the blows of many. Diodorus (37. 22a) gives a different version of the seating arrangement, placing Sertorius between Tarquitius and Antonius and naming these as sole slayers.

Among the Roman troops the assassination of Sertorius aroused animosity against Perperna, but he nevertheless assumed the leadership without much trouble, since he

held the next rank to Sertorius (App. *BC* 1. 114). But since 'he was fitted by nature neither to command nor to obey' (Plut. *Sert.* 27. 2) he soon faced opposition and found it necessary to use extreme measures including the killing of three nobles and of his own nephew (App. ibid.).

It is difficult to estimate the duration of Perperna's last command; the sources concentrate mainly on the final battle between Perperna and Pompeius. It is to be noted that the winning over of some of the cities mentioned in the introductory commentary to this section would be time-consuming; the desperate resistance of Uxama and Calagurris, the last towns to be taken by the Romans (Oros. 5. 23. 14) lasted for months after the death of Perperna.

3. 80. he adopted different courses of action. Kritz, supported by Dietsch, applied this to the battle in which Crixus, the leader of Gallic and Germanic contingents among the fugitives in the Spartacus war, was defeated and killed in 72 by the consul Gellius, assisted by his lieutenant Arrius. (See Comm. on 3. 90).

La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 45) suggested relegation of the fragment to fragments *incertae sedis* of Book 3. Since Kritz referred it to the Crixus battle and Maurenbrecher referred it to Perperna's last battle, La Penna felt that these were but two out of several similar possibilities in Book 3.

Descriptions of Perperna's last engagement in Plut. *Sert.* 27. *Pomp.* 20. 4–6; Frontin. Str. 2. 5. 32; App. *BC* 1. 115 show that Pompeius used 10 cohorts as a decoy to draw the enemy into an ambush; Perperna's force was attacked from the front and on both flanks simultaneously. Maurenbrecher's argument for referring the fragment to Perperna's final battle is convincing: the key phrase *fiducia gnaritatis locorum* ('relying on their knowledge of the locality') is clearly more applicable to Perperna's army than to the fugitive force under Crixus on which Gellius (*ἐξαίφνης ἐμπεσών*) suddenly swooped near Mt. Garganus in Apulia.

3. 81.* the mule driver of a contractor recognized Perperna. Appian reports that 'Perperna was defeated all along the line and concealed himself in a thicket' (*BC* 1. 115). Having been recognized by the mule-driver 'Perperna was brought before Pompeius who ordered him to be put to death' (Plut. *Pomp.* 20. 6). Cf. Amm. Marc. 26. 9. 9.

3. 82*–3. had dared and allowed . . . an extended period of future use. Exuperantius 56Z sums up the last stage of the Sertorian War: 'Afterwards Pompeius suppressed Perperna, demolished the cities of Uxama, Clunia, and Calagurris, and having set up trophies in the Pyrenees, returned to Rome.' Cf. Oros. 5. 23. 14.

Both of these fragments refer to the siege of Calagurris, noteworthy for the extremities to which its defenders were reduced. In the case of fr. 83 Gerlach and Kritz felt that Sallust's statement was a close imitation of a phrase used by his admired model, Thucydides. In speaking of the siege of Potidaea, Thucydides remarked: 'and so far had the distress for food gone in Potidaea that, besides a number of other horrors, instances even occurred of people having eaten one another' (2. 70. 1). The practice of cannibalism in the Calagurris siege is given a detailed treatment in Val. Max. 7. 6 ext. 3, part of which states: 'because no animal of any kind had by now survived in their city, they used the bodies of their wives and children as the fare of a monstrous meal . . . and, moreover, they did not hesitate to salt what was left of the ill-fated remains.'

3. 84. But Pompeius . . . believed that he would be the equal of kind Alexander. This fragment has been transmitted with book-number; fr. 85 has no book-number, but its content clearly indicates that it is connected with this fragment and that both belong to Book 3.

In a general statement on Sallust's treatment of Pompeius (Introd. pp. 17–18) I refer to the historian's tendency to stress character traits that are relevant to Pompeius' motivation and activity at different stages of his career. Thus in the letter to the senate, Pompeius com-

pares his feat of crossing the Alps with that of Hannibal (see Comm. 2. 82. 4 and cf. the initial portrait of Pompeius in 2. 17–20). Now, at the end of the Sertorian War he did not hesitate to compare his military exploits with those of Alexander the Great.

3. 85*. he set up trophies of his victories over the Spaniards. Pliny (*NH* 3. 18) confirms that Pompeius erected a monument to his victories and his valour in the Pyrenees. He does not describe the monument but quotes the inscription of Pompeius' *res gestae*: '876 towns brought into subjection from the Alps to the borders of Farther Spain.' The absence of the name of Sertorius on the stone fits in with the observation of Florus: 'The victorious generals desired that the struggle should be considered a foreign rather than a civil war in order that they might celebrate a triumph' (2. 10. 9). If one analyses Pompeius' own version of his exploits (Comm. on 2. 82. 4–6), the fact that this pretentious memorial was the object of censure (Dio, 41. 24. 3) should cause no surprise.

3. 86–90. Deal with the campaign waged by L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Lentulus Clodianus, the consuls of 72, against the fugitive armies under Spartacus and Crixus. Despite the string of successes that had placed much of south Italy under rebel control in 73, Spartacus had no illusions about the dangers of his situation. He therefore urged a strategy that would protect his followers as much as possible, and took steps to arm as effectively as circumstances permitted the ever-increasing influx of volunteers during the winter of 73/2. There have survived only five fragments which appear to have been part of the narrative of this campaigning year of the Spartacus war, the first four of these have to do with preparation for the encounter.

3. 86. the only place which would be safe. Spartacus' biggest problem was dissension between the different contingents of his miscellaneous force; by the time the campaign of 72 began in earnest both Spartacus and Crixus commanded armies of formidable size. The basic problem.

the securing of agreement on a concerted strategic plan was never fully resolved. For his part, Spartacus 'took the proper view of the situation, and since he could not expect to overcome the Roman power, he began to lead his army towards the Alps, thinking it necessary for them to cross the mountains and to go to their respective homes' (Plut. *Crass.* 9. 7). His plan was thwarted by the attitude of the leaders Crixus and Oenomaus who were content to keep their forces ravaging about Italy; they would not listen to his plan of an orderly progress with adequate military precautions being applied throughout. This was the strategy that Spartacus had devised from the outset and for which, in the preparatory weeks of the 72 campaigning season, he sought to arm his troops as effectively as possible.

3. 87.* deprive them of their weapons and their horses. From the very first influx of volunteers to the fugitive force and the growing determination to resist whatever forces the Roman senate sent against them, Spartacus realized that the only sure means of entrenching military discipline was the fostering of an *esprit de corps*; this would depend on the provision of armament and weaponry proper to a regular army. The ways of doing this were applied from the beginning and were repeated now in the prospect of more determined Roman attempts to crush them: the armament and weapons of slain or captured foes were to be retained and their horses were to be added to those 'procured by the breaking in of herds of horses which they encountered' (Flor. 2. 8. 7).

3. 88*–9*. The Germans cover . . . with skins. Editors before Maurenbrecher assumed that these two fragments formed part of a lengthier description of Germany and the Germans, probably added by Sallust as an excursus inside the narrative of Curio's expedition to the Danube in 75 (Sall. *Hist.* 2. 60; Flor. 1. 39. 6; Eutrop. 6. 6. 2S). Maurenbrecher proposed a reference to the battle in which the Germans, commanded by Crixus, were defeated and cut down by the consul Gellius' army. I have taken the fragment to be part of a discussion of weaponry and

protective clothing used to introduce the crucial campaigning season of 72.

3. 90. And at the same time Lentulus [abandoned] an elevated position. The transmitted Latin version of this fragment is very corrupt. Maurenbrecher's version is based on the incorporation of corrections by Mercier, Kritz, and Dietsch. A major problem is that Nonius has omitted the verb of which 'Lentulus' is the subject and 'elevated position' is the object. I accept Dietsch's suggestion that some such word as *reliquit* ('abandoned') should be supplied.

From the translation I have given it is clear that the Roman general who had been under considerable pressure had summoned help either from a subordinate commander or from a fellow-general; he then took the action of leaving his position when it became clear that reinforcements were close at hand. The phrase *ex sarcinis paludamenta* ('from the baggage military cloaks') is puzzling: *paludamenta* which normally refers to military cloaks used by generals and other officers of high rank does not fit in with the context; it may be used loosely here to indicate the contents of the soldiers' packs.

The naming of Lentulus confirms that we are dealing with an encounter that took place during the 72 campaign against Spartacus. The sources on this campaign (Liv. *Per.* 96; Plut. *Crass.* 9. 7–10. 1; *Cat. Min.* 8. 1–2; App. *BC* 1. 117; Flor. 2. 8. 10; Eutrop. 6. 7. 2S; Oros. 5. 24. 4) provide accounts which differ in important details; cf. T. R. Holmes, *The Roman Republic*, vol. 1 (New York 1923), 386–9. I have assumed that there were four major encounters, three in the course of Spartacus' march to the north, and one, in Picenum, in the course of his return southwards: (i) the consul Gellius, perhaps assisted by his lieutenant, the propraetor Q. Arrius, surprised and defeated with great losses the fugitive contingent under Crixus which had separated from the main body; Crixus was among those killed; (ii) as Spartacus continued his march north with Gellius at his heels and Lentulus seeking to intercept him from the front, the Thracian leader turned on them one after the other and inflicted a serious

defeat on each; (iii) continuing on his way to the Alps, Spartacus was met by C. Cassius Longinus, governor of Cisalpine Gaul, whom he defeated at Mutina. He then for no satisfactorily attested reason abandoned his plan to cross the Alps; (iv) in the course of his journey southwards he was confronted, in Picenum, by the combined forces of both consuls whom he comprehensively defeated for a second time.

Dietsch referred this incident to the occasion of the separate battles against the consuls after Crixus had been killed. Maurenbrecher preferred the battle in which both consuls together were defeated in Picenum. I agree with Kritz that the fragment does not provide sufficient detail upon which to base a compelling identification.

3. 91–2. Are part of the narrative covering the activity of Scribonius Curio as governor of Macedonia in 74–73 BC. Since he was succeeded by M. Terentius Varro Lucullus, consul in 73, it is likely that Curio's governorship extended into the early part of 72. When Lucullus took over, Curio returned to Rome and celebrated a victory over the Dardani, probably in that same year (Cic. *Pis.* 44; Eutrop. 6. 2. 2 and 6. 5. 25S). During 74–73 Curio carried on with his campaign against the Dardani (see Comm. 2. 60 and 61) and had in the course of the task of reducing them travelled as far north as the Danube (Liv. *Per.* 95; Flor. 1. 39. 6; Eutrop. 6. 2. 2S; Oros. 5. 23. 20). Neither of the two extant fragments on this phase provides clear clues as to precise time and place.

3. 91. And Curio . . . orders him to set out . . . Curio, whose methods of compelling the Dardanians to honour their commitments to Appius (see note on 2. 60, **by whatever means he could**) were rigorous and uncompromising, had no qualms about accepting whatever help was offered in the task of subduing recalcitrants and collecting the tribute.

3. 92. Because of his uneasiness with regard to the festival of Vulcan. A translation of the Latin phrase *religione Volcanaliorum*. The *Volcanalia* was a Roman festival in

honour of the fire god, Vulcan; it was held annually on 23 August with games in the Circus Flaminius and a sacrifice, unexampled for Rome, of live fish thrown from the Tiber into a fire (Varro, *Ling.* 6. 20; Plin. *Ep.* 3. 5. 8). It was on this day that the consul Q. Fulvius Nobilior received a severe defeat from the Celtiberians in 153 BC, 'for which reason, from that time on, no general will begin a battle on that day unless compelled to do so' (App. *Hist.* 45). The word *religio* carries the meaning of impediment to action, arising out of doubt, unease, religious awe, conscience and the like. Thus on this *ater* or *atra dies* Curio considered discretion the better part of valour.

3. 93–100. Are the fragments of uncertain placement (*incertae sedis*) of Book 3. I comment only on the four fragments which I have relegated to this section from Maurenbrecher's narrative text.

3. 93. the soldiers began to march in a more careless fashion. The general nature and the vagueness of this statement does not permit precision of allocation. Kritz, admitting this problem, conjectured a reference to a mutinous army; Dietsch suggested a comment on troops relaxing because they felt immediate danger was passed. Maurenbrecher (3. 25M) confined it to a situation in which troops rejected a commander's plan of action; he suggested reference to Lucullus' army in Phrygia and the mutinous attitude of the Valerians (see Comm. 3. 19).

3. 94. For it was then the third hour. A translation of Nonius: *nam tertia tunc erat*. Kritz believed that this was a reference to a planned attack on Cyzicus: 'he [Mithridates] set out immediately after the evening meal, taking advantage of a dark and rainy night' (Plut. *Luc.* 9. 1). To fit in with the details of this identification he changed the wording of the fragment to *nam tertia luna erat* ('For it was the third day after the new moon'). The editors Dietsch and Maurenbrecher (3. 27M) accepted Kritz's conjecture.

A. Garbugino (*Stud. Non.* 12 (1987), 61–5) notes the transmitted fragment makes no reference to night time. It

is not unusual for an ordinal numeral to be used with its noun *hora* ('hour') understood; cf. Hor. *Sat.* 2. 6. 34; Cic. *Mil.* 29. The Sallustian fragment could well be referring to the third hour of the day (about nine o'clock) and to a morning mist (*matutina nebula*, as in Liv. 37. 41. 2). As it stands the general statement of the fragment could apply to any one of the conflicts dealt with in Book 3.

3. 95. hampered by the intrigue. Applied by Gerlach to the conspiracy against Sertorius, but that conspiracy resulted in death and was not simply an inconvenience to Sertorius. Maurenbrecher's (3. 32M) application of it to suspected intrigues between Mithridates and the Valerians is far too daring.

3. 96. each man recalled the one most dear to him . . . duties. A scene typical of a host of military crises; there is nothing in the fragment to support reference to a specific occasion. Maurenbrecher's (3. 95M) referral of it to the army of Varinius facing Spartacus is only one of the several possibilities in Book 3. Kritz and Dietsch interpreted 'final duties' (*munia*) as the making and signing of wills; cf. Caes. *BGall.* 1. 39. 5; Flor. 1. 45. 12.

BOOK 4

Because of the smaller number of fragments which have survived from Book 4 of the *Histories*, problems arise concerning the structure of this book. Maurenbrecher, for example, has dealt in nineteen fragments of his chapter 1 (4. 1–19M) with urban affairs of 72 and material relating to affairs in the East over the three-year period 72–70. These latter comprise important campaigns by Lucullus against Mithridates, operations concurrently conducted by M. Aurelius Cotta in Bithynia, and the 72 campaign of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus in Macedonia.

In accordance with the views I have expressed concerning Sallust's narrative method (Introd. § 5), I have attempted to distinguish the events of separate campaigning seasons and/or theatres of operation. Thus frr. 1–2

deal with urban affairs of 72; frr. 3–10 with events of the Mithridatic war in 72; frr. 11–13 with the activity of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus in Thrace; frr. 14–36 with the last phase of the Spartacus war; frr. 37–45 with urban affairs of 71; frr. 46–51 with Mithridatic campaigns of 71; frr. 52–6 with urban affairs of 70; frr. 57–8 with the activity of Lucullus in 70; fr. 59–66 with Lucullus' Armenian campaign of 69; fr. 67 the Letter of Mithridates; frr. 68–77 Lucullus' campaign in northern Armenia in 68, with comments on his character; fr. 78 with urban affairs of 68. In the commentary on such meagrely illustrated phases I have attempted to round out the picture with evidence from other sources.

4. 1–2. Indicate that Sallust began this book with a treatment of urban affairs (*res urbanae*) of 72 BC.

4. 1. his colleague . . . surnamed Clodianus. The consuls for 72 were L. Gellius Publicola and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus, of whom Sallust did not have a high opinion.

proposed a bill for exacting the money. The sole evidence for the *Lex Cornelia de pecunia quam Sulla bonorum emptoribus remiserat exigenda* is listed by Rotondi (*Leges Publicae*, 366–7), who points out that its precise stipulations are not known. There is no indication that the law was ever promulgated.

which Sulla had remitted. See note on 1. 40, **sold or simply given away**, and on 1. 48. 12, **a few of his underlings.**

4. 2. The senate was searching . . . for him and Metrophanes. Maurenbrecher rightly rejected the view of previous editors that this referred to the embassy sent by Mithridates to arrange an alliance with Sertorius. There is no evidence that Metrophanes took part in these negotiations, discussed by Sallust in Book 2. See notes on 2. 90–1.

It is known that the ex-Marian, L. Fannius, who had fled to Mithridates from Fimbria's army, later played a prominent role in the Mithridatic War: both he and Metrophanes, who had commanded a naval squadron at

Euboea during the First Mithridatic War, were the commanders of a force defeated by Lucullus' lieutenant Mamercus in 74 (Oros. 6. 2. 16–18). No further report has survived concerning Metrophanes' activity in the Third Mithridatic War. The fact, however, that the scholiast records that ultimately the two traitors, L. Magius and L. Fannius, deserted Mithridates and returned to the Romans (Ps.-Asc. 244 St.; cf. Dio, 36. 8. 2) has given rise to Maurenbrecher's attractive assumption that 'him' (*eum*) of the fragment refers to Fannius, and that both he and Metrophanes, commanding a Pontic fleet in Spanish and Italian waters (Memnon, 43) decided to abandon a hopeless task and desert to the Romans. P. Frassinetti's interpretation of the Latin text (*Athenaeum* 40 (1962), 101–2) led him to the conclusion that Fannius and Metrophanes, still loyal to Mithridates, were contemplating a surprise attack somewhere on the Italian coast and that the senate was intent on picking out the boats which contained the enemy commanders. Maurenbrecher's view, that the fragment represents the overtures made by the commanders of the Pontic fleet to join the Romans, seems to be confirmed by the report that, when Pompeius heard of the promulgation of the *Lex Manilia* (66 BC) which gave him supreme command against Mithridates and Tigranes, he sent a conciliatory message to Mithridates to test the king's attitude. The name of the envoy sent, according to Dio, 36. 45. 2, was Metrophanes, who apparently had in fact been given safe refuge among the Romans. See Magie, 2. 1220 n. 4.

4. 3–10. Deal with the campaign against Cabeira in 72 BC. In the spring of that year Lucullus entrusted the continuing siege of Amisus, which had been successfully provisioned by Mithridates over the winter of 73/2, to L. Licinius Murena (Plut. *Luc.* 15. 1; App. *Mith.* 78). Lucullus himself, with three legions, marched against Mithridates' main force at Cabeira. The authorities for this campaign are so imprecise that one has to deal with problems of chronology on the basis of common sense. Since Lucullus' route would take him by way of Eupatoria, a newly erected fortress on the junction of the

river Iris and river Lycus, thus closing off the approach to Cabeira, this fortress must have been captured (or betrayed, App. *Mith.* 115) before Lucullus penetrated into the Lycus valley. The neutralizing of Eupatoria was offset by the fact that the superior cavalry forces of the enemy still dominated the route to Cabeira. Mithridates' tactic of cutting the Roman line of communication and confining them to the hills was in its turn offset by Lucullus' luck in finding some Greek prisoners who were able to guide them through the hills to a strong point overlooking Cabeira (Plut. *Luc.* 15. 3–4). While this position was safe from attack, Lucullus was cut off from communication with the Roman force at Amisus, and was dependent for supplies on a route southward to Cappadocia which had to cross the Lycus valley still dominated by Mithridates' cavalry.

4. 3. He orders a squadron . . . to approach close to the king's camp. This fragment is placed in Book 2 by Arusianus' codex N, but since mention is made of the king's (Mithridates') camp, it has no place in Book 2. I interpret it as dealing with the preliminaries to the first encounter between the Roman and Pontic armies in the neighbourhood of Cabeira.

test the plan of action from close quarters. The codices present *properationem explorare*, which makes no sense. Maurenbrecher, following Keil ad loc., accepted *prope rationem* and interpreted it as *rationem locorum qui prope sunt* ('the nature of the terrain close at hand'). W. Clausen (*AJP* 68 (1947), 296) considered this interpretation improbable and suggested a usage 'not explicitly cited in the lexica', i.e. *prope rationem* meaning 'according to plan'. I have assumed that, given the difficulties posed by Mithridates' superiority in cavalry, Lucullus felt that careful planning was required, and took the precaution of testing the validity of the plan he had in mind with a reconnoitre of the battle area. For *explorare* in the meaning of 'test', 'try out' see Tac. *Ann.* 12. 66.

4. 4. He therefore summoned the legions . . . on the mountains. At his strong position overlooking Cabeira

Lucullus set up his HQ and summoned the legions which had been forced to take refuge in the hill-country.

4. 5*–7. The outcome of the Cabeira campaign would depend on the king's success in intercepting the Roman convoys. These three fragments are all that remain of Sallust's report of the campaign. Other sources indicate three engagements, the first of which was indecisive and is referred to fleetingly in 4. 5*. There is no direct reference to the other two: 4. 6 makes reference to the crucial factor—supply-trains—the central objective of both encounters, and 4. 7 deals with the immediate aftermath of the third conflict.

4. 5.* Under the gaze of the leader . . . loyal and keen. Servius draws attention to the use of *ducis* ('leader') instead of Lucullus' official rank, proconsul. The fragment refers to an incident in the first encounter between the opposed forces in the neighbourhood of Cabeira. When the Roman detachment turned tail before a strengthened Pontic force, the troops in the Roman camp asked Lucullus to lead them to the rescue of their comrades. He refused, and in order to illustrate the effect of the visible presence of a general in dangerous encounters he went down to the plain on his own. His presence restored Roman morale; they were persuaded to turn about and face the enemy afresh, and they were victorious in their turn. Nevertheless, on their return to camp Lucullus 'inflicted the customary disgrace on the fugitives', making them dig a twelve-foot ditch while the rest of the army looked on. (Plut. *Luc.* 15. 5–7).

4. 6. the shortage of food . . . was worrying Lucullus. To counter Pontic superiority in cavalry strength, Lucullus provided detachments of greater numerical strength to escort the supply-trains. He reported victories in each of the two other engagements with the Pontic army. In the second encounter ten cohorts under Sornatius routed with great slaughter the enemy force which attacked the convoy they were escorting (Plut. *Luc.* 17. 1). The third and crucial engagement (Plut. *Luc.* 17. 2–3; App. *Mith.* 81) involved a Pontic force comprising half the cavalry and 4,000 infantry sent to intercept a con-

voy protected by Roman legionaries under M. Fabius Hadrianus. The enemy made the mistake of attacking the Romans in a defile, within which their cavalry could not operate, and suffered total defeat.

which the king had cunningly contrived. This fragment, a citation from Priscianus, has been transmitted with book-number II. As I pointed out on p. 249 of vol. I (where the fr. is referred to as 4. 8M), this is the only Priscianus book-number unanimously queried by editors. Kritz, applying the shortage of supplies to the problem met by Lucullus when he marched into Pontus (Plut. *Luc.* 14. 2) placed the fragment in his Book 3. Maurenbrecher, noting the phrase quoted above, rightly accepted Dietsch's application of it to Appian's report of the tactics devised by Mithridates (*Mith.* 81), and placed it here as part of the tactical manœuvring around Cabeira.

4. 7.* He himself was beset by doubts on that night. Maurenbrecher was the first to include this fragment which is transmitted without book-number. Despite the non-specific nature of its content, I follow Maurenbrecher in referring it to the effect on Mithridates of the double defeat of his forces, a débâcle which caused the king to abandon Cabeira and seek safety in flight (Plut. *Luc.* 17. 2–4; App. *Mith.* 81).

4. 8. the camp was entered without a blow being struck. The hurried preparations by Mithridates and his immediate circle for a precipitate flight from Cabeira gave rise to rumours and panic among the Pontic troops: 'Filled with terror, mingled with anger that the signal had not been given to them also, they ran and demolished their own fortifications and scattered in every direction . . . without orders from the commanding general or any other officer' (App. ibid.).

4. 9–10.* Provide a summary of the immediate aftermath of the fall of Cabeira. The Roman troops (4. 9) indulged themselves in the usual celebration of victory and the acquisition of booty, including what gold they were able to grab without their general's knowledge. Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 17. 8: 'However, Lucullus allowed such soldiers

as these to plunder the enemy's camp.' Lucullus concentrated on searching for and safeguarding treasure and documents for which he would be responsible to the senate: 'In capturing Cabeira and most of the other strongholds he found great treasure and many prisons, in which many Greeks and many kinsfolk of the king were confined' (Plut. *Luc.* 18. 1).

On hearing of the enemy's flight Lucullus sent out a large force of cavalry in pursuit. The fugitives were chased as far as Talaura from which, four days before, Mithridates had succeeded in escaping to King Tigranes in Armenia. The Roman pursuit was abandoned; Lucullus spent the winter of 72/1 in Cabeira.

4. 11*–13.* Deal with the campaigns of M. Terentius Varro Lucullus, proconsul in Macedonia, against the Thracians. Maurenbrecher referred the first of these fragments to events in Thrace in Book 3 (3. 51M). He may have been influenced by the vague statements in Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2. 24 and Ps.-Asc. 266 St. into accepting that Lucullus took over the command from Scribonius Curio before his term of office as consul for 73 had expired. Cf. *MRR* 2. 109. I have taken the opposite view (see notes on 3. 91–2) and believe that in the course of 72 Lucullus not only subdued the Thracian threat by crushing the Bessi (Cic. *Pis.* 44; Eutrop. 6. 10S; Oros. 6. 3. 4) but also penetrated to the Danube and won over the Greek cities on the shore of the Black Sea.

4. 11.* **Aenum and Maronea.** Thracian cities (Mela, 2. 28: *Aenos . . . et . . . Maronia*). They probably lay on Lucullus' route to the Black Sea region.

4. 12.* **a fierce tribe of the Getae . . . the Moesii.** Both were Thracian tribes of the lower Danube region, and both were subdued in Lucullus' extension of Roman rule as far as this region. Eutropius 6. 10 gives a list of the cities conquered at this time; according to Florus (1. 39. 6), Lucullus reached the Tanais and Lake Maeotis, but there is no support in any other source for this statement.

4. 13.* **Bizone.** Presumably Bizye, on the lower Thracian coast of the Black Sea.

4. 14–36. Constitute what remains of Sallust's narrative of the final phase of the war against the gladiators, a narrative which included an excursus on the topography of the southernmost parts of Italy (4. 19–25). Maurenbrecher allocated twenty-two fragments to this segment (4. 20–41M). I have used twenty-two fragments, but have relegated two of Maurenbrecher's (4. 34 and 35M) to Fragments of Uncertain Reference (Introd. vol. 1, § 8), and transferred to this section two fragments from Maurenbrecher's Book 3 (3. 102 and 103M). I have, with Maurenbrecher, organized the fragments to indicate two phases of the final campaign of this war, conducted on the Roman side under the command of M. Licinius Crassus. The excursus on topography separates the opening phase of preparation by both sides and the last encounter during 72 of the opposed forces from the closing phase, which ends with Spartacus' defeat. Problems concerning the sources also beset this phase of the Spartacus war (see note on 3. 60–7); I refer to specific cases in the notes which follow.

4. 14–15. Belong to a context dealing with efforts by Spartacus' forces to arm themselves to meet the newly organized Roman army under Crassus. The acquisition piecemeal of weapons and cavalry by victories in the field (see notes on 3. 87) would not have been sufficient adequately to arm the numbers which continued to flock to the rebels' cause. These two fragments which I have transferred from Maurenbrecher's Book 3 deal with the enthusiasm aroused by the rebel victories and the initiative shown by slaves, tenant-farmers, and free labourers in fashioning for themselves weaponry and defensive equipment. This was an on-going necessity and would be repeated whenever circumstances demanded.

4. 14. These men were very familiar with the region. The manuscripts of Nonius place this fragment in Book 4. Maurenbrecher, assuming that this was part of a one-off show of enthusiasm, followed Appian (*BC* 1. 116) and Florus (2. 10. 6) in assigning it (as 3. 102M) to the outset of the slave participation in the Spartacus affair. I have

restored it to Book 4 for the reasons indicated above. Maurenbrecher printed the reading of the MSS.: *hi locorum perignari* ('men quite unfamiliar with the region'). I have accepted Douza's correction of *perignari* to *pergnari* to produce the translation above. I have done so because I interpret *hi* ('these men') to refer to the free men and slaves of Lucania who had come to join Spartacus.

4. 15.* Skins recently stripped off. The statement by Servius on *Aen.* 7. 632: 'as Sallust says concerning the Lucanians who used to cover with skins shields made of wickerwork' would seem to confirm both the placement and the context of both fragments.

4. 16. they hasten on their way to the town. After his defeat of the combined force under the consuls Gellius and Lentulus (see Comm. on 3. 90), Spartacus occupied the mountains around Thurii and seized the town itself as his centre of operations. From Appian's statement (*BC* 1. 117), 'Supplied with abundant material from this source his men made frequent forays for the time being' it can be deduced that the fragment refers to this phase of the war.

4. 17. though advanced in years, still possessed a martial spirit. After the defeats inflicted on the consuls, the Roman senate faced a desperate situation (Plut. *Crass.* 10. 2; App. *BC* 1. 118; Oros. 5. 24. 5). Crassus was invited to take over the command against Spartacus and was made propraetor with proconsular *imperium*; his position and the nature of his *imperium* have been matters of dispute (see Z. Rubinsohn, *Historia* 19 (1970), 624–7). Crassus recruited six new legions, probably at his own expense (App. ibid.; Plin. *NH* 33. 134; cf. Cic. *Parad. Stoic.* 6. 45), and these were added to the remnants of the legions which had served under Gellius and Lentulus; his total force thus amounted to between 40,000 and 45,000 men.

The demands on manpower occasioned by the wars in Spain and in the East in the seventies made recruiting of levies in 72 a difficult proposition. Crassus' problem was apparently solved by the response of veterans who had finished their service under Sulla a decade before. These men whose farms were threatened by the servile war had

the battle experience to compensate for the lack of command experience of their commanding general.

4. 18. He causes those designated by lot to be beaten to death. Crassus' first move was to secure the territory around Picentia to protect the approach to Rome should Spartacus attempt a long-expected attack on the city (Plut. *Crass.* 10. 2, where Plutarch's 'Picenum' is obviously a confusion with 'Picentia'). He next sent a detachment of two legions under Mummius to observe Spartacus' movements, but with explicit orders not to engage him under any circumstances. But Mummius at the first opportunity gave battle and was defeated. Many of his men were slain, and many of them threw away their arms and fled for their lives. Plutarch describes the aftermath: 'Five hundred of them, who had shown the greatest cowardice and had been the first to fly, he divided into fifty decades, and put to death one from each decade, on whom the lot fell, thus reviving, after the lapse of many years, an ancient mode of punishing the soldiers' (*Crass.* 10. 4).

It is not unlikely that the two legions assigned to Mummius were composed of men who had earlier served under the consuls, Gellius and Lentulus, as Appian (*BC* 1. 118) indicates; this would support the charges of lax discipline made against these consuls (Plut. *Cat. Min.* 8. 1). Appian, however, also states that Crassus decimated the two legions and reports another version according to which Crassus decimated his whole army to the total of 4,000 deaths. Appian's first version is a slight corruption of one given by Plutarch; his second is an incredible exaggeration.

4. 19–25. Even from the few fragments that remain of the narrative of the final phase in 71 BC of the Spartacus war it is obvious that Sallust went into considerable detail on the movements and strategy of both armies. To complement his military narrative he provided a topographical excursus on the region in which the last months of the war took place. What remains of this excursus indicates activity over both wings of the southern extremity, but the bulk of the action was centred on the promontory of Bruttium and the Sicilian Strait.

4. 19* All of that part of Italy . . . is divided into two promontories. Mela gives a fuller description on the same lines: 'where it stretches a long way (southwards) it is divided into two headlands, the one facing Sicilian waters, the other the Ionian Sea' (2. 58). At 2. 67–8 he gives a detailed account of the gulf (*Sinus Tarentinus*) between the headlands Sallentinum and Lacinium, and that (*sinus Scyllaceus*) between Lacinium and Zephyrium, with the major towns on their coasts.

Bruttium. The *promunturium Bruttium*, called after the Bruttii, a people of the south-west peninsula, the toe of Italy (modern Calabria).

Sallentinum. The *promunturium Sallentinum*, called after the Sallentini, a people occupying the south-eastern promontory, the heel of Italy. The region was called Calabria down to about AD 700, when the Byzantines transferred the name to the south-western promontory after the Lombards seized ancient Calabria.

4. 20.* Areas of Italy which are level and gently undulating. Part of a general description of ancient Calabria and Apulia, a region with arid soil which is fertile, especially in the coastal and northern plains.

4. 21. at its narrowest point does not extend more than thirty-five miles. Obviously part of his description of Bruttium.

4. 22.* Sicily had once been joined to Italy. Mela (2. 115) has: 'Sicily at one time, they say, was part of the mainland and joined to the land of Bruttium, but was afterwards cut off by the waters of the Sicilian Sea.' Cf. Plin. *NH* 3. 86; Just. *Epit.* 4. 1. 1.

4. 23.* Scylla . . . that legendary creature. According to legend Scylla was a sea monster living in a cave opposite Charybdis. Homer (*Od.* 12. 85–126) describes her as having six heads, each with a triple row of teeth, and twelve feet. Fish, dolphins, and other sea creatures were her usual fare, but if a ship came too close she would seize six men at a time from it and devour them. The only way to fend her off was to implore help from her mother Cratais. Sallust is reporting a later version, in which Scylla is cred-

ited with a human shape and with a girdle of dogs' heads about her loins. Cf. Virg. *Ecl.* 6. 75; Ovid, *Met.* 13. 730 ff; 14. 1 ff.

the waves which clash there seem to utter a barking sound. 'Hence, therefore, myth brought forth Scylla and Charybdis, the hearing of barking, what were believed to be the images of a monster, while sailors . . . think the waves, which the chasm of the engulfing whirlpool makes to clash, are barking' (Just. *Epit.* 4. 1. 1).

4. 24. Charybdis. The name given to a type of whirlpool in a narrow sea-channel. The name was identified with the Straits of Messina in which, in fact, no such phenomenon exists (e.g. Hom. *Od.* 101 ff.). It was believed to suck in and cast out water three times a day and no ship could possibly survive in it.

4. 25.* Pelorus takes its name . . . from Hannibal's helmsman. Mela (2. 116) adds the detail: 'whom the same man [Hannibal] had killed, thinking that he had been betrayed by him. This came about because when Hannibal had fled Africa and was seeking Syria in that region, the shoreline from far away seemed continuous and the sea not accessible.' The same anecdote is transmitted by Val. Max. 9. 8 ext. 1, and by Isid. *Etym.* 14. 7. 4, both of whom have followed a different tradition, namely that Hannibal's course was not from Africa to Syria, but from Italy to Africa.

4. 26–36. Crassus' recourse to decimation as a disciplinary measure had an immediate effect on the morale and attitude of his troops. In the first encounter under his command, one which took place before Spartacus retreated south, the Romans defeated the rebel force (Flor. 2. 8. 12; App. *BC* 1. 118; Oros. 5. 24. 6). The objection (Holmes, *Roman Republic*, 1. 389–90) that Crassus did not defeat Spartacus' army before that leader's retreat to the south does not hold up against the combined evidence of the sources. See E. Gabba, *Comm. App.* (1958) 1. 551; Stampacchia, *La tradizione*, 65–6; Ward, 88 n. 16.

Realizing the change in Roman leadership and fighting-

spirit, Spartacus retreated to the south of Bruttium, to terrain less suitable for legionary tactics, and from where it was possible to escape to Sicily across the strait of Messina. Plutarch gives his version of Spartacus' plan: 'At the Straits he chanced upon some Cilician pirate ships and determined to seize Sicily. By throwing two thousand men into the island, he thought to kindle anew the servile war there, which had not long been extinguished, and needed only a little additional fuel. But the Cilicians, after coming to terms with him and receiving his gifts, deceived him and sailed away. So Spartacus retreated from the sea and drew up his army in the peninsula of Rhegium' (*Crass.* 10. 6–7).

When Crassus reconnoitred the region occupied by Spartacus he 'enclosed them with a line of circumvallation consisting of ditch, wall, and paling' (App. *BC* 1. 118). Plutarch's detailed description (*Crass.* 10. 7–8) of the extent and nature of this siege work, accepted at face value by scholars, has been queried by Ward, 88–90 n. 20, who proposed a far more likely operation: Crassus shut up Spartacus in the area of Scyllaeum (modern Scilla), a small promontory north of Rhegium and just across the strait from Pelorus in Sicily; it could easily be cut off by an opposing force because the landward part is already separated from the surrounding territory on the east and west by the deep ravines of the Torrente Livorno and the Vallone d'Angelo, while the line between them on the south could easily have been fortified in the manner described by Plutarch.

Of the eleven fragments (4. 26–36) which I have allocated to the narrative of the 71 BC campaign, three deal with Spartacus' failed second attempt to cross to Sicily, three are connected with the rebel breakout from Crassus' circumvallation, three with the split in Spartacus' army and the destruction of the Gauls and Germans under Castus and Cannicus, and two with the final defeat of Spartacus at the hands of Crassus.

4. 26. When they had placed the containers under the beams. Disappointed in his hopes of pirate assistance for the crossing to Sicily, Spartacus tried an alternative

method of transportation: 'They tried to launch rafts of beams and casks bound together with twigs on the swift waters of the straits' (Flor. 2. 8. 12).

4. 27. The entangled rafts. Spartacus' experiment was wrecked by a combination of rough weather and the dangerous currents of Scylla and Charybdis.

4. 28. C. Verres. Gaius Verres was governor *propraetore* in Sicily 73–71 BC. His conduct in office was notorious, and on his return to Rome in 70 he was prosecuted for *res repetundae* ('extortion—illicit enrichment of provincial governors at the cost of people subject to their power') before a court composed of senators. Verres secured the services of the noted advocate, Quintus Hortensius, but Cicero as prosecutor produced such compelling evidence that Verres abandoned his defence and went into exile in Massilia. Cicero's 'Actio Secunda' (2 *Verr.*) was therefore never delivered in court.

strengthened the coastline close to Italy. This favourable comment on Verres' activity is part of Sallust's observations on Spartacus' attempt to cross over into Sicily. Ward, 89 n. 19 accepts as reasonable J. P. Brisson's conjecture (*Spartacus* (Paris 1959), 232) that the Cilician pirates had withdrawn because of the presence of Crassus' army in the vicinity. But he questions Brisson's suggestion that the pirates were fearful of landing on the opposite shore on account of Verres' fortifications; he does so on the ground of Verres' general conduct in Sicily, and Cicero's attacks on him regarding this work of fortification. The tendentious nature of Cicero's treatment of Verres throughout, and the absence of positive proof to the contrary in his exclamatory attack in 2 *Verr.* 5. 5 hardly justify rejection of Sallust's positive statement. Cf. 2 *Verr.* 5. 1 ff. and see note on 4. 54, **He was suspected of having come to an agreement with the robbers.** Stampacchia, *La tradizione*, 67, suggested a combined operation by Verres and Crassus with the purpose of locking up Spartacus within the Rhegium peninsula. She notes that *Schol. Gronov.* 324 St. points out that Verres' governorship in Sicily was prolonged into a third year on account of the slave war.

4. 29.* on a cold night . . . Maurenbrecher placed this fragment, transmitted without book-number, in the context of the break-out of the rebel forces from Crassus' blockade; he did so because of Plutarch's statement in *Crass.* 10. 9: 'He therefore waited for a snowy night and a wintry storm, when he filled up a small part of the ditch with earth and timber and the boughs of trees, and so moved a third of his army across.' La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 49, recommended relegation to Fragments of Uncertain Reference on the objection that 'cold night' is not the same as 'stormy night'. Like Stampacchia, *La Tradizione*, 74, I believe that Plutarch's known dependence on Sallust justifies the placing of this admittedly meagre statement on weather conditions within this context.

Faced with a shortage of supplies, Spartacus had to find a way through Crassus' line of circumvallation. Besides Plutarch, Florus (2. 8., 13), Appian (*BC* 1. 120), and Frontinus (*Str.* 1. 5. 20) refer specifically to the rebel army's break-out; the difference in detail of the reports illustrates the problems of contamination, chronological displacement, and the like which make accurate reconstruction of Sallust's narrative so difficult. Florus simply provides a summary of break-out and final defeat: 'they finally made a sally and met a death worthy of men fighting to the death.' Appian's report contains material not reported elsewhere and material placed outside the immediate context, indicating omissions or accidental misplacement. In 1. 119 he reports an earlier failed attempt at break-out with the intention of heading for Samnium, and goes on to describe a series of attacks on the besiegers and disruption of their tasks of fortification. In 1. 120 he connects the decision to break out with the senate's decision to involve Pompeius in the task of crushing Spartacus, and puts it, therefore, within the context of the final battle between Crassus and Spartacus: 'he made a dash with his whole army through the lines of the besieging force and pushed on to Brundisium with Crassus in pursuit.' Frontinus' brief statement also contains detail different from that of Plutarch: 'When Marcus Crassus

had constructed a ditch around the forces of Spartacus, the latter at night filled it with the bodies of prisoners and cattle that he had slain, and thus marched across it.'

4. 30. a military garrison . . . at that time off its guard. These details, which appear only in Sallust, make clearer the reason for Spartacus' choice of a snowy and stormy night for this attempt to break out of Crassus' siege line.

4. 31.* They were in the forest of Sila. Sila is a large mountain to the east and north of Rhegium. It was the nearest and most appropriate place of immediate refuge for Spartacus' troops when they had escaped from Crassus' blockade. I have translated Maurenbrecher's version *in silva fuerunt*; one of Servius' MSS has *fugerunt*, which led Dietsch to conjecture *in silvam Silam fugerunt* ('they fled into the forest of Sila'). The version I have accepted gives much the same result.

4. 32. They began to disagree among themselves. After the break-out from the circumvallation in Bruttium, Spartacus' force split into two and headed north along the Via Popilia. The Gauls and Germans were under the command of two of their own men, Castus and Cannicus (Liv. *Per.* 97; Frontin. *Str.* 2. 4. 7, 5. 34; Plut. *Crass.* 11. 4). Spartacus commanded the rest.

Both Sallust and Plutarch report that the split was the result of a quarrel. Ward, 93 n. 27 interprets it as a tactical move to make foraging easier and to cause Crassus to split his force to deal with them. However, his argument that a split made in anger would rule out both Spartacus' later action of going to the aid of the other group and Orosius' naming of the Gallic–Germanic contingent as *auxiliatores* ('helpers') is not a convincing one, given the vicissitudes of warfare and the previous history of the relations between the various racial groups in Spartacus' army; see note on 3. 86, **the only place which would be safe**. Syme, 212 n. 149, suggested that this fragment might refer to the quarrels between Pompeius and Crassus in 70, the year of their joint consulship.

4. 33. A taste as good as that of the clearest of the springs. Both divisions of the rebel force made their way

into Lucania before Crassus could catch up with them and give battle. But the Romans did attack the force under Castus and Cannicus which had encamped by a lake, which 'they say, changes from time to time in the character of its water, becoming sweet, and then again bitter and undrinkable' (Plut. *Crass.* 11. 1). Frontinus gives a succinct account of this battle: 'Licinius Crassus in the Slave War, when about to lead his troops at Camalatrum against Castus and Cannicus, the leaders of the Gauls, sent twelve cohorts behind the mountain with Gaius Pomptinus and Quintus Marcius Rufus, his lieutenants. When the engagement began, these troops, raising a shout, poured down from the mountain in the rear, and so routed the enemy that they fled in all directions with no attempt at battle' (*Str.* 2. 4. 7; cf. 2. 5. 34). Plutarch (*Crass.* 11. 2) reports that Crassus was prevented from following up this advantage because Spartacus suddenly appeared and forced him to break off the pursuit.

4. 34. In the meantime . . . two Gallic women ascended the mountain. Most of the group under Castus and Cannicus re-formed and continued north along the Via Popilia. Crassus had to stop them in case they were looking to Rome as their target. Spartacus probably left the Via Popilia at Eburum and headed towards Aquilonia from where he hoped to join the Via Appia and head for Brundisium. Accordingly, Crassus split his forces; his lieutenant L. Quinctius and his quaestor Cn. Tremellius Scrofa were instructed to monitor the movements of Spartacus (Plut. *Crass.* 11. 6—a confused narrative, on which see Ward, 94. n. 31; Frontin. *Str.* 2. 5. 34). He himself pursued the Gallic–Germanic group. When he caught up with them, 'he sent forward a detachment of cavalry to lure to combat the Germans and the Gauls . . . and by feigning flight, to draw them on to the place where Crassus himself had drawn up his troops in battle array' (Frontin. *Str.* 2. 5. 34). Plutarch, drawing on Sallust, states that the 6,000 cavalry tried, as directed, to escape observation by covering up their helmets, 'but they were seen by two women *who were sacrificing for the enemy*, and would have been in peril of their lives had not

Crassus quickly made his appearance and given battle' (*Crass.* 11. 5). Frontinus reports Livy's statement on the outcome of this battle: '35,000 armed men, with their commanders, were slain; five Roman eagles and twenty-six standards were recaptured, along with much other booty, including five sets of rods and axes.'

to spend their menstruation period there in solitude. The Latin phrasing is *conventum vitantes ad menstrua solvenda* ('avoiding the crowd in order to spend their menstruation period'). Maurenbrecher followed Kritz and Dietsch in accepting Plutarch's rendering of the Latin phrase *ad menstrua solvenda* as *προθυομένων τοῖς πολεμίοις* ('who were offering sacrifices for the enemy'), an interpretation which assumes that the Sallustian phrase refers to *menstrua sacra* (acts of worship which had to be performed monthly'). This meaning for *menstrua solvenda*, based on this fragment, made its way into such handbooks as Forcellini's *Totius Latinitatis Lexicon*, George's *Lateinische Wörterbuch*, and Lewis and Short's *Latin Dictionary*. Kritz, Dietsch, and Maurenbrecher rejected Gerlach's acceptance of *menstrua* as referring to the women's menstruation period. Gerlach supported his view by citing the use of *menstrua solvere* in Lucretius, 6. 794–6 and Tacitus, *Hist.* 5. 6. This interpretation, which appears in more recent lexica, is discussed by A. Ernout (*RPh* (1925), 57–9.

4. 35. Having been made only the more eager to hasten the task. All editors agree in identifying this statement with a flurry of activity on the part of Crassus. Maurenbrecher (4. 39M) associated the urgency with a report concerning Crassus' change of mind concerning a letter he had sent to the senate asking them to summon M. Lucullus from Thrace and Pompeius from Spain to join in the crushing of Spartacus. In Plutarch's words: 'he was sorry now that he had done so, and was eager to bring the war to a close before those generals came' (*Crass.* 11. 3). As a result, Crassus first hastened to crush the troops under the command of Castus and Cannicus.

The above is a reasonable allocation, but I follow Kritz and Dietsch in placing this fragment at a later stage in the

struggle and in assigning it to a context in which the emphasis is on Crassus's attitude to Pompeius. While Crassus was engaged in the battle in which he destroyed the force under Castus and Cannicus, Spartacus had defeated the Roman force sent to monitor his movements; the quaestor Scrofa barely escaped with his life. That success filled the troops under Spartacus with such enthusiasm and over-confidence that they forced their leaders to lead them back through Lucania against the Romans. 'This', says Plutarch, 'was the very thing which Crassus most desired. For the approach of Pompeius was already known, and there were many who publicly proclaimed that the victory in this war belonged to him; he had only to come and fight and put an end to the war. Crassus, therefore, pressed on to finish the struggle himself . . .' (*Crass.* 11. 8). A statement in Plutarch's 'Comparison of Nicias and Crassus' (*Crass.* 36(3). 2) suggests that this latter occasion is the one referred to in the Sallust fragment: 'I do not, indeed, commend Crassus, in the war with Spartacus, for hastening into action with greater speed than safety, although it was natural for a man of his ambition to fear that Pompeius would come and rob him of his victory.'

4. 36. He met his death . . . selling his life dearly. Words which may be part of a Sallustian character-sketch of Spartacus in which his courage and sense of honour are stressed. Three of the sources (Plut. *Crass.* 11. 8; App. *BC* 1. 120; Oros, 5. 24. 7) indicate that it was Spartacus who initiated this last battle against the Romans under Crassus, which Orosius places near the headwaters of the river Silarus (also called Siler and Silerus—modern Sele). This river rises practically on the border between south-western Apulia and north-western Lucania, thus explaining Ampelius' (45. 3) placement of the battle in Lucania and Eutropius' (6. 7. 2S) locating it in Apulia; see Ward, 96 n. 37. Realizing that this was the crucial test, Spartacus threw himself into the thick of the battle (Plut. *Crass.* 11. 9–10; App. *BC* 1. 120), but his defeat was inevitable and total. These two sources, which provide the most detailed accounts of the final battle, differ in their

versions of the manner of Spartacus' death. Thus Plutarch: 'Finally, after his companions had taken to flight, he stood alone, surrounded by a multitude of foes, and was still defending himself when he was cut down'; whereas Appian reports: 'Spartacus was wounded in the thigh with a spear and sank upon his knee, holding his shield in front of him and fighting in this way against his assailants until he and the great mass of those with him were surrounded and slain.'

Plutarch, undoubtedly reflecting Sallust's views, goes on to point out that, although Crassus had distinguished himself as a general and a victor, his success nevertheless enhanced the reputation of Pompeius. The fugitives from the battle encountered the latter, and were cut to pieces, so that he could write to the senate that in open battle Crassus had indeed conquered the slaves, but that he himself had extirpated the war. Crassus had completed his task by the spring of 71 BC; for the rest of that year Rome was to witness an electoral campaign for the consulships of 70, and political manœuvring for the support of the plebeians.

4. 37.*–45. The content of the nine fragments indicates that Sallust dealt in some detail with the *res urbanae* 'urban affairs') of 71. After the suppression of the servile war and the successful outcome of the Spanish war against Sertorius, the agitation for the restoration of full tribunician powers, which had dominated urban affairs in 76–3, broke out again; to this activity was added pressure for the removal of senatorial control over the lawcourts. It was within this climate of popular unrest that the two victorious generals, Pompeius and Crassus, planned to achieve the next target of their respective ambitions—election to the consulship of 70 BC. The bulk of the available fragments on this phase deal with the thinking behind Pompeius' decision to bring popular pressure to bear on the senate, in order to achieve his personal goals.

4. 37.* that he would carry out the wishes of the people. Plutarch makes it clear that the reference here is to Pompeius. He reports that expectations concerning Pompeius' future conduct were shadowed by the suspicion

that he might use his army to become a second Sulla. Aware of this fear Pompeius declared that he would disband his army after his triumph. 'Then there remained just one accusation for envious tongues to make, namely, that he was more devoted to the people than to the senate, and had determined to restore the authority of the tribunate which Sulla had overthrown, and to court the favour of the many; which was true' (*Pomp.* 21. 4).

This indication of attitude, given even before Pompeius' arrival in Rome, fits in with the feelings concerning the senate in his letter written in 75 (see notes on 2. 82). His election to the consulship of 70 was based on popular support and the influence of Crassus who was elected as his colleague. On Pompeius' continued courting of popular favour see further on 4. 42.

4. 38* M. Lollius Palicanus. Quintilian mentions neither Sallust nor his *Histories* in connection with this fragment. Gellius (1. 15. 12) quotes the final phrase (*loquax magis quam facundus*) as a Sallustian expression. Maurenbrecher, on the authority of the general statement in Ps.-Asc. 189 St., 'First Sicinius, tribune of the plebs, and not long after Quintius, and finally Palicanus had brought it about that the consuls Cn. Pompeius and M. Licinius Crassus gave tribunician power to the people', argued that Lollius was tribune in 70. Broughton (*MRR* 2. 126 n. 4) pointed out that G. Niccolini (*I Fasti dei Tribuni della Plebe* (Milan 1934), 245–7) held that the date of the tribunate of Lollius is established by the case of Sthenius (Cic. 2 *Verr.* 2. 95–100) after December 72 and before the college of Tribunes in office at the time of the trial of Verres. It was Lollius who, as tribune in 71, gave Pompeius the opportunity, as consul-elect, to address the people; see note on 4. 39.

a native of Picenum of humble stock. Picenum was Pompeian territory, a circumstance undoubtedly useful to Lollius in his urging of Pompeius to support the people's demands for the restoration of tribunician powers.

verbose rather than eloquent. Cicero, dealing with the various types of orator, speaks of 'several others of the

same type I recognize, not as worthy of the ears of a select audience, but well fitted for the turbulence of popular assemblies. Of this type . . . Palicanus likewise, better suited to the taste of the ignorant' (*Brut.* 223).

4. 39. embarked on a long speech. Cicero provides a clear and detailed statement of the major topics of political discussion in Rome during 71: 'In fact, when Gnaeus Pompeius himself, as consul-elect, addressed for the first time a public meeting near the city, and, in accordance with what seemed to be a general expectation, stated his intention of restoring the powers of the tribunes, his words were received with a buzz of grateful approval from the assembly. But when he pointed out, in the course of the same speech, that our provinces had been ravaged and laid waste, that the lawcourts were behaving scandalously and wickedly, and that he meant to see to and deal with this evil—then it was with no mere murmuring but a mighty roar that the people of Rome showed their satisfaction' (*Verr.* 1. 45). Lollius' participation in this meeting is indicated by Ps.-Asc. 220 St.

4. 40. If nothing had been agreed upon . . . he himself would devote his attention to the matter. Pompeius could not enter the city or deal officially with the senate until he had dismissed his army, being constrained by the rule that no magistrate could enter the city without forfeiting his *imperium*, unless by a special decree. Generals who claimed a triumph had to wait outside the walls (*ad urbem*) until the senate had decided on their application; cf. Cic. *Fam.* 3. 8. 1; Caesar, *BGall.* 6. 1. 2; Tac. *Ann.* 3. 19. 3. It could be expected that the senate would not of its own accord give into demands by the people's representatives on these matters. See the attitude of the ruling body as noted in 3. 35. 21, **Gnaeus Pompeius . . . they tear to pieces.**

4. 41. which practice, indeed, has penetrated the city and spread like a disease. My translation reflects the manuscript version which uses the verb *coierit*, for which Maurenbrecher substituted *coniectus* ('cast', 'thrown'), a conjecture of Aldus. The 'practice' referred to is the ruth-

less exploitation by provincial governors as described by Cicero in *Verr.* 1. 45, the spread of such activity in Roman affairs, and the unwillingness of the corrupt senatorial juries to deal with it as the laws demanded. In 71 Lollius Palicanus took steps to provide aid to Sthenius and other victims of Verres in Sicily (2 *Verr.* 2. 95–100).

4. 42. so that he might soon have them as a ready instrument of his wishes. Appian's statement on the immediate post-war ambitions of the two generals underlines the necessity of popular support in the case of Pompeius' candidacy: 'Both men were candidates for the consulship. Crassus had been praetor as the law of Sulla required. Pompeius had been neither praetor nor quaestor and was only 34 years old, but he had promised the tribunes of the people that much of their former power would be restored' (*BC* 1. 121). The senate's decree of dispensation from the normal prerequisites for election in Pompeius' case (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 62) was undoubtedly due to the strength of that general's popular support. Sallust is here drawing attention to the fact that Pompeius would still be dependent on that support in enacting the reforms he had promised in his address: a strong Optimate faction had been opposed from the outset to the irregularity of the young general's progress in the military and political affairs of the state. To counteract the opposition to his future plans and ambitions he would continue to require committed and determined support.

4. 43. He discharged his army as soon as he had left the Alps behind. Appian (*BC* 1. 121) reports that even after being elected consuls Pompeius and Crassus refused to dismiss their armies. Pompeius' excuse was that he was awaiting the return of Metellus for his Spanish triumph; Crassus maintained that Pompeius ought to dismiss his army before he dismissed his. Two passages in Dio provide some clues as to the identity of the general who acted in a more constitutional manner than Pompeius and Crassus.

In a context which recommends that individuals who have reached a pinnacle of personal supremacy should

have the prudence to place the army, the provinces, official offices, and public funds in the hands of the people, Dio provides a purported statement of Agrippa in 29 BC: 'Consider the testimony of history: Marius and Sulla and Metellus, and Pompeius at first, when they got control of affairs, not only refused to assume sovereign power but also escaped disaster thereby' (52. 13. 2). In 56. 39. 2 Dio reports a statement of Drusus in AD 14 concerning Augustus' moderate exercise of supreme power: 'The significance of this act you may best judge by recalling that our fathers praised Pompeius and the Metellus who flourished at that time because they voluntarily disbanded the forces with which they had waged war.'

In an examination of these Dio passages, J. A. Crook (*CR* 62 (1948), 59–61) has strongly reinforced Maurenbrecher's assumption that the general in this case was Q. Caecilius Metellus Pius, Pompeius' fellow-general in the Spanish war against Sertorius. Crook's arguments have been accepted and added to by A. R. Burns (*CR* 63 (1949), 52–3). I would add that the viewpoint discernible in the Dio statements is probably close to that of the Sallustian narrative on these points.

4. 44–5. Deal with the relationship between Pompeius and Crassus, and Pompeius' expectations of Crassus as a colleague after the election, i.e. during his period as consul designate. Sallust is hinting at trouble to come.

4. 44. This had been sufficiently provided for but only for the time being. Sallust may be referring here to the apparent reconciliation between Pompeius and Crassus referred to by Appian (*BC* 1. 121); cf. note on 4. 56, **Crassus concerned himself rather with criticizing his colleague.** In spite of temporary truces, periods of compromise necessitated by political realities, it is clear that deep rivalry existed between Pompeius and Crassus. This traditional view has been questioned by scholars such as F. E. Adcock, *Marcus Crassus Millionaire* (Cambridge 1966). but the testimony of the sources outweighs their argument. But periods of compromise and accommodation did mark the relationship. Plutarch points out that, when

Crassus asked for assistance in his candidacy for office, 'Pompeius received his request gladly (for he wished to have Crassus, in some way or other, always in debt to him for some favour) and eagerly promoted his candidature.' However, 'when once they had taken up office, they did not remain on this friendly basis' (*Crass.* 12. 3. 3; *Pomp.* 22. 1–2).

4. 45. expecting a junior colleague and one who made up to him. Pompeius' statement to the people 'that he should be no less grateful to them for the colleague than for the consulship' (Plut. *Crass.* 12. 2; *Pomp.* 22. 2) indicates that he expected full co-operation from his consular colleague. Apart from possible disagreements about policy, on which see Commentary on 4. 56, a major cause of contention may have been, as Syme suggests, the superior attitude adopted by Pompeius: in spite of the fact that Crassus was older and had been shabbily treated over the outcome of the war against Spartacus, Pompeius tried to treat him like a junior colleague, and expected admiration and deference, which he obviously did not receive.

4. 46–51. Deal with operations conducted by Lucullus against Amisus, which had resisted through a second winter, that of 72/1 (see introductory note on 4. 3–10), and the final stage of M. Aurelius Cotta's two-year siege of Heraclea Pontica.

4. 46. Amisus was being besieged without any battles being fought. After the fall of Cabeira Lucullus received the surrender of the town and spent the winter of 72/1 there—see note on 4. 9–10. The town of Amisus, the siege of which had been entrusted by Lucullus to his legate L. Licinius Murena in the spring of 72, had held out against the Romans and was still defiant into the spring of 71.

4. 47. ladders which were equal to the walls in height. Plutarch attributes the successful resistance of Amisus to the ingenuity of the city's commander Callimachus, 'who by his acquaintance with mechanical devices and his ability to use every resource which the siege of a city demands, had caused the Romans the greatest annoyance'

(*Luc.* 19. 2). Here Sallust is probably dealing with a technique used against the besiegers in defence of their walls.

4. 48. lighting their way with torches, had carelessly left them inside the houses. Callimachus met his match in Lucullus, who attacked at the time of day when Callimachus was accustomed to withdraw his soldiers from the rampart for a rest. When the Romans got possession of part of the wall, Callimachus abandoned Amisus, setting fire to the walls as he left. Lucullus ordered the flames to be extinguished, hoping to save the town itself, but was ignored by the troops who were intent on booty. 'Ransacking everything by torchlight and carrying lights about everywhere, they destroyed most of the houses themselves' (Plut. *Luc.* 19. 5).

4. 49. having shortened sail by about a third. Maurenbrecher, for reasons which are not convincing, allocated this fragment, as 4. 3M, to a naval battle fought by Triarius off Tenedos in the Aegean, an engagement which I have placed in 73 BC—see introductory note on 3. 35–42. The shortening of sail was a precautionary measure used in stormy weather and in naval battles; I have placed the fragment as part of the description of activities carried out by the Roman forces under Cotta in the course of 71 BC.

As his specific task in the campaign against Mithridates the proconsul M. Aurelius Cotta had undertaken in 73 the reduction of the Pontic coast and the siege of Heraclea, in which he was to be assisted by Lucullus' naval commander C. Valerius Triarius when the latter had finished his tasks in the Aegean (Memnon, 42–3). The siege of Heraclea lasted two years (ibid. 47–50). This fragment is part of the narrative of the capture of Heraclea; this was followed by the surrender of Tius and Amastris (App. *Mith.* 82; Memnon, 50–2).

4. 50. all quarters of the city were inundated . . . by the incoming tides. Editors before Maurenbrecher assumed that this fragment was part of the description of the siege of Cyzicus which belongs to the years 74–3 and has been dealt with in the notes on 3. 14–29. The fragment has

been transmitted with book-number and is clearly concerned with a city by the sea which is under threat both on the seaward side and inside the city itself. I follow Maurenbrecher in identifying the city as Heraclea Pontica, under attack by land from Cotta, by sea from a Roman fleet under the command of Triarius. The tempestuous conditions which are causing havoc both within and without the city may be the result of the violent earthquake which Nicolaus of Damascus reports as having occurred around Apamaea in Phrygia in the period of the Mithridatic wars (fr. 80, in *FHG* 3. 416).

4. 51. and the ground opened into a chasm. Nicolaus speaks of lakes coming into existence where none had been before, of rivers and springs being revealed by the movement of the earth, while many others which had been in existence had disappeared.

4. 52–6. These five fragments refer to aspects of some of the urban affairs (*res urbanae*) of the year 70 BC. Political activity in this year resulted in some important changes in the balance of power and in public administration. The *Lex Pompeia Licinia de tribunicia potestate* removed all the remaining vestiges of Sullan legislation against the tribunate; the *Lex Aurelia iudiciaria* reconstituted the juries into three equal groups; the censorship, the authority of which had been practically eliminated under Sulla, in the sense that no censors served between 86 and 70, was revived; the newly appointed censors Cn. Cornelius Lentulus Clodianus and L. Gellius Publicola, who had been consuls in 72, instituted a severe purge of the senate, excluding sixty-four senators in all. The few fragments we have on this phase are remnants of Sallust's own comments on the personal relationships and character of some of the people involved.

4. 52. After the return of those to whom the senate had granted an amnesty. This fragment has been transmitted with book-number III, and was published by Maurenbrecher as his 3. 47M. It refers to the *Lex Plautia de reditu Lepidanorum*, probably a plebiscitum by the tribune Plautius (Rotondi, *Leges Publicae*, 366), which

granted an amnesty to those followers of Lepidus who had passed over to Sertorius. The date of the measure is disputed. Mommsen's (*Strafrecht*, 654 n. 2) argument for 77 has been decisively rejected. Drumann's (*Geschichte Roms*, 3. 139) referral of the measure to 70 or later has been defended on the ground that the problem required a plebiscite for its solution (*CAH* 9. 896). The year 73 was favoured by Lange (*Römische Alterthümer*, 3^2. 185) and by Maurenbrecher (*Proleg.* 78 n. 8).

The date 73 cannot be correct: the right of tribunes to legislate was not restored till 70 and this must be the right date of the Lex Plautia (see *MRR* 3. 158), and the tribune the same as the author of the *Lex Plautia* (*Plotia*) *Agraria* of the same year.

4. 53.* **He was loaded with debt.** Among the sixty-four senators excluded by the censors in 70 was C. Antonius Hybrida who was Cicero's consular colleague in 63. Either in 84 or earlier Antonius, as prefect of cavalry in Greece, committed depredations for which he was later called to account. He was tried in 76 before M. Terentius Varro Lucullus as *praetor peregrinus* (the praetor who dealt with law suits in which either one or both parties were foreigners), with the young Julius Caesar acting for the plaintiffs (Asc. 84C).

Asconius (ibid.) bases Antonius' removal from the senate in 70 on several grounds: that he had stolen from Roman allies; had refused judicial investigation; had, because of the magnitude of his debts, sold his estates and no longer had title to his possessions.

4. 54. He was suspected of having come to an agreement with the robbers. Maurenbrecher rightly follows Kritz in applying this fragment to a statement concerning C. Verres, governor *pro praetore* of Sicily from 73 to 71, and the Cilician pirates who operated in neighbouring waters. In the late summer of 70 Verres was prosecuted at Rome by Cicero on behalf of the Sicilian people on the technical charge of extortion.

Among the many accusations marshalled by Cicero was the charge that he had come to an arrangement of mutual

advantage with the local pirates: thus, 2 *Verr.* 1. 9: 'he has despoiled sanctuaries, butchered a multitude of innocent persons, slain and tortured and crucified citizens of Rome, and taken bribes to let pirate chiefs go free.' Cf. 2 *Verr.* 1. 12; 4. 116.

it is not known whether this was truly the case or . . . at fault through negligence. Given the tendentious nature of Cicero's second speech against Verres, Sallust may have sounded a note of caution concerning this charge by drawing attention to Verres' well-known *socordia* ('laziness, negligence')—see, for example, 2 *Verr.* 5. 24–6, 32–5.

4. 55. L. Hostilius Dasianus, of a restless temperament. Cicero gives a full account of the various schemes used by the defence to secure Verres' acquittal, one of which led to Cicero's *Divinatio in Q. Caecilium*, a speech delivered four months before the trial and designed to thwart the proposal of Verres' supporters that Q. Caecilius Niger, who had served as Verres' quaestor in Sicily in 72, should be appointed prosecutor. We have here reference to another such artifice, one dealt with by Cicero in *Verr.* 1. 6, where he reports that Verres, to counter Cicero's collection of evidence in Sicily, sent an agent to collect evidence on his behalf in Achaia—the agent did not even travel as far as Brundisium.

The scholiast on this passage (*Schol. Gronov.* 331 St.) states that some identify this 'collector of evidence in Achaia' as Dasianus, that others identify him as Piso. Broughton (*MRR* 2. 128) identifies him as the L. Hostilius (Dasianus?) who was tribune of the plebs in 68 BC.

4. 56. Crassus concerned himself rather with criticizing his colleague. There is considerable difference of opinion among modern scholars concerning the attitude of Crassus during his consulship. The majority, modifying Plutarch's statement of total lack of co-operation between the consuls (*Crass.* 12. 2; *Pomp.* 22. 3), believe that they acted in concert in the restoration of tribunician powers and then fell into continuing disagreement. Others have argued for total co-operation throughout. We know that major issues were dealt with in 70—see the introductory

note to 4. 52–6. There is also the tradition (App. *BC* 1. 121) that the consuls were practically compelled to enter into a pact of reconciliation when they took office; we do not, however, know what policies, if any, they disagreed about. Thus, since Crassus had been elected with Pompeius on a platform of restoration of tribunician powers, it may be that he was committed to co-operation on this issue, even though a late fragment from Cicero's *Pro Cornelio* (76C) is the only contemporary evidence which clearly indicates that both consuls were involved. Again, since both consuls had to agree to the holding of censorial elections (Cic. *Att.* 4. 2. 6), Crassus must have acted with Pompeius in reviving the censorship; it is reasonable, however, to suppose that he would not have favoured the rejection of so many senators for reasons of patronage similar to those referred to by Sallust in *Cat.* 17. 7 and 48. 8. As for jury corruption, Cicero (*Verr.* 1. 45) says that Pompeius wanted something done about corruption in the *provinces*; he did not, however, offer specific proposals; Plutarch (*Pomp.* 2. 3) reports that Pompeius allowed the passing of the *Lex Aurelia iudiciaria*, whereas he actively supported the law concerning the tribunate.

Sallust's statement indicates that expectation of disagreement foreshadowed in frr. 44–5 was justified.

4. 57–8. These two fragments are all that remains of a narrative dealing with events related to the activity of Lucullus in 70 BC. Even before the fall of Amisus (see notes on 4. 46–8) Lucullus had realized that secure control of Pontus was not possible while Mithridates was still at large. He therefore resorted to negotiation to remove the threat posed by the king; his wife's brother Appius Claudius Pulcher was sent as envoy to Tigranes king of Armenia to demand the surrender of Mithridates (Plut. *Luc.* 19. 1 and 21. 1; App. *Mith.* 83; Memnon, 46). Appian's ordering of the events, by which the sending of Claudius is placed after the capture of Sinope in 70, is clearly incorrect.

During Claudius' absence in the East Lucullus returned

to the debt-ridden province of Asia and carried out measures of relief which earned him the lasting enmity of the equestrian business class in Rome (Cic. *Acad.* 2. 3; Plut. *Luc.* 20 and 23. 1; App. *Mith.* 83). Soon after Claudius' return from the East the remaining strongholds in Pontus were reduced following the fall of Sinope (Plut. *Luc.* 23. 2–3; App. *Mith.* 83; Memnon, 53–4; Strabo, 12. 3. 11; Oros. 6. 3. 2–3; Eutrop. 6. 8. 2S). The order of events in Appian and in Cic. *Leg. Man.* 21, where the fall of Sinope is placed prior to that of Amisus, and in Eutropius, where the fall of both cities is placed before Mithridates' flight from Pontus, is incorrect. Amasia, the ancient capital of Pontus, fell soon after Sinope, and before the end of 70 the entire kingdom was in Roman hands. Consequently, Lucullus asked for the appointment of the usual ten commissioners who in co-operation with the general himself were to set about organizing the new province. The senate approved a commission which included Lucullus' brother M. Terentius Varro Lucullus and L. Licinius Murena, probably the former legate of Lucullus (Cic. *Att.* 13. 6. 4; Dio, 36. 43. 2).

4. 57. He strengthened the morale of the tetrarchs and kings. When Appius Claudius reached the territory of Tigranes, he was at first conducted by royal guides by a circuitous and time-consuming route through the upper country. When he realized this, Claudius abandoned his guides and headed straight for Antioch. Ordered to wait there for the king who was engaged in warfare in Syria, he spent the months of waiting winning over 'many of the princes who paid but a hollow obedience to the Armenian . . . He also promised many of the enslaved cities, when they went to confer with him secretly, the assistance of Lucullus, although for the present he bade them keep quiet' (Plut. *Luc.* 21. 2).

tetrarchs. The expression *tetrarchae regesque*, used in reverse order in Sallust, *Cat.* 20. 7, was already a cliché; cf. Cic. *Mil.* 76; *Vat.* 29; *Dom.* 60; *BAlex.* 78; Hor. *Sat.* 1. 3. 12; Tac. *Ann.* 15. 25. 6. Tetrarch originally signified one who ruled over a fourth part of a country; it was later

used to designate a minor potentate without reference to the extent of country ruled.

4. 58.* unaccustomed to hearing the truth. Despite La Penna's doubts concerning the placing of this fragment (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 50), I follow Maurenbrecher and his predecessors in applying it to Claudius' confrontation with Tigranes when he was eventually admitted to his presence. Unimpressed by the pomp and circumstance, the Roman envoy told the king bluntly that he had come to take back Mithridates as a necessary appendage to the triumph of Lucullus, or else to declare war against Tigranes. 'Although Tigranes made every effort to listen to this speech with a cheerful countenance and a forced smile, he could not hide from the bystanders his discomfiture at the bold words of the young man. It must have been twenty-five years since he had listened to a free speech. However, he replied to Appius that he would not surrender Mithridates, and that if the Romans began war he would defend himself' (Plut. *Luc.* 21. 6–7).

4. 59–66. Given Tigranes' reply, Lucullus decided to take the offensive. He appears to have spent the winter of 70/69 in Pontus; in early spring he began his march into enemy territory. Before leaving he had made what he considered to be adequate provision for the safeguarding of the Roman provinces under his jurisdiction: his legates Sornatius and Fabius Hadrianus were left with 6,000 men to defend Pontus; Triarius, probably still in charge of the fleet, was given the task of defending Roman sovereignty in the provinces of Asia and Bithynia (Plut. *Luc.* 24. 1; 35. 1; App. *Mith.* 88; Dio, 36. 9. 2, 10. 1). Lucullus was away from his provinces for two years engaged in Armenian campaigns of considerable complexity. On the theories concerning the relative fighting strengths of the opposed forces see H. A. Ormerod, *CAH* 9. 336 n. 1; Magie, 2. 1216 n. 45; cf. my note on 2. 57.

This group of fragments relates to the Armenian campaign of 69 BC; it provides only a fleeting and superficial glimpse of the narrative of that campaign. The other sources which deal with it are: Plut. *Luc.* 24–9; App.

Mith. 84–6; Memnon, 56–67; Cic. *Leg. Man.* 23; Strabo, 11. 14. 15; Liv. *Per.* 98; Dio, 36. 1b; 2. 3–4; Oros. 6. 3. 6–7; Eutropius, 6. 9. 1S; Frontinus, *Str.* 2. 2. 4, 4. 14.

4. 59. they were calmed down by a magnanimous speech. This fragment, which has been interpreted as dealing with the soothing of angry troops, was variously allocated by editors before Maurenbrecher. Given the transmitted book-number, Maurenbrecher's allocation of it to Lucullus' handling of protests expressed by his troops seems appropriate. These troops felt that with the annexation of Pontus the war with Mithridates was over and that in addition to undertaking 'a second war' (Plut. *Luc.* 24. 1) Lucullus was entering into unknown country involving, according to rumour, long marches, deep rivers, and mountains perpetually covered with snow. Lucullus succeeded in allaying their immediate fears and set out in circumstances wherein his soldiers 'followed him reluctantly and rebelliously, while the people's tribunes at Rome raised an outcry against him, accusing him of seeking one war after another' (Plut. *Luc.* 24. 3).

Maurenbrecher's identification of the protesters as specifically the Valerian legions (see notes on 2. 90 and 3. 19) is without foundation; the content of the protests reflects a general feeling of weariness and fear of the unknown.

4. 60. through the kingdom of Ariobarzanes. Ariobarzanes I, king of Cappadocia from 95–62 BC, was a staunch supporter of the Romans; he suffered for his alliance with them at the hands of Mithridates and Tigranes, but was finally rewarded for his loyalty and given the title *amicus populi Romani* ('Friend of Rome').

to the river Euphrates. The only Roman before Lucullus to have seen the Euphrates was Sulla on the occasion of his interview with a Parthian envoy in 92 (Liv. *Per.* 70; Plut. *Sull.* 5. 8; Vell. Pat. 2. 24. 3). All that lay beyond the Euphrates was unknown country to the Romans before Lucullus' Armenian campaign.

five hundred barges . . . built secretly during the winter . . . Plutarch reports that Lucullus found the Euphrates

'swollen and turbid from the winter storms, and was vexed to think of the delay and trouble which it would cost him to collect boats and build rafts' (*Luc.* 24. 2). Sallust's version indicates that the state of the river in early spring had been anticipated and prior arrangements had been made with Ariobarzanes for the provision of craft necessary for the crossing. This would seem to be confirmed by the fact that when the Romans had crossed the river at Tomisa, they handed back as a gift to Ariobarzanes this town which an earlier Cappadocian king had sold to the ruler of Sophene. The gesture also secured the control of this strategic position.

4. 61.* **such a suddenly occurring change . . . due to divine intervention.** Both Sallust and Plutarch agree that a sudden fall in the water level made a crossing possible. Plutarch says nothing about the use of boats; he stressed the apparently supernatural nature of the happening, also acknowledged by Lucullus' sacrifice of a bull to the Euphrates in thanksgiving for his safe passage (*Luc.* 24. 5).

4. 62–3. From Tomisa Lucullus marched south-east to Amida on the upper Tigris. The news of his advance was received with incredulity, but finally Tigranes dispatched a force under Mithrobarzanes with orders to bring Lucullus back alive. This force was destroyed by Lucullus, its leader slain; Lucullus then headed for the great fortress of Tigranocerta. On the approach of the Romans, Tigranes abandoned Tigranocerta, withdrew to the Armenian mountains, and set about assembling his army (Plut. *Luc.* 25. 2–7). Lucullus laid siege to Tigranocerta 'in the belief that Tigranes would not endure it, but contrary to his better judgement and in anger would descend into the plains to offer battle; and his belief was justified' (Plut. *Luc.* 26. 2).

4. 62. Naphtha. Tigranocerta was a town of enormous size and strength (App. *Mith.* 84). Its exact location is unknown; see the summary of the ancient evidence and the results of modern exploration in Rice Holmes, *Roman Republic*, 1. 409–25. The investing force could make little

headway since the townspeople defended themselves with arrows and destroyed the siege works with naphtha. 'The barbarians did him serious injury by means of their archery as well as the naphtha which they poured over his siege engines; this chemical is full of bitumen and is so fiery that it is sure to burn up whatever it touches, and it cannot easily be extinguished by any liquid.' (Dio, 36. 1b).

4. 63. cuts away the protecting screens. I follow Maurenbrecher in applying this fragment to the narrative dealing with the resistance by those besieged in Tigranocerta. A body of defenders appears to have penetrated the Roman fortifications and to have occupied a most favourable position. The phrase *pluteos rescindere* refers to the forcible removal of the screens of wood or wickerwork used for protection in siege warfare. In spite of the problems dealt with in both fragments, the siege was maintained as the surest way of inducing the king to offer battle.

4. 64–6. When the mobilization was completed Tigranes, in spite of warnings from Mithridates and advice from a royal favourite Taxiles (Plut. *Luc.* 26. 3 and 5; App. *Mith.* 85), came down from the hills to destroy a Roman army which he dismissed contemptuously with the words: 'If they are come as ambassadors, they are too many; if as soldiers, too few' (Plut. *Luc.* 27. 4; App. ibid.).

The three fragments of this group form part of the Sallustian description of the barbarian host which resulted from the conjunction of various Eastern peoples which swelled Tigranes' force, and which was the basis of the boastful confidence with which he prepared to meet Lucullus in the battle near Tigranocerta: 'The Armenians and Gordyeni joined them with all their hosts, and the kings of the Medes and the Adiabeni came up with all their hosts, and many Arabs arrived from the sea of Babylonia, and many Albanians from the Caspian Sea, together with the Iberians who were neighbours to the Albanians' (Plut. *Luc.* 26. 4).

Leaving Murena with 6,000 men to continue the siege of Tigranocerta, Lucullus moved out to face Tigranes. By

a combination of speed of movement and quickness of tactical thinking he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Armenian king, and this was followed by a great slaughter of his troops (Plut. *Luc.* 27. 5–28; summaries in App. Mith. 85; Frontin. *Str.* 2. 1. 14 and 2. 4; Memnon, 57; Eutrop. 6. 9. 1S; Oros. 6. 3. 6—of these, Frontinus and Orosius err in stating that Mithridates took part in the battle). The defeat had an immediate effect. A large component of the southern dominions of Tigranes went over to the Romans; the dissatisfied subjects of Tigranes with whom Appius Claudius had dealt at Antioch (see note on 4. 57–8) sent envoys to deal with Lucullus. The satrap of Sophene, the ruler of Commagene and various rulers of Arab states of northern Mesopotamia came to terms (Plut. *Luc.* 29. 7; Dio, 36. 2. 5). Lucullus also won over the people of Gordyene and while in their country he entered into negotiations with Phraates, the new king of Parthia. It is within the context of this flurry of negotiations that Sallust has placed his Letter of Mithridates.

4. 67. Appian records that, after Lucullus' defeat of Mithrobarzanes and the tightening of the siege of Tigranocerta by the Roman legate Sextilius (see introductory note on 4. 62–3), Tigranes finally sent for his father-in-law Mithridates (*Mith.* 85). Tigranes had not received Mithridates on the Pontic king's arrival in Armenia (App. *Mith.* 82; Plut. *Luc.* 22. 1, Memnon, 55), indeed, according to Memnon, not for twenty months. See Magie, 1. 343 and 2. 1215 n. 44. After ignoring to his cost Mithridates' advice to avoid battle near Tigranocerta, Tigranes recognized the Pontic king's superior experience of the Romans, and entrusted to him the command of the new army which they had levied in the winter of 69/8. The letter to the king of the Parthians is the first move in Mithridates' plan to contain and remove the threat posed by the Romans to the rule of eastern kings.

Since there is no external evidence for such a letter written by Mithridates Eupator, modern scholars debate whether Sallust has here inserted into his narrative a version of a real letter by the Pontic king or a composition

entirely of his own invention. For a clear and concise discussion of this problem see B. C. McGing, *The Foreign Policy of Mithridates VI Eupator King of Pontus* (Leiden 1986), 154–6.

I am convinced by the close analysis of the text by E. Bikerman, 'La lettre de Mithridate dans les Histoires de Salluste', *REL* 24 (1946), 131–51, and F. Alheid's 'Oratorical Strategy in Sallust's Letter of Mithridates Reconsidered', *Mnem.* 41 (1988), 67–92, that the letter is an extremely skilful exercise by Sallust in the genre of deliberative oratory. Made up of prologue (§§1–4), *narratio* = a statement of the facts related to the basic objectives stated in the prologue, (§§5–15), an *argumentatio* = the presentation of supporting arguments, (§§16–22), and a short concluding passage (§23), the letter conforms to the principles of ancient rhetorical theory; its ultimate aim is to persuade Arsaces to join Mithridates and Tigranes in the war against Rome.

4. 67. 1–4. Form the prologue to a *suasoria*, a speech of advice conceived to be applicable to a crisis in the career of an eminent figure in history. Into it Sallust incorporates the features of deliberative oratory appropriate to his purpose. In theory the aim of the genre was to stress the *utilitas*, the usefulness and expediency of the advice being given (*Rhet. Her.* 3. 3). Each half of this exordium is directed at persuading Arsaces to a course of action which is described as being to his advantage. The first half (§§1–2) introduces the main issue (offensive alliance) and presents the leading points of the argumentation in its favour, points which will be developed in the *narratio* and *argumentatio* segments of the letter. In his desire to steer Arsaces away from the easier alternative of a non-intervention policy, Mithridates then (§§3–4) attempts to counteract the factors which are unfavourable to his main objective, the winning of an alliance with the Parthian king.

4. 67. 1. King Arsaces. Sallust uses the dynastic name of the kings of Parthia, the Arsacids. The king addressed here was Phraates III, the twelfth Arsacid.

All those . . . should first of all consider . . . honourable or dishonourable. For a similar generalization, a typical introduction to a *suasoria*, see Thuc. 1. 32. 1; Sall. *Cat.* 51. 1.

offensive alliance. Sallust uses the term *societatem belli* which implies *foedus sociale*, an agreement which bound those who entered into it to a particular course of action in a specific situation. L. Raditsa 'A Historical Commentary to Sallust's Letter of Mithridates' (Diss. Columbia 1969), 5, cites Livy, 45. 25. 9–10, and Polybius, 30. 58–9, in noting the difference between the general relationship *amicitia* ('friendship') and *societas* ('partnership').

whether it is possible for them to remain at peace. Alheid (*Mnem.* 41 (1988), 71) points out that several times this introduction crosses the line between prologue and discussion (*tractatio*). Here, as *suasor belli* ('an advocate of war'), Mithridates introduces an argument under the guise of a general question.

legitimate and safe, honourable or dishonourable. The Latin versions of these categories are respectively *pium*, *tutum*, *gloriosum*, *indecorum*. Mithridates avoids the term *utile* in this context: the concept of usefulness and advantage was hardly appropriate in the circumstances under which he was negotiating an offensive alliance. He therefore restricts himself to the hortatory terms listed above; of these the concepts of safety and of honour and glory appear several times in the *argumentatio* (§§16–22), and will be discussed as they arise.

Bikerman takes the use of the concepts *pium* ('legitimate') in §1 and *scelestissimi* ('most wicked') in §2 as indicating that Mithridates' argument in passages which deal with Roman criminal behaviour (§§5–15, 17–18, 22) justifies the declaration of a pre-emptive war and the calling of such a war *pium bellum* ('a just war'). Alheid (*Mnem.* 41 (1988), 84–7 and n. 17) points out that the expressions *bellum iustum* and *bellum iustum piumque*, normally used of wars undertaken in response to an act of unprovoked aggression performed by a prospective enemy, can also be applied to a war which is justified

because an enemy-to-be is making war probable or unavoidable. See Livy, 6. 2. 1–5; 8. 3. 2; 9. 1. 10. Mithridates argues that Arsaces has the moral right to join in the war against Rome in order to prevent a Roman conquest of Parthia. On the extension of this moral duty to embrace Rome's activities against the entire world see on §22.

4. 67. 2. If you could enjoy lasting peace . . . prosperity. The factors in favour of alliance used in this section correspond to the points mentioned in §1: the categories of possibility, safety, and glory. While Sallust causes Mithridates to stress the inevitability of war with the Romans throughout the letter—cf. Dio, 36. 1—no reference is made to specific plans of Lucullus; Mithridates' arguments are based on his own interpretation of Roman character and intentions.

4. 67. 3. resentment against Tigranes on account of the recent war. Must refer to recent attacks in Mesopotamia by Tigranes. Hostilities between Parthia and Armenia had started with the death of Mithridates II of Parthia not long after 87 (N. C. Debevoise, *A Political History of Parthia* (Chicago 1938, repr. New York 1968), 50–1). Tigranes peopled a section of Mesopotamia with settlers uprooted from Cilicia and Cappadocia (Plut. *Luc.* 21. 4).

and my lack of success. A euphemistic description of the events noted in the commentary on 4. 59–66. As already indicated, the process of argumentation begins even in the prologue: as part of that process Mithridates here avoids elaborating on his misfortunes. An appeal for pity and assistance would be counter-productive in that it would impair the authority with which he hopes to persuade Arsaces to participate in a war which is presented not as a lost cause, but as a joint venture eminently capable of removing the Roman menace.

4. 67. 4. Tigranes . . . will accept an alliance on any terms. Dio, 36. 1. 1–2, and Memnon, 58, indicate that Tigranes offered to retreat from Mesopotamia and Adiabene; Plutarch has Arsaces demanding withdrawal from Mesopotamia as the price of his co-operation (*Luc.*

30. 1). Here the Pontic king, without making a specific offer, indicates Tigranes' readiness to accept any terms offered. The statement also makes clear that any agreement reached will necessarily involve Tigranes as a full participant, even though he receives scant mention, some of it slighting, in the rest of the letter.

although Fortune has deprived . . . she has equipped me. In this carefully worded statement Mithridates argues that his defeats were due not to error or weakness, but to the vicissitudes of fortune; out of this, however, he has gained invaluable experience. Instead of reminding and partially threatening Arsaces with the traditional argument of the changeability of fortune, he offers him the opportunity of benefiting from his personal lack of success.

I am no longer at the height of power. As Paladini observes, this statement is a careful mixture of euphemism with enough blunt truth to win support and not to frighten off.

I provide an example . . . of how you may conduct your own affairs with more prudence. The indeterminate, carefully phrased second half of this sentence—*quo rectius tua componas*—is designed to fit in with the self-esteem of the Parthian king.

something to be wished for . . . The Latin word chosen, *optabile*, is a mild limitation of the scope of the verb *componas*; once again Mithridates has avoided using the blunt *utile*.

4. 67. 5–15. This segment was regarded by Bikerman (*REL* 24 (1946), 137–41) as the first part of the *argumentatio* ('presentation of supporting argument') on the ground that the series of historical examples it contains points to two conclusions: (1) After the conquest of Pontus and Armenia, Rome will turn against the kingdom of Arsaces; (2) it will be possible to bring the war which Arsaces is being persuaded to join to a successful conclusion. Alheid (*Mnem.* 41 (1988), 73–4) cogently argues, however, that this part of the letter is not to be regarded as the first part of the *argumentatio*. In his view §§5–15

are to be compared with Sall. *Iug.* 81. 1 where Iugurtha tries to rouse the fighting spirit of his ally Bocchus by arguing that the latter will be the next victim of Rome's *avaritia* ('greed') and *lubido imperitandi* ('lust for dominion') like Iugurtha himself and others before him. Iugurtha's speech is presented in *oratio obliqua* ('indirect speech') and the *exempla* ('examples') are indicated as briefly as possible. A *narratio* which aims primarily at persuasiveness is a feature of forensic oratory; ancient authorities agree that deliberative oratory, concerned as it is with a decision about the future does not require a *narratio* ('statement of facts') to the same extent (Arist. Rhet. $1417^{b}12$–16; Cic. *Part.* 13; Quint. *Inst.* 3. 8. 10–11). But Aristotle in the same passage remarks on the possibility for the deliberative orator to influence the decision by a favourable or critical account of events from the past. This part of the letter, therefore, prepares for the *argumentatio* which begins at §16; since persuasiveness is the major aim, an objective presentation of the facts is no more to be expected than in the *narratio* of a forensic speech.

Of this segment, §§5–9 cover the years 200–74 and describe how the kings of Macedon, Syria, Pergamum, and Bithynia fell victim to Roman deceit. §§10–15 are about Mithridates and Rome in the period 88–69. Sallust may well have made use of pro-Mithridatic source material to present a version of these events suited to the aims of the letter. Its anti-Roman theme is an illustration of the 'spiritual opposition' (H. Fuchs, *Der geistige Widerstand gegen Rom in der antiken Welt* (Berlin 1938)) to the Romans, especially in the eastern world. The same attitude marked the *Historiae Philippicae* of Pompeius Trogus from which is preserved a speech (in direct form) of Mithridates which repeats some of the themes of the Sallustian letter—see Iust. *Epit.* 38. 4–7.

To what extent Sallust himself agreed with the picture he caused Mithridates to present is less easy to decide. The letter has come down to us torn from its narrative context, and we do not know whether or not Sallust contradicted the Pontic king's version of Roman activity in

Asia which is anti-Roman to the point of continuous and excessive distortion of the facts.

The fact that Mithridates posits as the cause of the Roman perfidy the vices *cupido imperi* and *cupido divitiarum*, defects which are identical with those which in Sallust's theory led to the degeneration of Roman political and social life after 146 BC (cf. *Cat.* 11–13; *Iug.* 41) has been taken as an indication that Sallust shared Mithridates' condemnation of Roman imperial activity; see D. C. Earl, *The Political Thought of Sallust* (Cambridge 1961), 109–10; Pasoli ad loc. Bikerman and Syme suggest that Sallust, influenced by events at the time of writing, used the letter to put the Romans on their guard against formulating designs of expansion against Parthia. Pasoli puts forward the more prudent and more plausible suggestion that Sallust would not have put such stress on the letter of Mithridates if the Parthian problem had not been prominent at his time of writing.

4. 67. 5. The Romans have one inveterate motive. This general proposition, which receives detailed elaboration in §17, provides a framework for the account of events from 200 to 69 BC. It points to Roman aggression not only against kings but against the whole world, and portrays the specific events as part of one great Roman design motivated by desire for wealth and power which in its intensity and pertinacity justifies the description of the Romans as *communes omnium hostes* ('the common foe of all mankind') (*Iug.* 81. 1). See H. E. Stier 'Der Mithridatesbrief aus Sallusts Historien als Geschichtsquelle', in R. Sthiel and H. E. Stier (eds.), *Festschrift fur Franz Altheim* (Berlin 1969), 441–51.

on all nations, peoples, and kings. The Latin expression is *cum nationibus, populis, regibus*; it is used three times by Sallust with variation of order in each case: cf. *Cat.* 10. 1; 20. 7. The emphasis in the ensuing *exempla* is almost totally on kings (the Cretans in §10 being the sole exception). In §15 Roman behaviour is described as 'following the custom of overthrowing all monarchies'. As a king, Arsaces would be particularly sensitive to such examples. Cf. §17.

an insatiable desire for dominion and riches. This explanation of Roman reasons for going to war is in sharp contradiction to Roman pretensions. No declaration of war could be presented to the Roman people by the senate without the prior approval of the *fetiales* (see note on 3. 34. 17); and according to Livy (38. 45. 3–6) the eastern wars which Mithridates uses to illustrate his statement of motive were declared in strict compliance with fetial procedure. According to fetial law war could only be proposed by the senate and approved by the people if it was in retaliation for seizure of Roman territory or property, or to help allies (Cic. *Off.* 1. 36; *Leg. Man.* 14).

Mithridates places the emphasis on moral factors, ingrained propensities in order to convince Arsaces that war against the Romans as enemies is not simply a matter of victory or defeat, but of survival.

they first began a war. Refers to the so-called Second Macedonian War begun by the Romans in the autumn of 200 against Philip (Liv. 31. 22. 4–47. 3; 32. 4. 1–6. 4, 9. 6–25. 12, 32–40; 33. 1–2. 5, 24–5, 27–49). See N. G. L. Hammond and F. W. Walbank, *A History of Macedonia*, vol. 3 (Oxford 1988), 411–43; R. M. Errington, *CAH* 8 (1989), 261–74. This war was brought to a successful conclusion by the Roman general Titus Quinctius Flamininus at Cynoscephalae in 197.

with Philip, king of the Macedonians. Philip V of Macedon who ascended the throne in 221, and who, in 215, with the hope of conquering the Illyrian coast, allied himself with Hannibal against Rome. The revival of hostility referred to here was indeed caused by Roman intervention in the East, but this intervention was requested by Pergamum and Rhodes; an embassy was sent late in 201 to make clear to Philip the terms—laid down in a *senatus consultum*—under which Rome was prepared to remain at peace with him (Polyb. 16. 17; 31. 4–7; Liv. 31. 2. 1–4 and 18. 1). Philip ignored all diplomatic negotiations and Rome declared war on him late in 200. On the threat posed by Philip, the complicated diplomatic negotiations connected with it, and the eventual decision to resort to war see Errington, *CAH* 8 (1989), 252–61.

after pretending to be his friend. Introduced here with the words *amicitiam simulantes*, the idea of Roman duplicity is emphasized in all the examples in §§5–9 where it is implied that the Romans, in order to prevent a combining of the monarchies which they were successively to attack, made agreements they had no intention of keeping. Their *cupido imperi* overrode all other obligations when these ceased to be politically expedient: Arsaces is being warned of the unreliability of any treaty they may now be attempting to make with him.

as long as they were being hard pressed by the Carthaginians. The years 205–202 BC formed the decisive period of the Second Punic War. Because they realized the necessity to concentrate their forces against the Carthaginians in Africa, the Romans readily accepted the opportunity to negotiate a peace with Philip and offered liberal terms in the peace treaty of Phoenice in 205 (Liv. 29. 12. 1; App. *Mac.* 31); see Errington, *CAH* 8 (1989), 104–5. When the Roman envoys approached Philip at Abydos in 200, demanding that he cease from attacking the Rhodians, Attalus of Pergamum, and the Greek cities, the king begged Rome to abide by that treaty (Liv. 30. 42. 3; 31. 18. 3–4), but he did not challenge Rome's right to dictate conditions. There is no indication of a formal renunciation of *amicitia* with Philip. The situation has been transmuted into a charge of lack of good faith on Rome's part.

4. 67. 6. When Antiochus came to Philip's aid. In the winter of 203/2 Philip accepted from Antiochus III the Great, king of Syria, an offer of a secret alliance against Egypt, the terms of which remain unclear; sources, commentary, and bibliography in F. W. Walbank, *A Historical Commentary on Polybius*, vol. 2 (Oxford 1967), 471–3. There is no evidence that Antiochus offered tangible help to Philip in the course of the war of 200–196. During this Second Macedonian War Antiochus was occupied with the realizing of a long-deferred hope of restoring Seleucid control over Asia Minor by mounting an attack on Ptolemaic Egypt and occupying Coele Syria. An expedition undertaken by Antiochus in the spring of

197 had as its primary objective the conquest of the coastal cities of Cilicia, Lycia, and Caria. The other objective attributed to this expedition by Livy (33. 19. 11), the provision of help by land and sea to Philip, was never put into effect. It appears that Mithridatic propaganda used the suspicions aroused by the secrecy of the negotiations between Antiochus and Philip to concoct another illustration of Roman duplicity.

by surrendering Asia to him. There is no evidence that Rome at any time offered Antiochus a free hand in Asia Minor. It is not unlikely, however, as Paladini suggests ad loc., that the Romans, occupied with the Macedonian war, closed an eye to Antiochus' conquests in Asia, demanding as a tacit counter-agreement that Antiochus give up all interest in the affairs of Europe (cf. Liv. 33. 20). To transform such a situation into a proper *concessio Asiae* is again part of Mithridates' tendentious interpretation of Roman intentions.

A short time afterwards. After the defeat of Philip in 197 Rome's attitude to Antiochus changed, mainly because of his presumed predatory intentions with regard to Europe and Roman influence there. Nevertheless, the Roman senate over the period 196–2 used every possible diplomatic avenue to avoid armed conflict with the Syrian king (see Errington, *CAH* 8 (1989), 272–82). As one would expect, Mithridates makes no mention of forbearance on Rome's part. It was not until 192 that war broke out between Rome and Syria.

Antiochus was stripped . . . Antiochus suffered two overwhelming defeats—at Thermopylae in April 191 and at Magnesia in December 190. Peace was made under the conditions that he keep his hands off Europe, withdraw from Asia on the western side of the Taurus mountains, and pay indemnity of 15,000 talents.

ten thousand talents. Only Eutropius agrees with Sallust on the amount he has designated as the indemnity demanded by Rome. Polybius (21. 17) and Livy (37. 45. 14; 38. 38. 13) put the figure at 15,000 talents over a twelve-year period.

4. 67. 7. after many battles of varying results. A reference to the vicissitudes of the Third Macedonian War from its outbreak in 171 to its conclusion with the disastrous defeat of Perseus at Pydna in 168. Perseus did have some measure of success—he defeated P. Licinius Crassus, the consul of 171, at Callinicus (Polyb. 27. 8. 1; Liv. 42. 57–62; Plut. *Aem.* 9. 2); in 170 he defeated the inept consul, A. Hostilius Mancinus, at Elimiae, thus preventing him from penetrating into Macedonia proper (Plut. *Aem.* 9. 3; cf. Liv. 43. 11. 9). In 169, however, because of the diplomatic skills and military leadership of the consul Q. Marcius Philippus, Perseus' success waned (Polyb. 28. 13; Diod. 30. 10. 1; Liv. 44. 1–9; Flor. 1. 28. 5; App. *Mac.* 17) and in 168 he was overwhelmingly defeated by the consul L. Aemilius Paullus at Pydna (Polyb. 19. 14–18; Liv. 44. 42. 7; Plut. *Aem.* 12–27; Frontin. *Str.* 2. 3. 20; Flor. 1. 28. 7. On the Third Macedonian War see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, 512–57; P. S. Derow, *CAH* 8 (1989), 307–19.

Perseus, the son of Philip. Perseus, first-born son of Philip V of Macedon, succeeded his father in 179/8 and continued a policy of apparent loyalty to the agreements made with Rome. He possessed neither the acumen nor the physical energy of his father. His story is used by Mithridates as the first of two illustrations of the manner in which the Roman Republic treated princes who placed their trust in Rome.

they formally took under their protection. Perseus did attempt to negotiate with Aemilius Paullus; he was prepared to return to the Roman fold if he was guaranteed royal status. Paullus insisted that his surrender should be unconditional, and after Perseus finally surrendered the Roman general made statements designed to encourage but not to guarantee the king of Macedon's hopes of survival (Liv. 45. 4. 7, 8. 5).

before the gods of Samothrace. The island of Samothrace in the north-eastern Aegean was the centre of the cult of the Cabiri, gods of fertility and protectors of sailors. After Pydna Perseus fled to Samothrace and 'took refuge . . . as

a suppliant, entrusting himself to the inviolability of the temple. There Gnaeus Octavius, the praetor in command of the fleet, reached him and persuaded him by argument rather than by force to give himself up to the good faith of the Romans.' (Vell. Pat. 1. 9. 4–5). These two incidents in Perseus' career—the flight to Samothrace and his subsequent acceptance of an *in fide* relationship with Rome are dealt with as separate events in the other sources (Diod. 29. 25; Liv. 45. 4–8; Plut. *Aem.* 24–31). Here they have been conflated in order to imply that the *in fide* relationship had religious guarantees which Rome subsequently ignored.

killed him by never letting him sleep. A variety of traditions has survived concerning the death of Perseus. Livy (45. 42. 4) reports simply that the senate decreed that he should be held in custody in Alba Fucens. The other Latin sources—Vell. Pat. 1. 11. 1; Val. Max. 5. 1. 1; Ampelius, 16. 4; Oros. 4. 20. 39—agree that Perseus died at Alba. Greek sources add detail concerning the manner of death. According to Zonaras (9. 24. 56) Perseus endured life at Alba so long as he had hopes of a return to power; when this expectation was frustrated he killed himself. Reflecting the same tradition Plutarch states that the majority of writers on the topic reported suicide by Perseus (*Aem.* 37. 2–3). He also alludes to what he calls a singular and extraordinary version of Perseus' death, according to which his guards grew angry with him, but, because they were forbidden to harm him directly, they kept him from sleep until he died. Diodorus alone hints that people in higher positions desired Perseus' destruction (31. 9. 1–4). No historian of Perseus' death mentions outright murder. Mithridates did not bother searching for precision—Perseus' death was the fault of the Romans.

4. 67. 8. Eumenes. Eumenes II, first-born son of Attalus I of Pergamum whom he succeeded in 197. He continued his father's policy of co-operation with Rome which secured for him, by the peace of Apamaea, the Thracian Chersonese and most of Seleucid Asia Minor (Polyb. 21. 40–8; Liv. 38. 38–40 and 45–6; App. *Syr.*

38–9; *Diod.* 29. 11; see Hammond and Walbank, *History of Macedonia*, 454–5; Errington, *CAH* 8 (1989), 286–9. Roman goodwill was shown by the senate's intervention in his favour in his wars with Bithynia and Pontus (Errington, *CAH* 8 (1989), 328–30). But as supporter of the *status quo* in the East, Eumenes became unpopular with all the dissatisfied powers.

whose friendship they now ostentatiously parade. It is probable, as L. Raditsa (*Helikon* 9–10 (1969–70), 140) suggests, that Lucullus' envoys, in their attempt to persuade Arsaces to associate himself with them, made reference to the Attalids and the benefits they had gained from their co-operation with Rome. When the Romans attempted to persuade a king to ally himself with them, they usually spoke of the kings who had profited from such an alliance (Polyb. 21. 11. 5–8; Liv. 37. 25. 9–12; App. *Syr.* 23). Mithridates, aware of the effectiveness of the Roman propaganda against the solidarity of kings, is here, as in the case of Perseus, reminding Arsaces that obsequious loyalty is no safeguard against the Roman drive for power.

they first betrayed to Antiochus as the price of peace. There is no evidence to substantiate such a charge. What did take place was a significant change in the relations between Rome and Eumenes in the course of the Third Macedonian War when the senate began to suspect him of betraying the cause of Rome. The turning point in attitude was reached after the conclusion of the war against Perseus in the winter of 167/6 (Polyb. 30. 20; cf. Just. *Epit.* 38. 6. 1–4), and thereafter Eumenes was subjected to a series of humiliating insults. In 164 the senate readily listened to accusations made against him by Prusias of Bithynia and some cities of Asia concerning his intimate association with Antiochus (Polyb. 31. 6) and sent C. Sulpicius Gallus to Asia to investigate charges against him (Polyb. 31. 10).

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having made him the overseer of captured territory. Sallust's use of *custodia* (guardianship) indicates that Eumenes was never anything other than the custodian of the lands conquered by Rome, in this case Asia Minor this side of the Taurus (cf. §6). The temporary, conditional nature of occupancy implied by *custodia* emerges from Liv. 37. 44. 6–7; 38. 23. 3. At 37. 55. 5 Livy uses the fairly imprecise verb *attribuo* ('assign'); cf. Polyb. 21. 24. 7–8; App. *Syr.* 44; Diod. 29. 11.

reduced . . . by exactions and insults . . . to the most wretched of slaves. See note on §9, **they occupied Asia.**

having concocted a counterfeit and impious will. Mithridates rejected the authenticity of the will by which Attalus III appointed the Roman people heirs of the kingdom of Pergamum in 133 (*OGIS* 338 and 435; see A. H. J. Greenidge and A. M. Clay, *Sources for Roman History 133–70 BC* (Oxford 1960), 11–12). He used the accusation *simulatum et impium testamentum* as an exemplar of Roman rapacity and Aristonicus as Rome's victim because of lack of support from fellow-kings.

impious will. In the sense of disregard for the divinely imposed moral duties governing men's relationships between themselves: the bequeathing of the kingdom to the Romans instead of to Eumenes' son transgressed this moral code.

they led his son Aristonicus in triumph like an enemy. Soon after the death of Attalus III, Aristonicus, illegitimate son of Eumenes II and the only surviving Attalid, decided to seize the throne by violence. In a struggle which began in 133 he was opposed by many of the inhabitants of Pergamum, by Nicomedes of Bithynia, Mithridates V of Cappadocia, and Pylaemenes of Paphlagonia, kings allied with Rome, and by Byzantium and other cities abroad. A Roman army under the consul Publius Licinius Crassus eventually arrived in 131, but

Crassus was quickly defeated and killed near Pergamum. Crassus' successor, the consul Marcus Perperna, defeated Aristonicus in 130 and took him prisoner, but died before victory celebrations were held. The war was brought to an end in 129 by the consul Manius Aquillius with the assistance of senatorial envoys. (Strabo, 14. 1. 38; Diod. 34. 2. 26; Liv. *Per.* 59; Flor. 1. 35. 4–7; Frontin. *Str.* 4. 5. 16; Oros. 5. 10. 1–5; Eutrop. 4. 10. 1–2S; Just. *Epit.* 36. 4. 6–12).

The only source which agrees with Mithridates' statement that Aristonicus was led in Aquillius' triumphal procession is Vellius Paterculus (2. 4. 1) who also agrees with Orosius (5. 10. 5) and Eutropius (4. 20. 2S) that the usurper was strangled at Rome by order of the senate.

4. 67. 9. They occupied Asia. Strabo's statement on the testament of Attalus III: 'The Romans declared the country a province, calling it Asia . . .'(13. 4. 2) represents the Roman viewpoint on the outcome of the struggle with Aristonicus. L. Raditsa (*Helikon* 9–10 (1969–70), 689–94) points out that Mithridates' implication that Asia was being held by force is more applicable to the condition of Asia after the First Mithridatic War. It was only after the peace of Dardanus that the Roman tax-farmers really began to plunder Asia and that the presence of Roman soldiers began (Magie, 1. 163). Sallust's use of the verb *obsidere* ('beset', 'assail', 'occupy') challenges the Roman ideal of the status of provinces according to which association with Rome did not involve subjection, the status of ally being in no way incompatible with freedom.

The vocabulary used here and in §8 ('reduced him by exactions and insults from king to the most wretched of slaves') may also reflect Sallust's own view concerning the ways in which under senatorial rule the ideals of good government were engulfed by the demands of the vices *ambitio* and *avaritia*. See Commentary on Cotta's speech, 2. 44.

and finally . . . they seized Bithynia. The Romans came into possession of Bithynia on the basis of a testament of Bithynia's last king, Nicomedes III. See the introductory

note on 2. 83–91. Mithridates' statement *quam reginam appellaverat* ('in every way recognized as queen', as interpreted by Jacobs–Wirz–Kurfess ad loc.) has caused some commentators, on the basis of such very confused passages as Sall. *Iug.* 65. 2; Caes. *BGall.* 1. 35. 2, to question the authenticity of the testament. The scholiast on *Pompeiana* 5, '*Bithyniae quae*' (316 St.) believes that there was a genuine bequest.

4. 67. 10. Why should I mention my own case? In the second part of the *narratio* (§10–15) the *exempla* deal with events in which Mithridates himself played a part. Rome is named as the party responsible for the Mithridatic wars of 88 to 69; Roman successes are put down to the hostility of nature and the shortcomings of subordinates, not incompetence on Mithridates' part. The emphasis in this part of the persuasion process is that in the light of the examples in §§5–9 there is no room for hesitation or reluctance to acknowledge the danger represented by Rome.

tetrarchies. See the note on 4. 56, **tetrarch**.

Although I was completely separated . . . and to King Ptolemy. These sentences not only explain the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War, but are also designed to show Arsaces that Mithridates saw the future course of events, and attempted to instruct others in political reality.

they provoked me to war through Nicomedes. The sources report that in 89 an embassy headed by Manius Aquillius (cos. 101) was sent to restore Nicomedes III of Bithynia and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia to the thrones they had been forced to relinquish by Mithridates (App. *Mith.* 11; Iust. *Epit.* 38. 3. 4). The envoys then incited the kings to raid the territory of Mithridates, and paid no heed to that king's protests (App. *Mith.* 11–17; Iust. *Epit.* 38. 3. 4–9). This raid resulted in the outbreak of the First Mithridatic War in 88. It appears that the phrase *bello lacessiverunt* ('provoked me to war'), used by Mithridates to imply total Roman responsibility for the war, can be justified to the extent that the envoys adopted a belligerent and uncompromising stance. Appian, however, indicates a deliberate policy of diplomatic provocation on

to the Cretans. At the time of the First Mithridatic War Crete was still independent. It was not until 67, after a fierce resistance, that it was put under subjection by Q. Caecilius Metellus, who thereby acquired the *cognomen* Creticus.

to King Ptolemy. Ptolemy VIII Lathyrus, who ruled over Egypt down to 81. Late in 87 and through 86 Lucullus, sent by Sulla, visited Crete, Cyrene, Egypt, Syria, and Rhodes to raise a fleet among these free and allied states (Plut. *Luc.* 2..2–3. 3; App. *Mith.* 33 and 51; Auct. *Vir. Ill.* 74. 2). Lucullus won some support from Crete, but received a courteous but firm refusal from Egypt.

4. 67. 11. in revenge for the wrongs inflicted upon me. The Latin phrasing *ultus iniurias* reflects the viewpoint that the only honourable course is to avenge oneself for wrongs inflicted; cf. Cic. *Leg. Man.* 11 and the use of *inultum* as equivalent to *impunitum* in *Cluent.* 172.

I drove Nicomedes out of Bithynia. In the first engagement of the Mithridatic war of 88 Nicomedes with his Bithynian army suffered disastrous defeat at the hands of Mithridates' generals Archelaus and Neoptolemus. Nicomedes fled with survivors into Paphlagonia, once again ousted from his throne (App. *Mith.* 18; 20; cf. Iust. *Epit.* 38. 3. 8). This is the only phase of this war to which the justification of avenging wrongs can plausibly be applied.

recovered Asia . . . and freed Greece from . . . servitude. Mithridates justifies these two phases of his campaign in two different ways. In the case of Asia, he presents himself as avenging the wrongs done to Antiochus (§6); he justifies his Greek campaign as liberation from slavery.

In dealing with this war, the sources, expressing mainly a Roman point of view, speak of Mithridates' seizure of Asia and Sulla's recovery of it (thus, Plut. *Sull.* 11. 2, where mention is also made of the seizure of Bithynia and Cappadocia; cf. App. *Mith.* 58; Liv. *Per.* 83; *OGIS* 742. 4–7; Eutrop. 5. 7. 2S). The case of Greece is more complex. Mithridates' activity in Athens and elsewhere in Greece is described as revolutionary by Plut. *Sull.* 11. 3;

cf. Flor. 1. 40. 8. On the other hand, Velleius Paterculus is adamant that a real revolt did not take place in Athens: the Athenians were in spirit on the side of Rome, but were forced to work for the Pontic forces (2. 23. 4–6). The same attitude is reflected in Plut. *Sull.* 12. 1. However, Sulla's punishment of Athenians after his victory (App. *Mith.* 62; Flor. 1. 40. 21; Paus. 1. 20. 4–7) has injected uncertainty concerning loyalty to the Roman cause. This uncertainty is also reflected in modern scholarship: while no one speaks of Mithridates as freeing Greece, some scholars feel that there was revolt in Athens and for very good reasons. Thus, J. Beloch, 'Der Verfall der antiken Kultur', *Historische Zeitschrift* 84 (1900), 1–38; U. von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf, 'Athenion und Aristion', *Setzungsbericht d. preuss. Akad.* (1923), 39–50.

4. 67. 12. Archelaus . . . by betraying my army. Looking back over a period of twenty years, Mithridates conflates two incidents, the defeats which Archelaus suffered in Greece in 86 and his desertion to Rome several years after the Peace of Dardanus (85) following accusations of treachery in his negotiations with Sulla. The implication that Archelaus had betrayed him in the field explains the defeats of Chaeronea and Orchomenos, which he is not inclined to mention either here or in §4.

There is evidence that Archelaus was actively propositioned by Sulla, but without immediate effect (Plut. *Sull.* 22; App. *Mith.* 55). The sources also indicate that the most Archelaus could be accused of in the actual war was recklessness and incompetence (App. *Mith.* 45), while Plutarch (*Sull.* 20. 2–4) claims that events proved that Archelaus' assessment of the Romans was accurate: it was Roman courage, not Pontic treachery which decided both battles. It was Mithridates' bitter reaction to defeat and to the treaty of Dardanus which led Archelaus to seek safety by defecting to Murena in 83 (App. *Mith.* 64).

and those . . . will find no relief from war until they are wiped out. In this section Mithridates reverts to the crucial point addressed in his prologue: the opportunity and the necessity to form an offensive alliance against Rome. War with Rome is inevitable; those who thought in 88, as

Arsaces might be tempted to think now in 67, that they could have the benefits of Mithridates' efforts without contributing to them paid the penalty of their cowardice or misguided opportunism.

Ptolemy. The reference is to Ptolemy XI Auletes. Mithridates' characterization of the Egyptian attitude echoes the arguments and complaints voiced by the Egyptian king at a later date, when he pointed out how expensive it had been to gain and maintain Roman friendship (Dio, 39. 12). After his accession in 81 Auletes had attempted to win recognition from the Roman senate; it was finally granted to him in 59, two years before his death, at the instigation of Julius Caesar (Caes. *BCiv.* 3. 107). In the twenty years before official recognition as *amicus et socius* Auletes' status had been totally uncertain: the senate on the one hand hesitated to annex Egypt directly by force; on the other, had formally refused to recognize Egypt's independence. Mithridates is referring to this long period of insecurity. As it turned out Ptolemy Auletes' bribery eventually achieved its object.

the Cretans who have already been attacked. I agree with Raditsa (*Helikon* 9–10 (1969–70), 200) in rejecting Paladini's assumption that this refers to M. Antonius' abortive campaign against Crete in 74, dealt with in the Commentary on 3. 68–76: Mithridates' comment is not appropriate to a total Roman defeat. Events relating to Crete which took place a few months before the historical date (67) of the letter fit in more convincingly with Mithridates' description (see note on 2. 42, **the *cognomen* Creticus**). In 69 the consul Q. Caecilius Metellus was given the command against the Cretans. The long war referred to here reached its climax in the late summer of 67 when the Cretans appealed to Pompeius rather than to the allegedly cruel Metellus for terms of settlement. Metellus ignored the Cretan assertion of terms agreed upon with Pompeius and carried on with his aim of finishing the war before Pompeius' arrival. It is to this situation that the letter refers. Mithridates dismisses the hopes fostered by the Cretan negotiations with Pompeius, and insists on what he considers to be the reality of the

situation—the war can only end with the extinction of Crete as an independent power (Plut. *Pomp.* 29; Dio, 36. 17a–19 and 45. 1). Metellus with three legions crushed the Cretans and the island became a Roman province; it was united with Cyrene at least from the time of Augustus.

4. 67. 13. had not so much granted me peace. In §10 Mithridates maintains that he was provoked to the First Mithridatic War by the Romans through Nicomedes. Here he admits aggression but justifies it on the ground that the Peace of Dardanus in 85 was made by the Romans in bad faith. In both cases he takes up a theme introduced in §2, taken up again in §5, and repeated in §§15, 17, and 21, namely that the Romans are bent on the destruction of all independent powers, monarchies in particular. They are creatures of political necessity; no lasting agreements, only wars to extinction are possible with them.

The idea that the peace of Dardanus was not negotiated in good faith receives varied treatment in our sources; thus Murena's argument at the outbreak of the Second Mithridatic War in 83 that the peace had no legality (App. *Mith.* 64) was taken up by Mithridates himself in his decision to start the third war in 74 (App. *Mith.* 70). On contrasting Roman and Eastern views on the topic see Raditsa, *Helikon* 9–10 (1969–70), 633–5.

because of their own internal troubles. Refers to the civil war between Marius and Sulla. See Comm. on 1. 21–46.

too late, he admits the truth of my prediction. The references to Tigranes' slowness in supplying assistance, and to the imprudence which is the fruit of the Armenian king's lack of belief in the Pontic king's foresight (§15) are intended to reinforce the urgings of §§3 and 4 of the prologue.

took up the war again. On the date of the beginning of the Third Mithridatic War see Comm. on 2. 84–91. Modern scholars talk of three Mithridatic wars: that which began in 88 and concluded in 85 with the peace of Dardanus; that which began with Murena's penetration into Cappadocia in the winter 83/2 and concluded, after the siege of Sinope and the retreat into Phrygia, with

Murena's recall and the arrival of Aulus Gabinius (81) who restored to the affairs of Asia more or less the organization agreed upon by the Peace of Dardanus; and that war which began in 74. Mithridates makes no mention here of the 83–81 conflict. Paladini ad loc. gives the Latin word used here, *rursus*, one of its accepted meanings ('again', 'a second time') and suggests that Mithridates considered the war which began in 74 a continuation of the conflict which had been interrupted by the Peace of Dardanus.

At Chalcedon I routed Marcus Cotta . . . loss of a first-class fleet at sea. On this activity see Comm. on 3. 12 and 13.

4. 67. 14. the siege of Cyzicus. On the details of the siege operation see Commentary, 3. 14–28. It is true that lack of supplies, lack of support from neighbouring peoples, inclement weather and siege conditions that gave rise to diseases and plague did play a large part in the story of Cyzicus. Compared with the preceding section there is a marked absence of a personal note here. The inevitability of the effect of natural phenomena on the outcome of the siege enables Mithridates to gloss over the inadequacies of his personal leadership.

not compelled by the enemy. Totally untrue. See Comm. on 3. 28–9.

lost the flower . . . by shipwrecks at Parium and Heraclea. For some detail concerning these losses see the introductory commentary to 3. 35–42. In fact there was only one storm, one of unusual violence in the Black Sea (Plut. *Luc.* 12. 1; 13. 2–3; App. *Mith.* 77 and 78); see Comm. on 3. 38–9.

4. 67. 15. at Cabeira. On the preliminaries to the campaign against Cabeira see the introductory comment to 4. 3–10.

battles of varied outcome. An exaggeration. After some initial success because of his more numerous cavalry, trained on encounters in the plains country of the river Lycus (see Comm. on 4. 3–4). Mithridates soon faltered against the tactical skills of Lucullus. After a few weeks

his losses were so severe and his position so untenable that he decided on a retreat into Armenia, ruled by his son-in-law Tigranes. That retreat was soon transformed into headlong flight. See Comm. on 4. 5–10.

the kingdom of Ariobarzanes. Cappadocia, of which Ariobarzanes, through the favour of the Romans, became king in 95. This was the first of many instances of Roman patronage which was repaid by Ariobarzanes with loyal devotion. In 93 Tigranes, in support of Mithridates, invaded Cappadocia and expelled Ariobarzanes. Rome gave Sulla the task of restoring him in 92. Removed yet again by Mithridates, Ariobarzanes again recovered his throne with Roman help, that of Manius Aquillius who in the same year (89) restored the kingdom of Bithynia to Nicomedes III (see §10). During the First Mithridatic War Ariobarzanes took refuge in Rome, attended the peace negotiations at Dardanus, and early in 84 was placed yet again on the throne of Cappadocia, this time by Curio, sent by Sulla. Cappadocia was not directly involved in the campaigns of Lucullus and 'untouched by war' was a reliable source of supplies for the Roman army.

Mithridates is again stressing for Arsaces' benefit that Roman superiority was not due to their capacities and fighting spirit, but to conditions over which he, Mithridates, had no control.

they are now boasting of the outcome of Tigranes' imprudence as if it were a victory. The reference is to the siege of the great fortress of Tigranocerta which Lucullus used to induce Tigranes to decide on a battle in the vicinity of Tigranocerta, on terrain which was totally suitable for the purpose. For details of both operations see Comm. on 4. 62–3 and 4. 64–6 respectively. Once again for his own purposes Mithridates deliberately depreciates the Roman achievement. To judge by the unanimous testimony of sources other than Sallust (Strabo, 11. 14. 15; Plut. *Luc.* 25–8; App. *Mith.* 84–5; Dio, 36; Xiph. 1. 2–3) it has to be recognized as an outstanding victory; one can understand the extent to which Mithridates would wish to minimize it. (Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 17. 2–3).

4. 67. 16–22. Contain the *argumentatio* of the letter. It is a progressive process of persuasion, the structure and content of which is controlled by the questions asked in the first sentence of §16 and by the declaration of intent in its final sentence.

4. 67. 16. Do you really think . . . or that there will be an end to the war? This double question is based on two objections assumed to be raised by Arsaces which imply that he does not consider Rome a great enough danger to compel him to join forces with Mithridates and Tigranes.

if we are defeated that you will be in a better position to resist the Romans. Can be interpreted in two ways: (i) it indicates Mithridates' assumption that Arsaces feels that since his resources already surpass those of Mithridates, Tigranes, and those of the other kings mentioned in §§5–15 he is in a better position to defend Parthia (Alheid); (ii) the phrase *nobis oppressis* ('if we are defeated') is a causal adjunct (Bikerman) and hence Arsaces is considering a policy of non-intervention a wise move in the existing situation. In the interim he could recover the territory occupied by Tigranes (see note on 4. 67. 3, **resentment against Tigranes on account of the recent war**), enlarging at the same time his resources against a Roman invasion of Pontus in the near future. Both lines of thought are implied in Mithridates' countering of these assumed objections in subsequent sections of the letter.

or that there will be an end to the war? Implies an assumption on the part of Arsaces that Rome would be satisfied with the conquest of Pontus and would not turn against Parthia. Objections to this line of thought are raised in §§17–19.

I am well aware . . . I am seeking an alliance . . . the Romans are seeking your spoils. Regarded by Bikerman (140–1) as the refutation of Arsaces' presumed objection that Mithridates' defeat by the Romans will place him in a stronger position (*firmiorem*). While the resources of Arsaces are indeed extensive, a policy of non-intervention is only feasible for one who is strong enough to be sure

that he will not be the next target of the victorious army. The phrase *ad praedam peteris* (lit. 'you are being sought for booty') recalls *cupido profunda imperi et divitiarum* of §5, and is a warning that Rome will not end her advance in the East; the wealth of Parthia inevitably makes her the next victim. Here Mithridates gives his opinion on the point raised in §1—the possibility of maintaining peace with Rome.

my advice [to you] is . . . to finish . . . at the expense of our bodies, a war without damage to you. Here in general terms, and using the few trump cards he can produce (Armenia still intact; the battle-experience of his troops; no trouble or danger for Arsaces), he attempts to inveigle the Parthian king into an alliance. Later, with explicit advice and explicit urging he will again stress the advantage of a joint operation against Rome (§§21–2 and 23).

while Tigranes' kingdom is still intact. Clearly indicates (Jacobs–Wirz–Kurfess ad loc.) that at the time of writing the fortress-city Tigranocerta had not yet been captured by the Romans.

a war in which we cannot conquer or be conquered without danger to you. Different interpretations of this statement have been proposed. The common view is that it refers to the policy of non-intervention—neutrality will be dangerous for Arsaces in any case; either the Romans or Mithridates and Tigranes will punish him. The implied threat in this explanation, which seems totally out of keeping with the main clause of the sentence, led Pasoli (145) to suggest that *neque vincere . . . possumus* ('we cannot conquer') is an admission of the fact that Mithridates and Tigranes realize that a successful outcome is not possible without Arsaces' help. As such, the phrase indicates why the war, conducted with Arsaces' help, is presented in the main clause as a war which will end Roman aggression in the East, and as a safe risk for Arsaces, in that Mithridates and Tigranes will take the brunt of the war and spare their ally as much as possible. Hence the statements of §§21–2. *Neque vinci . . . possumus* ('nor can we be conquered') repeats the warning implied at the begin-

ning of this section: a Roman victory over Pontus and Armenia would be followed by an invasion of Parthia.

4. 67. 17–21. This part of the *argumentatio*, noticeable for its character and feeling, falls into two parts, each beginning, as in the case of §16, with a rhetorical question. §§17–18 deal with the imperial ambitions of Rome; in §§19–21 the motivation of Roman greed for riches, the prizes of conquest, is foremost. Divided in this way, §§17–21 repeats and elaborates the double cause of Roman love of war as presented in §5.

4. 67. 17. Are you overlooking the fact . . . have turned their armies in this direction. Here and in phrases such as *pestem conditos orbis terrarum* ('destined to be the scourge of the whole world') and 'plundering and destroying allies and friends, those near them and those far off' there are echoes of the cliché *ab ortu ad occasum (solis)* ('from the rising to the setting (of the sun)') used to describe the extent of Rome's domination; cf. *Rhet. Her.* 4. 33. 44; Cic. *Cat.* 4. 21; *Sest.* 67; Sall. *Cat.* 36. 4; Hor. *Carm.* 4. 15. 15–16.

That they have owned nothing . . . their empire? Here, however, a new element is added, one which strengthens Mithridates' point that for Arsaces peace with Rome is an impossibility. Behind the above statement and what follows it Bikerman has recognized the ancient conception of the character of a nation being determined once and for all by its origin. The implication is that Roman aggression did not start with the war against Philip of Macedon as §5 might suggest. Inherent in the nature of the Roman people, it will never cease.

their wives. Possibly a reference to the [legendary] Rape of the Sabine women (Liv. 1. 9. 1–16, on which see Ogilvie, *Commentary on Livy 1–5*, 64–7.

without parents. i.e. not descended from legitimate citizen marriages, and hence without forefathers of renown.

especially monarchies. Cf. §§5, 15, 22.

4. 67. 18. For few men desire freedom, most are content with masters who are just . . . them. An explanation of

Roman hostility to kings, a traditional theme of royal anti-Roman propaganda. Cf. Sall. *Iug.* 81. The Romans regard kings as rivals for two reasons: (i) most nations prefer royal rule because it is based on justice, in contrast to what the Romans pretend is freedom (*libertas*); (ii) kingdoms are the champions of nations which have been forced to accept 'the yoke of servitude' (*grave servitium*) referred to in §11.

4. 67. 19. Seleuceia. A city on the Tigris, opposite Ctesiphon, and the customary residence of Parthian kings. It was a flourishing centre of trade (Strabo, 16. 2. 5; Plin. *NH* 6. 30; Tac. *Ann.* 6. 42. 1; Amm. Marc. 13. 6. 23; Eutrop. 8. 10. 2S).

greatest of cities. To distinguish it from Syrian Seleuceia.

the realm of Persis, famed for its riches. Like the empire of the Achaemenids the Parthian empire was loosely organized and immensely varied. Pliny (*NH* 6. 29) indicates that the Parthian empire was made up of eighteen kingdoms. Since the emphasis of this part of the *argumentatio* is greed as the motivation for Roman conquest, Mithridates picks these two flourishing centres as the most likely targets of Roman attack. He reiterates the futility of the prospect of a reliable understanding with the Romans for the reasons expressed in §20, a section which sums up the attitudes and the policy which have motivated the Roman actions described in §§5–9 and 10–15.

4. 67. 21. or they will themselves perish. I assume that the Latin word *occident* is from the verb *occĭdere* ('die', 'fall in battle') and not from *occīdere* ('to kill').

if you from Mesopotamia and we from Armenia surround their army. i.e. Arsaces from Mesopotamia and Mithridates and Tigranes moving from Armenia must encircle the Romans quartered in Sophene and Gordyene.

has remained safe thus far only by good fortune or through our own shortcomings. As in §15 Mithridates is not prepared to give the Romans credit in any way, even at the cost of making known errors committed by his own side. The 'good fortune' of the Romans refers to the set-backs and difficulties experienced by the Pontic command

(§§14–15). The 'shortcomings' (*vitiis nostris*), given Mithridates' temperament, are not likely to refer to his own deficiencies, but to the lack of wisdom shown by Tigranes over Tigranocerta, an episode still fresh in his mind.

4. 67. 22. And you will gain the fame. See note on §1, **legitimate and safe, honourable or dishonourable.**

the plunderers of all nations. The description *latrones gentium* is echoed in the speech of Calgacus in Tac. *Agr.* 30. 5, where the Romans are described as *raptores orbis* ('plunderers of the world'). Cf. §§5, 17. Arsaces' moral duty extends to a prevention of the harm done by Roman activity in every quarter of the earth.

4. 67. 23. This is my advice . . . to conquer. The letter is concluded, not with a peroration (summing-up) but with a short statement, an ending not uncommon in deliberative oratory; cf. the speech of Philippus in 1. 67. It contains the expected exhortation to join forces in the quest for victory, but more pointed is the final warning against a policy of non-intervention which repeats and sharpens the issue dealt with in §§1–2.

Appian's report (*Mith.*, 87) of the Parthian king's reply to the approaches made to him by both powers ('The king made secret arrangements with both, but was in no haste to help either of them.') can be interpreted in different ways. Dio's report (36. 1. 1–3), confused, obscure, and influenced by Plutarch's version of this topic, states that Phraates concluded a formal alliance with the Romans which he later repudiated. I discuss the distorting effect of the Plutarchan treatment of negotiations with Parthia (*Luc.* 30) in the commentary on 4. 77. In the present case I suggest that Phraates followed the established Parthian policy of protecting his own interests by maintaining, with the appropriate form of placatory tactics, non-hostile relationships with powerful neighbours.

4. 68.–77*. After the defeat in the battle near Tigranocerta, Mithridates and Tigranes retreated into northern Armenia. Pursuit by Lucullus was impracticable on account of the lateness of the season and the nature of

the terrain. The Roman commander therefore occupied himself with the capture and sacking of the fortress-city Tigranocerta and the strengthening of his resources. (Plut. *Luc.* 29. 2–4; App. *Mith.* 86; Memnon, 57; Dio, 36. 2. 3–5). It was not until well into the summer of 68 that Lucullus began his march northwards; the only indication of the route he followed is the inference from Plutarch that the Roman general advanced by a route to the west of Lake Van and that he retired by a different road to the east of the lake (H. A. Ormerod, *CAH* 9 (1951), 369). To the west of Lake Van lay the plain of Musch, where Lucullus' foraging parties were attacked by the Armenian cavalry. To achieve his object of bringing about a pitched battle, Lucullus marched on Artaxata, the capital of Armenia proper. As his army was moving up the valley of the river Arsanias (the upper Euphrates) Mithridates and Tigranes appeared on the opposite side of the river, obviously intending to attack. Lucullus crossed the river in two divisions, drove off the enemy light cavalry, and with his united forces defeated the heavy cavalry under Tigranes and put the whole army to flight. The march on Artaxata was resumed, but rigours of terrain, climatic conditions, and shortage of supplies proved too daunting. When Lucullus rejected his troops' plea to retire they refused to move any farther. The advance was abandoned, and, marching by a road east of Lake Van, the Roman army arrived at Nisibis. Later in the year Lucullus captured that city and set up his winter quarters there.

Maurenbrecher allocated eleven fragments to this phase of the Third Mithridatic War (70–80M). Of these I have relegated his frr. 75* and 80* to Fragments of Uncertain Reference. For reasons explained in the Commentary I have also changed the order of the fragments. Apart from traces of topographical/ethnographical excursuses on Gordyene and Mesopotamia, and references to the battle of the Arsanias and to Nisibis, what remains of the Sallustian treatment indicates that he dealt with two important factors—the organizing ability and strategic and tactical skills shown by Lucullus throughout his com-

mand against Mithridates; contrasted with this is the attitude of his troops towards Lucullus, a factor affected by the continuing mutinous attitude of the Fimbrian legions in his army, by the agitator P. Clodius Pulcher, by demagogic tribunes, and, possibly, Pompeian partisans in Rome. Such an attitude obscured to a great extent the quality of Lucullus' achievements, and was to have a crushing effect on his future career (Plut. *Luc.* 31–4; Dio, 36. 3–7; Eutrop. 6. 9. 1S; Oros. 6. 3. 7; cf. Cic. *Leg. Man.* 23–4; Liv. *Per.* 98).

4. 68*. Lucullus gave money to Quintius. L. Quinctius was tribune of the plebs in 74 (see notes on 3. 8, **already wickedly practised . . . disputation**, and 3. 34. 11, **with which Lucullus attacked Lucius Quintius**), and praetor in 68. Receipt in Rome of the news that Lucullus had failed to exploit immediately his victory near Tigranocerta in 69 provided ammunition for agitation in 68 that he should be replaced. Popular leaders (tribunes) in Rome denounced him for protracting the war through love of power and love of wealth. In words ascribed to Quinctius anti-Lucullus propaganda maintained that 'he all but had in his sole power Cilicia, Asia, Bithynia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Pontus, Armenia, and the regions extending to the Phasis' (Plut. *Luc.* 33. 5; Dio, 36. 2. 2), and Quinctius had strong support for his crusade that Lucullus should be relieved of all his commands. Given the factional state of Roman politics at this time, Lucullus, who had been forced to resort to intrigue to gain the command against Mithridates (see note on 3.8, **already wickedly practised . . . disputation**) apparently resorted to bribery in his attempt to retain his command.

4. 69–70. These fragments are from a treatment by Sallust of the character and achievement of Lucullus. Their content fits in convincingly with an evaluation of Lucullus' leadership and the attitude of his troops towards their general.

4. 69. the immoderate desire that his command should be prolonged. This fragment has been transmitted as belonging to Sallust's *Iugurtha*. I agree with previous

editors that this was probably an error by Arusianus or of the Arusianus tradition. The desire to prolong an already unusually extended command would conflict with Sallust's views concerning strict constitutional procedure, yet, even though Lucullus was an aristocrat, the historian apparently held a high opinion of his military ability under conditions of stress.

considered outstanding in other respects. It is not unlikely that Sallust commented on Lucullus' incapacity to win the devotion of his troops, a failure which is given prominence in Plutarch's narrative, e.g. *Luc.* 33. 2 and 36. 5, the latter of which states: 'To such an incredible degree was Lucullus either unqualified or unfortunate as far as the first and highest of all requirements in a leader is concerned. Had the power of gaining the affection of his soldiers been added to his other gifts, which were so many and so great . . . the Roman empire would not have been bounded by the Euphrates, but by the outer confines of Asia and the Hyrcanian sea.' It seems clear, however, that Sallust did not agree with other accusations levelled at Lucullus, notably the charge of personal greed. It is significant that this was the charge most often raised by discontented soldiers and picked up by Lucullus' enemies in Rome and exploited by 'the soldiers' friend', the agitator P. Clodius Pulcher (*Luc.* 34. 4); see note on 5. 9, **who was his wife's brother.** Plutarch points to restraint on Lucullus' part—*Luc.* 8. 3; 14. 2–3; 19. 5.

4. 70.* Sallust in fact says that his soldiers were ill-disposed towards him from the very outset of the war. In his treatment, largely based on Sallust, of the final stages of Lucullus' command against Mithridates, Plutarch (*Luc.* 33–4) incorporated a description of the character traits of Lucullus which facilitated the attacks made against him by tribunes, partisans of Pompeius, and the agitator Publius Clodius. Thus he prefaces this general statement by Sallust on the troops' attitude to their general with the observation that Lucullus himself was primarily to blame for his own downfall. Lucullus, he reports, ignored the feelings of the common soldier, refused to co-operate with senior officers, considering both groups inferior to him-

self. Sallust implies much the same causation in his reference to the inflexibility of the discipline imposed by Lucullus. For no good reason Maurenbrecher placed this fragment in Book 5 (= 5. 10M).

4. 71.* In the region of Gordyene . . . spices are produced. Presumably part of a description of Gordyene, a region south of Armenia and east of the Tigris in which Lucullus spent the winter of 69/8. Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 29. 9; 30. 3.

4. 72. Just then the Bithynii, approaching the river Arsanias . . . Maurenbrecher accepted Dietsch's emendation of Arusianus' *Tartaniam* to *Arsaniam*, and with Dietsch interpreted the fragment as part of the description of the battle of the river Arsanias, on which see Plut. *Luc.* 31. 5–9. The Bithynii referred to probably was a *cohors alaria*, a foreign contingent of auxiliary troops, usually cavalry, attached to the Roman army. The wording implies that the Bithynii in the van of the Roman advance towards the capital Artaxata were the first to see and to report on the presence of the Armenian forces on the opposite side of the river.

4. 73. More cohorts and then . . . the whole army attacked. A description of the opening phase of the battle of the Arsanias. Plutarch gives more detail: '[Lucullus] crossed the river with twelve cohorts in the van, and the rest were organized in such a way as to prevent the enemy from closing in on his flanks. For large bodies of cavalry and select infantry confronted him; these were covered by Mardian mounted archers and Iberian lancers, on whom Tigranes relied beyond any other mercenaries . . . However, they did not shine in action, but after a light skirmish with the Roman cavalry, gave way before the advancing infantry, scattered to the right and left in flight, and drew after them the cavalry in pursuit' (*Luc.* 31. 6–7).

4. 74–5. Part of a geographical and ethnographical excursus on Mesopotamia to which Lucullus, forced to abandon his march on Artaxata, made his way by a route east of Lake Van to Nisibis in Mesopotamia. He spent the winter of 68/7 in this city; see introductory commentary on 4. 68–77.

4. 76. enclosed by sides a foot high. Part of a description of Nisibis, the Mesopotamian city put under siege by Lucullus. Dio's remark, 'the walls, being of brick, double, and of great thickness, with a deep moat intervening, could be neither battered down anywhere nor undermined' (36. 6. 3), indicates that the fortification of Nisibis conformed to the general pattern of a broad terrace of earth (*agger*) enclosed between two battlemented walls and furnished with towers placed at strategic points. The *agger* provided a pathway for patrolling sentries. Dietsch adds that the provision of sides extending above the level of the *agger* was a feature of Mesopotamian and Babylonian walls.

4. 77.* He was headstrong and over-confident. I take this to be a criticism of Lucullus by soldiers who had little enthusiasm for his aims and the hardships entailed in pursuing them. As such it could be part of Sallust's general portrait of Lucullus (see Comm. on 4. 69–70), but I believe it to be associated with a specific act of mutiny, namely that occasioned by Lucullus' alleged decision to embark on a campaign against the Parthians.

In a concise analysis of the Plutarchan narrative (*Luc.* 30. 1–2), A. N. Sherwin-White, *Roman Foreign Policy in the East* (London 1984), 181–3 has shown that Lucullus' decision and his troops' refusal to follow him is best placed after Lucullus' capture of Nisibis, the time stated in Eutropius' report of Lucullus intention to attack the Parthians (6. 9. 2 S), rather than after the Armenian defeat near Tigranocerta where Plutarch places it. See *Comm.* on 4. 67. 23.

4. 78. He settled on the sum of three million sesterces with C. Piso. In the consular elections held in 68 C. Calpurnius Piso was elected consul for 67. Dio (36. 38. 3) points out that Piso while canvassing for office had been indicted on charges of bribery but had escaped being brought to trial by bribing one man after another. This fragment points to a huge bribe involving just one man arranged by Piso presumably when he was consul designate. Nothing is known concerning the transaction in question nor of the person with whom Piso was dealing.

4. 79–83. Are fragments *incertae sedis* of Book 4. I comment only on the first and last of these fragments.

4. 79. Worried and irresolute. Applied by Maurenbrecher to Tigranes devastated by the defeat near Tigranocerta (Plut. *Luc.* 29. 2). It could equally well be applied to Mithridates after the fall of Cabeira; see note on 4. 7*, **He himself was beset by doubts on that night.**

4. 83. [Fearing] lest [the river] . . . had been cut through by the wooden piles. The Latin version of this fragment: *ne inrumpendi p⟨ontis⟩ . . . sublicibus cavata . . . ⟨es⟩sent* is very corrupt. After *p* about twenty letters and after *cavata* about eighteen letters are missing. Influenced by several reports in Dio of the damage wreaked by the Tiber when swollen as the result of rain-storms (37. 58. 3; 50. 8. 3; 53. 33. 5) I have suggested within square brackets, following a lead by Maurenbrecher, a possible partial reconstruction. The fragment would be part of a section dealing with *res urbanae* of 69 or 68.

BOOK 5

The number of fragments which have survived from the narrative of Book 5 is disappointingly small. From what remains it is clear that Sallust described the final stages of Lucullus' leadership of the Roman army in the war against Mithridates and the debate about the *Lex Gabinia* early in 67. There is no fragment which can be ascribed to the legislative programme of the tribune C. Cornelius who in 67 proposed a number of bills aimed at reforms which would have been approved by Sallust. For a summary of these proposals and their reception see *MRR* 2. 144. There is no trace of any reference to the Cretan operations of Q. Metellus, the consul of 69, and his quarrel with Pompeius over the fruits of that victory (Liv. *Per.* 99; Plut. *Pomp.* 29; Dio, 36. 17a–19; see note on 4. 66. 12, **the Cretans who have already been attacked**.) Maurenbrecher suggested that the campaign of Pompeius and his return to Rome could have been part of Sallust's narrative; his view, however, is based on his interpretation of

two fragments without book-number (5. 25* and 26*M) which I have relegated to Fragments of Uncertain Reference. On the various hypotheses concerning other possible content of this final book see Syme (190–2).

Maurenbrecher assigned twenty-seven fragments to this book, sixteen of which have been transmitted without book-number. I have relegated six of these latter to Fragments of Uncertain Reference, i.e. frr. 8, 17, 19, 25, 26, and 27M; I have removed his fr. 5. 10* to Book 4 where it is dealt with as fr. 4. 69. I concede that the nine fragments without book-number which I have retained in the text are debatable; I give reasons in each case for my decision to include them.

5. 1–7. Form part of the narrative of the Mithridatic war which involved campaigns in late 68 and in 67. While Lucullus was engaged in the siege of Nisibis, Tigranes set about the task of recovering parts of Armenia captured by the Romans. The result for Lucullus was that 'he lost many districts of Armenia and of other countries around Pontus' (Dio, 36. 8. 1). While Tigranes was thus engaged, Mithridates with 4,000 of his own troops and 4,000 Armenian troops provided by Tigranes (App. *Mith.* 88) set out from northern Armenia and advanced, probably by the Lycus valley, into the heart of his kingdom. There he began a campaign against the Romans who were under the command of the legate M. Fabius Hadrianus. After two unsuccessful engagements, the second of which was broken off because of the wounding of Mithridates, Hadrianus took refuge in Cabeira where he was blockaded.

When Mithridates first advanced into Pontus, Lucullus was, as suggested in the note on 4. 77, **He was headstrong and overconfident**, probably planning an attack on the Parthians which was aborted because of the mutinous attitude of his troops (cf. Plut. *Luc.* 34. 6). In the meantime Hadrianus had been relieved by Triarius. Confronted by their united forces, Mithridates withdrew to Comana where after an inconclusive engagement both armies retired behind fortified positions for the winter.

In the following summer of 67 Mithridates, using his experience of Roman strategy, lured the legions of Triarius away from their strong position at Cabeira to protect their principal depot at Dadasa, which also housed the personal booty of the Roman soldiery, and which was being threatened by Mithridates. On the field of Zela Mithridates gained a decisive victory which involved the loss of the commanders and senior officers of nearly three Roman legions together with 7,000 other ranks (Plut. *Luc.* 35. 1–2; App. *Mith.* 89; Dio, 36. 12–13. 1; cf. Holmes, *Roman Republic*, 1. 425). This was Mithridates' greatest success against Roman troops; it was a victory which had decisive effects on the career of Lucullus and on subsequent Roman policy and politics.

5. 1* He suddenly invaded territories which were undefended. Gerlach (3. 71) applied this to Spartacus; Kritz put it among Fragments of Uncertain Reference, while Dietsch agreed that Gerlach's opinion had merit. I follow Maurenbrecher in applying it to the effect of Mithridates' unexpected attacks on Romans both on his way to Pontus and on his arrival in his kingdom: 'Meanwhile Mithridates had invaded the other Armenia and the neighbouring districts. Here he fell upon and destroyed many of the Romans, to whom he appeared unexpectedly as they were wandering about the country' (Dio, 36. 9. 1).

5. 2.* A very great number . . . attacked . . . off their guard as in times of peace. Kritz applied this to the fugitive slaves' incursions into Campania during the Spartacus war. With Maurenbrecher I accept Dietsch's proposal that the occasion is Mithridates' return to his kingdom in the autumn of 68, on the grounds that *immanis hominum vis* ('A very great number of men') and *pacis modo effusa* ('off their guard as in times of peace') do not fit in with the circumstances obtaining in the Spartacus episode. Dio's description of Mithridates' success: 'thereupon he promptly recovered most of the districts' (ibid.), corresponds more closely with the words of the fragment.

5. 3.* to such an extent was the sacrosanctity of the royal title ingrained in those people. La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963),

52) maintained that the allocation of this fragment by earlier editors to the attitude of the Celtiberi to their kings (see note on 2. 70, **dedicate their lives . . . refuse to go on living**) cannot lightly be dismissed. I have followed Maurenbrecher and his immediate predecessors Dietsch and Kritz in associating it with the reception given by the people of Pontus to Mithridates on his return to his kingdom: 'For the people were well disposed toward him because of kinship and because of his being hereditary monarch; and they likewise hated the Romans because these were foreigners and because they had been ill-treated by those set over them. Consequently they sided with Mithridates and later conquered Marcus Fabius, who was the leader of the Romans there' (Dio, 36. 9. 2).

5. 4.* and in battles he was quick to respond to a situation. A fragment relegated to those of uncertain reference by Gerlach and Dietsch on the grounds that the statement could apply to any of several generals dealt with in the *Histories*. Kritz, followed by Maurenbrecher, noting Donatus' words concerning Terence: 'The poet is showing that the duty of a general is not to expose himself to danger by taking unnecessary risks', connects this fragment with the following three which deal with a wound suffered by Mithridates, apparently the result of over-eagerness or carelessness.

5. 5. and even when he was over 70 years old . . . That this refers to Mithridates is clear from the statement of Dio: 'They would have destroyed [the Romans] utterly had not Mithridates, who, although over 70 years old was in the battle, been struck by a stone while taking part in the battle against the enemy' (36. 9. 5). The battle referred to was the second engagement fought against Fabius Hadrianus in late 68.

5. 6.* with a dislocated foot. Appian gives a fuller picture of the wounding of the king: 'Mithridates was struck by a stone on the knee and wounded by a dart under the eye, and was hastily carried out of the fight' (*Mith.* 88). The wounding brought the engagement to a premature close: 'This caused the barbarians to fear that he might

die; and while they halted battle on that account Fabius and others were able to escape to safety' (Dio, 36. 9. 6). The anxiety concerning Mithridates was probably largely aroused because of his advanced age.

5. 7.* [The antidote] will counteract the poison which is being given to you. Appian reports: 'Mithridates was cured by the Agari, a Scythian tribe who make use of the poison of serpents as remedies, and for this reason always accompany the king.' Accepting this version, Kritz assumed that the words were those of a doctor of the tribe. Dietsch, who put the fragment among those of uncertain reference, maintained that Sallust was describing the plant used as an antidote and which was called *mithridatia* by Plin. *NH* 25. 6. 26(62). Maurenbrecher suggested a combination of both factors and placed it in his text of Sallust's narrative.

5. 8–14. Deal with some of the factors which contributed to the removal of Lucullus from his command against Mithridates. These fragments provide specific examples of the types of political intrigue and pressure which placed Lucullus in a position where his replacement, firstly by Glabrio and then by Pompeius, became inevitable.

Informed of the impending dangers in Pontus, Lucullus in the spring of 67 had extricated his army from southern Armenia but had arrived too late to prevent the disastrous Roman defeat at Zela, an event which, for those anxious to oust Lucullus, provided compelling reasons for a change in the command against Mithridates. Somewhere along the normal route from the Euphrates crossing to the cities of northern Pontus Lucullus met the remnants of the Roman force (Plut. *Luc.* 35. 1; Dio, 36. 14. 1). Meanwhile Mithridates had withdrawn to Talaura (Dio, 36. 14. 2), a stronghold in the high mountains of Armenia Minor, and awaited the arrival of the army of Tigranes. Lucullus, after failing to entice Mithridates to battle, planned to snatch victory from defeat by turning eastward again to strike at Tigranes before the union with Mithridates could be achieved. But the legions, war-weary

and fiercely critical of Lucullus' leadership, refused to follow him; they retired south-west into Cappadocia but promised to maintain their positions in Cappadocia against hostile attack until the end of summer (Plut. *Luc.* 35. 2–4; App. *Mith.* 90). Their response was no doubt also influenced by their knowledge that Lucullus had been replaced by the senate in his military command and in his provinces by Q. Marcius Rex (*cos.* 68) and by M' Acilius Glabrio (*cos.* 67), both of whom arrived in their respective provinces in the summer of 67. Even though Marcius Rex brought three fresh legions to his province Cilicia, and Acilius Glabrio, proconsul in Bithynia and Pontus, had been appointed army commander against Mithridates, neither was anxious to be involved in a perilous campaign. Consequently, at the end of the summer of 67 Lucullus withdrew into Galatia with his surviving forces which he was to hand over to Glabrio. Mithridates resumed control of all Pontus, and Cappadocia fell into his hands on the flight of its king Ariobarzanes (Plut. *Luc.* 35. 7–8; 36. 2; App. *Mith.* 91; Dio, 36. 17. 1).

5. 8. attending to the private business interests of legates or tribunes . . . conducting their own business by providing supplies and by trading. Maurenbrecher does not comment on this fragment; Kritz and Dietsch provide different interpretations. Putting emphasis on what is implied by the word *negotia* (being engaged primarily in commerce), Dietsch cites Cic. *Leg. Man.* 4 on the concern of the Roman Knights (*equites*) over the great sums of money they had invested in the farming of Roman revenues and the dangers posed to those interests by the wars in the East. He notes that it was this business class which was behind the programme of vilification against Lucullus because of his firm stand against rapacity and greed. Dietsch therefore conjectures here a reference to the Roman businessmen who made it their aim to profit from conquests by Roman armies.

Kritz, relying on Liv. *Per.* 98 and Dio, 36. 14. 3 believed that the reference was to the conduct of the Valerian legions in Lucullus' army. An important factor affecting the morale of Lucullus' army was the presence of the so-

called Valerian (or Fimbrian) legions whose identity is discussed in the note on 2. 90, **As a result of the Fimbrian revolt**; references to this contingent also occur in the notes to 3. 9 and 3. 19. A statement in Dio, 36. 14. 3 provides the more probable context of this fragment: 'There was mutiny in the army. The Valerians who, after being discharged, had later entered the service again, had been restless even at Nisibis on account of their victory and ensuing idleness, and also because they had provisions in abundance and had been left to themselves much of the time, while Lucullus was absent on numerous errands.' Despite Lucullus' efforts to introduce discipline and an *esprit de corps* into the group, they had remained a problem throughout his command since they contributed to and exacerbated the unpopularity of their commander which was being fomented by his enemies in Rome (see Comm. on 4. 68). The element of riches, the booty of war, stressed in this fragment was one of major grounds for the soldiers; antipathy towards their commander.

5. 9. who was his wife's brother. Refers to P. Clodius Pulcher, a brother of Lucullus' wife Clodia. An aristocratic maverick, he transferred to the plebs in 59 with the aid of Caesar and Pompeius and was elected to the tribunate of 58; he was killed in a brawl in 52. His mode of operation was to take advantage of crisis situations to pursue personal objectives: in the present instance, as a member of Lucullus' staff in 68/7 either as a legate or in a personal capacity, he secretly encouraged the discontent of the mutinous Valerian legionaries. His reasons were personal: 'At this time he was in service with Lucullus, and did not get all the honour which he thought his due, and when many were preferred before him because of his evil character, he worked secretly upon the soldiers who had been commanded by Fimbria' (Plut. *Luc.* 34. 1–2; cf. Cic. *Har. Resp.* 42; Dio, 36. 14. 3–4). Late in 67 he deserted Lucullus and became a commander of the fleet under Marcius Rex; he was captured and later released by pirates (Dio, 36. 17. 2–3; App. *BC* 2. 23).

5. 10.* he was too eager to commit evil deeds. Kritz and Dietsch applied this to Clodius Pulcher, but put the

fragment among those of uncertain reference. I follow Maurenbrecher in placing it in the text. I take it to be part of a Sallustian description of Clodius' character, on which Plutarch's ch. 34 seems to be based; cf. Dio's comment on Clodius' 'innate love of revolution' (36. 14. 4); Cic. *Har. Resp.* 55; Vell. Pat. 2. 45. 1).

5.11. The soldiers of the Valerian legions. See the references mentioned in the Commentary on 5. 8.

that Bithynia and Pontus had been given to the consul by the Gabinian law. See the introductory comments on 5. 8–13. The Gabinian law mentioned here has been tentatively identified by Rotondi (*Leges Publicae*, 373) as the *Lex Gabinia de provinciis consularibus* which appointed the consul of 67, M. Acilius Glabrio to take over from Lucullus the proconsular governorship of Bithynia and Pontus. Rotondi also notes the observation of Lange (*Römische Alterthümer*, 207) that the aim of the law was to pave the way for the replacement of Lucullus by Pompeius as commander against Mithridates, and it is sometimes referred to as the *Lex Gabinia de bello Mithridatico*. Cf. Plut. *Luc.* 35. 4; Dio, 36. 14. 4.

and that they had been discharged . . . The result of these developments was that the Valerians 'became turbulent again largely because they heard that Acilius the consul, who had been sent to relieve Lucullus . . . was drawing near, and they accordingly regarded Lucullus with contempt, as being already a mere private citizen' (Dio, 36. 14. 4).

5. 12. Lucullus, when he heard that Q. Marcius Rex . . . was heading for Cilicia . . . Dio, 36. 15. 1–3, describes the effect on Lucullus of the mutinous attitude of his troops, a crisis which was exacerbated by the refusal of Marcius Rex to come to his aid: the army refused to march against Tigranes or Mithridates and turned aside into Cappadocia, while the Valerian legions withdrew altogether.

5. 13. But when he pleaded the state of mind of his soldiers as an excuse . . . This refers to Marcius Rex. Dio provides a fuller account: 'As for Marcius, the pretext

which he gave for not assisting Lucullus was that his soldiers refused to follow him. Instead, he went to Cilicia where he received one Menemachus, a deserter from Tigranes, and also Clodius who had left Lucullus out of fear because of the occurrence at Nisibis; the latter he put in charge of his fleet, for he, too, had married one of Clodius' sisters' (Dio, 36. 17. 2).

5. 14. He was rejecting the king. Most probably refers to Menemachus mentioned in the extract from Dio.

5. 15–20. For several decades piracy had been a growing threat in the Mediterranean. Attempts by M. Antonius in 102 (see note on 2. 69. D, **much experience of Roman strength**) and by his son in 74 (see Comm. on 3. 1–4 and 74–6) had failed to bring the pirates under control. In the early seventies P. Servilius Vatia had some success (Comm. on 1. 115–19; 2. 63–9) but no lasting solution to the problem was achieved. The Third Mithridatic War provided fresh opportunities for the pirates: they participated in support of Mithridates. Rome's inability to suppress them gave rise to acts of audacious arrogance against Roman officials and raids on Italy itself (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 33–5; Plut. *Pomp.* 24; App. *Mith.* 71; 91–3; Dio, 36. 20–3). By 67 pirate activity had so disrupted trade in the Mediterranean as to threaten the corn supply of Rome (Liv. *Per.* 99; Plut. *Pomp.* 25. 1–2; App. *Mith.* 93; Dio, 36. 23. 1). In that year a law aimed at clearing the Mediterranean of pirates was proposed by the tribune Aulus Gabinius, on whose background and career see E. M. Sanford, *TAPA* 70 (1939), 64–92, and E. Badian, *Philol.* 103 (1959), 87–94. This *Lex Gabinia de bello piratico* (Rotondi, *Leges Publicae*, 371) proposed that one man chosen from among the consulars be commissioned to carry out this task. The *imperium*, which was to last three years (App. *Mith.* 94; Dio, 36. 23. 4, 34. 3, 37. 1) gave the commander the right to appoint fifteen legates with praetorian *imperium* to raise a fleet of 200 ships, to levy troops as required, and to draw on the treasury at Rome and on the resources of the *publicani* in the provinces. The commander's *imperium proconsulare* was to

cover all the sea east of the Pillars of Hercules, all islands, and the coast of the mainland, including Italy, up to a distance of fifty miles inland (Vell. Pat. 2. 31. 1; Plut. *Pomp.* 25. 1–6; App. *Mith.* 94). Pompeius was not mentioned by name but it was obvious from the outset that he would be appointed by popular demand.

I have allocated six fragments, two transmitted without book-number, to this final topic of what remains of the fifth book of the *Histories*. They provide only meagre reference to material already covered by the other sources.

5. 15.* **Ostia.** The seaport town of Ostia at the mouth of the Tiber has two forms in Latin—feminine singular *Ostia/-ae*, as in Ennius, *Ann.* 144, and neuter plural *Ostia/-orum* as here in Sallust; cf. Liv. 9. 19. 4; Iuv. 8. 171. Kritz accepted as highly likely de Brosses' conjecture that Ostia featured in Sallust's discussion on pirate activity, a topic introductory to his treatment of the Gabinian law. In a similar context in other sources the Roman seaport receives specific mention. Thus Cic. *Leg. Man.* 33 exclaims: 'Why should I lament the reverse at Ostia, that shameful blot upon our commonwealth, when almost before your very eyes the fleet which had been entrusted to the command of a Roman consul was captured and destroyed by the pirates?' Cf. Dio, 36. 23. 2.

5. 16. that it was for reasons such as these that Sulla . . . before him alone. Opposition in the senate to the Gabinian law was almost total: 'the chief and most influential men of the senate thought that such unlimited and absolute power . . . was a thing to be feared. Therefore they opposed the law, with the exception of Caesar, . . . and vehemently attacked Pompeius' (Plut. *Pomp.* 25. 3–4). The consul of 67 C. Calpurnius Piso was violently hostile, and Q. Hortensius Hortalus (*cos.* 69) summed up the opposition case with the observation that if such power was to be granted to any one man, then Pompeius was the obvious candidate; but in the interests of security no such *imperium* should be conferred on anyone (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 52). In Sallust's version the speakers indicated are Gabinius, Pompeius, and Lutatius Catulus.

Syme (197–8) has made out a strong case for assigning an oration to Gabinius; Dio assigns orations to all three, but Gabinius is the only one with a strong claim to a delivered speech.

This fragment in *oratio obliqua* (indirect speech) is part of Pompeius' answer to the outcry opposing his appointment. Dio, 36. 25–6, gives him an oration in which he recapitulates his victories in Sicily, Africa, and Spain. His claim that he has by now done enough and that a different commander could easily be found is an example of his practice of pretending reluctance so that honours might appear to be forced on him against his will. Here he recalls honours conferred on him by Sulla in 83 (Plut. *Pomp.* 8. 3; *Crass.* 6. 5; App. *BC* 1. 80; Val. Max. 5. 2. 9). This could be either an authentic example of the ambiguous character of Pompeius' oratory, or an invention by Sallust.

5. 17. I realize that he had misgivings . . . title . . . In replying to Pompeius' speech of apparent refusal, Gabinius falls in with the tenor and trend of Pompeius' statements, and attributes the ex-consul's reluctance to a mixture of modesty and a desire not to arouse hostility by too ready acceptance of a title which carried such power and fame. Gabinius went on to urge Pompeius: 'Heed me, therefore, as well as these citizens here, and do not fear because some are envious. Rather press on for this very reason, and in comparison with the friendship of the majority and the common advantage of us all, scorn your traducers' (Dio, 36. 29. 2).

5. 18. I see that he, being needy, is hurrying in his quest for rewards. This fragment is part of Sallust's description of the intervention of the tribunes L. Trebellius and L. Roscius Otho in the debate on the pirate law. The Latin version I have followed reads: *video indigentem* ('I see him in need'); the Priscianus MSS show *ingentem* or *ingentia*, the latter of which Maurenbrecher accepted to produce 'huge rewards'. I have accepted Keil's *indigentem* ('needy') which is based on *indigentia* of the codex *M*.

When the tribune Trebellius interposed his veto against

the passage of the bill, Gabinius retaliated by proposing that Trebellius be immediately deprived of office; this fragment is part of Gabinius' attack on the tribune. When Trebellius realized the strength of the vote against him, he withdrew his veto, an action which caused his fellow tribune Otho to change his mind about exercising his veto.

5. 19.* he clearly showed himself a man of integrity . . . After the danger of tribunician veto had been removed Gabinius urged Lutatius Catulus to address the assembly, 'inasmuch as he was the foremost man in the senate and it seemed likely that through him the rest might be brought to the same way of thinking; for it was Gabinius' expectation that he would join in approving the proposal as a result of the plight in which he saw the tribunes' (Dio, 36. 30, 4).

The speech which Catulus delivered was not in the vein that Gabinius expected. He firmly reiterated the Optimate objections to the proposal: so many commands in succession had never before been held by one man; such a concentration of power was a bad thing, because it led to a shortage of battle-trained commanders, a lack from which Rome had suffered in the course of the Sertorian War (Cic. *Leg. Man.* 27). Moreover, no single commander could control so great an enterprise; while the provision of fifteen legates was a step in the right direction, a number of independent commanders would be more effective and be a less dangerous precedent.

The words of praise for Catulus' integrity and courage on this occasion illustrate Sallust's readiness to recognize the endeavours of anyone, irrespective of party affiliation, who resisted attacks on the republican constitution. See notes on 1. 48. 3, **Lutatii**, and on 4. 69, **the immoderate desire that his command should be prolonged.**

5. 20. For, if some human accident befell Pompeius . . . As a last resort Catulus introduced 'a prudential—and hypocritical question. It was dangerous to risk everything on one individual. What would happen if Pompeius perished?' (Syme, 197). His question as to who would replace Pompeius received a unanimous reply: Catulus himself.

(Cic. *Leg. Man.* 59; Vell Pat. 2. 32. 1; Val. Max. 8. 15. 9; Dio, 36. 31–6a). All opposition to the bill failed, and the law was passed.

FRAGMENTS OF UNCERTAIN REFERENCE

Many fragments transmitted without book-number have been placed in the body of the narrative text (translation) of the *Histories* because their content or evidence from other sources rendered their placement in a specific context highly probable. The fragments here described as Fragments of Uncertain Reference have also been transmitted without book-number, but their content is too brief or generalized, or their Latin versions too corrupt to permit precise interpretation and placement. I have organized these problem fragments into three sections for reasons which I explain at the beginning of each division.

1–36. Fragments without book-number which Maurenbrecher has placed in his text. I comment on each of these, giving reasons for my decision to relegate them to this category. I have included three fragments (1, 11, 12) which were discovered long after Maurenbrecher's edition of the *Histories*.

1. utterances of those who speak in the grove of eloquence. For one interpretation of this fragment see the note on 1. 22, **rejected those ⟨practices⟩**. For an alternative interpretation see Comm. on fr. 27 below.

2. In these books . . . falsehoods concerning honourable men. Maurenbrecher (1. 5M), following Kritz, applied this accusation to the elder Cato, an attribution reluctantly accepted by Syme (182) and Pasoli (ad loc.). Klingner (see the note on 1. 3, **The most eloquent Roman . . . truth**) convincingly argued that Sallust did not deny veracity to Cato, a view supported by La Penna who rejected Dietsch's application of the reference to M. Terentius Varro. In defence of Cato it has been proposed that Sallust was referring to a partisan writer of the revolutionary period (D. Flach, *Philol.* 117 (1973), 76 ff.), or

that La Penna's suggestion of the annalist Valerius Antias who wrote seventy-five books of Annals, stretching probably down to the death of Sulla, and whose veracity was called in question several times by Livy, was an attractive alternative. Despite the clues suggested by *longissimo aevo* ('over a long period of time') and *falso in deterius* ('falsehoods in an even more malicious way'), the fragment is too generalized to permit specific application. The claims of candidates alternative to Cato are reviewed by B. R. Katz (*Maia* 33 (1981), 111–22), whose amply annotated case for Varro as the likely candidate must nevertheless be relegated to the list of doubtfuls.

3. The commanders . . . their subordinates . . . Accepted by Maurenbrecher (1. 9M) as part of a treatment of Roman greatness, forming part of the introduction to the subject-matter of the *Histories*. There is no firm evidence of any such treatment (see the introductory note to 1. 2); the fragment could refer to any one of several military situations dealt with by Sallust.

4. The gates . . . open and the fields filled with farmers. Neither Kritz's suggestion of an episode in the slave war nor Maurenbrecher's (1. 14M) referral to a period after the Fall of Carthage is convincing: it could apply to any one of many incidents in the *Histories*.

5. He recruited an army with his own money. Maurenbrecher's referring of this to Cinna (1. 27M) is just one of several possibilities: the evidence he cites from *Schol. Gronov.* on Cic. *Cat.* 3. 24 (286 St.) and Exuperantius 27Z is not sufficient to confirm his conjecture. Other possibilities are the levying of troops by Pompeius before the war against Sertorius (Dietsch), and one which I consider most attractive, namely Licinius Crassus's levying of an army to subdue the outbreak under Spartacus: see the commentary on 4. 17.

6. the appearance of a captured city. Maurenbrecher (1. 30M) suggested the capture of Rome by Marius and Cinna; Kritz proposed devastation caused by runaway slaves; La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 23 n. 2) suggested that Gerlach's proposal of Sinope, sacked and burnt by its

own defenders could find support in Memnon, 37, in addition to the statement in Plut. *Luc.* 23. 2.

7. of the Samnites. La Penna (ibid.) labels Maurenbrecher's (1. 39M) allocation of this to the civil strife of the 80s as damning proof of Maurenbrecher's belief in his own powers of divination. The reference is exceptionally daring, but not totally egregious.

8. at the time . . . accessible to ships. Maurenbrecher (1. 56M) refers this to the first naval campaign of Servilius, in which case he should have put it after his 1. 27M which deals with Servilius' departure from Tarentum. To deny, as Maurenbrecher does, that the fragment could be applied to the beginning of a naval campaign by Antonius or by Pompeius is absurd (La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 24).

9. would be united under arms. A reference to Etruria's enthusiasm to unite under Lepidus' leadership against Rome (1. 70M) is just one of several possibilities. An enterprise connected with Sertorius or Spartacus is equally feasible.

10. He spoke in the following manner. Application of this to the speech of Philippus (1. 76M) rather than to any other of the speeches in the *Histories* is excessively daring.

11. by a very narrow strait. R. Syme (*Eranos* 55 (1957), 171–4), noting the phrase *angustissimo divortio* in the scholiast's definition of the Strait of Gades (Gilbraltar), pointed out that only one other example is extant of *divortium* (instead of the more usual *fretum*) used with a superlative adjective. Tacitus, who clearly relied on Sallust's description of the Black Sea region (cf. Comm. on 3. 44–60) used *artissimo divortio* ('by a very narrow strait') in connection with the location of Byzantium (*Ann.* 12. 63. 1). This led Syme to the attractive assumption that Tacitus used a modified version of *angustissimo divortio*, the phrase used by Sallust for the Strait of Gibraltar. Cf. Comm. on 1. 87–92. However, La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 66) argued for the possibility that Sallust's phrase was part of his description of the Bosphorus, since, in addition to Tacitus, Ammianus

Marcellinus (22. 4. 6) also used a variant of *angustissimo divortio*, namely *discidium angustum* ('narrow divide') in his description of the Bosphorus.

12. . . . **bursting with anger and grief . . . headed for Spain [or Sardinia].** This is fragment (1) of the papyrus fragments published in Pap. Rylands III (1938), 473; cf. note on 2. 9, **to Iolaus**. The last line of the fragment, *per-rexere in Hispaniam* is here supplemented by fr. 1. 83M which adds *an Sardiniam*. C. H. Roberts, who published the papyrus fragments, pointed out that from its last line as transmitted one could surmise reference to the withdrawal from Sardinia of the defeated forces of Lepidus under the leadership of Perperna; see the note on 2. 15, **banished from the [Roman] world**. But in considering the placement of this fragment the supplement *an Sardiniam* should be considered; thus the reference cannot be to Perperna's withdrawal to Spain.

Roberts gives adequate reasons for rejecting the referral by Dietsch and Maurenbrecher of *perrexere in Hispaniam* (1. 83M) to the flight of Lepidus from Italy after the failure of his *coup d'état*. I share his obvious unease concerning his own theory of an engagement fought by Lepidus, an incident based on Exuperantius, 3. 26, and referred by Maurenbrecher (*Proleg.* 14 n. 2) to the year 78. I also share Roberts's reluctance to accept the theory of H. Last who connects the papyrus fragment with the adventures of Sertorius in 81; I endorse his recommendation that in the absence of definite evidence it is best to leave the question open. On E. Lepore's theory of an attack against pirates by M. Antonius during the triennium 74–2 see *Athenaeum* 28 (1950), 280–91.

13. **that the engagement will be an omen for the war.** Maurenbrecher (1. 109M) assumed that the person referred to was Sertorius and that the engagement was the victory over Fufidius (cf. note on 1. 95, **And soon Fufidius . . . to his own troops**). If Fufidius was indeed the person referred to, an equally appropriate engagement would be the naval victory over Cotta near Mellaria at the outset of the expedition to Spain. Moreover, reference to a different

Roman commander or to an enemy general is not out of the question.

14. to alleviate . . . their condition of servitude. De Brosses, followed by Gerlach, interpreted this as the motive for the break-out of the gladiators at Capua (see note on 3. 60, **who, having escaped from their school**). Kritz put it among 'uncertain fragments' and suggested that they were words spoken by a tribune or by Sallust himself, criticizing the attitude of the nobility and the senate who offered some concessions because of the complaints of the people, but in no way changed their state of subjection. Accepting Kritz's suggestion, Maurenbrecher placed the fragment in his text (2. 24M) and applied it specifically to Sicinius' part in the first attempt to have the powers of the tribunate restored; see note on 3. 34. 8, **the first to raise the question**. Maurenbrecher ignored Dietsch's point that the fragment could just as appropriately apply to slaves seeking milder treatment from their masters. It could also refer, as La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 33) suggested, to subject peoples suffering from the domination of a neighbouring nation, such as the Bithynians or some other Asiatic race in the course of the war against Mithridates.

15 which had been (*fuerat*) the cause of revolutionary activity. The wording of this sentence is disputed: codex **T** of Servius Danielis has *fuerit*, codex **F** has *fuer.*; the vulgate chose *fuerat*, used by all editors except Maurenbrecher. De Brosses and Gerlach applied the fragment to the Gracchan revolution; Kritz, who like Dietsch left it among fragments of uncertain reference, pointed out that the vagueness of the wording did not permit certainty in a narrative which referred several times to the desire for revolution. Maurenbrecher (2. 50M) accepted *fuerit* ('will turn out to have been') and assumed it to be part of a statement made after the *Lex Aurelia de tribunicia potestate* had been passed.

16. it is nevertheless [fortified] on all sides by three walls and great towers. Maurenbrecher (2. 57M) rejected Kritz's allocation of this to Lucullus' camp at Cyzicus, on

the ground that a camp (*castra*) was not normally surrounded by triple-battlemented walls; he discarded de Brosses's suggestion of Nisibis because that city was not situated on a height nor surrounded by triple walls. Basing his choice on Strabo, 3. 4. 6, he suggested Carthago Nova (see note on 2. 48, **It could be taken for an island**). There is nothing in Strabo's description of Carthago Nova which specifically supports his view.

17. [A woman] endowed with exceptional physical beauty. Brevity and anonymity make specific application of this fragment hazardous. Kritz, citing Plut. *Luc.* 18. 3, referred it to Monime, a Milesian whose beauty induced Mithridates to offer her a marriage contract; cf. App. *Mith.* 21. Maurenbrecher (3. 18M) preferred a reference to Praecia, the influential mistress of Cethegus; see the note on 3. 8, **already wickedly practised . . . disputation**. As it stands, the fragment could apply to any one of several women who figured in the *Histories*. La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 41) suggested Clodia, wife of Lucullus, and sister of the troublesome P. Clodius, who is referred to in 5. 9 and 10.

18. Metrophanes who won the favour of Mithridates . . . Metrophanes is known to have fought along with the Fimbrian deserter L. Fannius against Lucullus' lieutenant Mamercus, who defeated them and caused them to flee into Mysia (Oros. 6. 2. 16–18). The use of the word *obsequendo* ('by humouring him') as in the note on 2. 90, **compliance in discussions**, suggests the fragment may have been, as Maurenbrecher (3. 22M) assumed, part of a passage introducing Metrophanes, who is also mentioned in 4. 2. The context in which fr. 2. 90 figures is also a possibility, but other similar occasions must have arisen in the course of the Mithridatic war; the vagueness of the wording prohibits secure placement.

19. When the soldiers had been rested for a short time. Maurenbrecher's placement of this fragment (3. 41M) in the context of Lucullus' pursuit of the Pontic force retreating from Cyzicus (see the introductory note to 3. 28–9) is far too bold. Given the brevity and the vagueness

of the statement, no other editor has attempted firm placement.

20. But Metellus in the farther province. When I discussed the opening phrase of 2. 59, **But Metellus . . . farther Spain**, I suggested that Maurenbrecher's 2. 68M, cited by Donatus, should be eliminated from the text. Wessner, who corrected the opening words of 2. 59 to *Sed Metellus in ulteriorem Hispaniam*, suspected that the fragment we are dealing with here (3. 45M) which is also cited by Donatus, was another faulty recall of the opening words of 2. 59. In this case, however, the phrase could have been used in a different context, one too vague to be confidently identified; elimination would be too harsh a solution. Maurenbrecher's acceptance of Dietsch's conjecture that the subject-matter was the choice of winter quarters in 74 by Pompeius and Metellus respectively is just one of several possibilities.

21. by a threefold wave. Servius interpreted this as equivalent to the Greek *τρικυμία* (the third wave, a huge overwhelming wave equivalent to the Latin *decumanus* (Greek *δεκακυμία*) ('every tenth wave which was supposed to be larger than the rest'). Maurenbrecher accepted this interpretation and applied it to the shipwreck of Mithridates' vessel in the Black Sea; cf. note on 3. 38, **and it could no longer be kept afloat** etc. Other editors disagreed with Servius' interpretation and applied it, relying on Homer, *Od.* 12. 104–6; Oros. 13. 18. 5, to the belief that the Sicilian strait ebbed and flowed three times every day.

22. For Dardania (Troy) . . . according to Sallust, after . . . Midas. The first two words of this fragment are a translation of *Dardaniae*, the first word of *Aeneid*, 2. 325. Maurenbrecher (3. 16M) followed his predecessors in accepting Servius' interpretation of *Dardania* as equivalent to Troy, and in placing this fragment in Sallust's excursus on the Pontus (see Comm. on 3. 44–59). The possibility, raised by La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 39, that this statement could have been part of the narrative of Curio's campaign in Dardania, the country of the Illyrian

Dardani is a far more attractive suggestion; the fragment might fittingly be placed in the Commentary on 2. 60.

23. by the frequency of the waves, which usually occurs . . . Too vague for certainty of placement. Maurenbrecher (3. 64M) followed de Brosses in making it part of the excursus on the Pontus. Kritz connected it specifically with the annual tunny season in the Black Sea (see note on 3. 46, **at that time of the year when a vast number of fish breaks free of the Pontus**. Dietsch suggested connection with the difficulty of sailing from the Propontis into the Black Sea.

24. He approached the foot of the mountain. Earlier editors placed this among fragments of uncertain reference. Maurenbrecher's (3. 92M) application of it to the praetor C. Claudius Glaber's decision to surround the fugitive gladiators who had taken up position on top of Mt. Vesuvius (see note on 3. 63, **Cossinius was washing himself . . . at the nearest villa**) cannot be substantiated.

25. while gradually in turn . . . all have been brought together into the battle. Servius is commenting on a Sallustian version of Vergil's *Aen.* 12. 282 *Sic omnes amor unus habet, decernere ferro* ('Thus a single desire seizes them all, to decide the matter by the sword'). Several possible contexts have been suggested: de Brosses opted for the gradually developing civil war between Marius and Sulla; Gerlach applied it to the campaign of Cabeira (see Comm. on 4. 3–10); Kritz, citing Plut. *Crass.* 11.8, chose the final battle between Spartacus and Crassus; Dietsch mentioned the battle of Segontia, which he mistakenly referred to as Saguntum (see the note on 2. 26, **their devotion outstripping their resources**. Maurenbrecher (4. 6M), citing Plut. *Luc.* 15. 5, followed Gerlach in applying it to the campaign of Cabeira.

26. They worked day and night without respite. Maurenbrecher, the only editor to include this fragment (4. 34M), applied it to the building of a wall across the isthmus of Bruttium by Crassus during the struggle against Spartacus (see the introductory commentary to 4. 26–36). The sentence from Plutarch cited by Maurenbrecher to support his placement: 'Now the operation was a huge one and

difficult, but he accomplished and finished it contrary to all expectations in a short time' (*Crass.* 10. 8) does add attractiveness to Maurenbrecher's suggestion, but is not enough to justify secure placement.

27. He used what Appius describes as a barking kind of delivery. The Appius referred to here may be the 'Appius senior' (possibly the grandfather of the troublesome P. Clodius) mentioned in Cicero's *De Or.* 2. 284. The orator referred to has been variously identified: Gerlach nominated the tribune L. Quinctius (on whom see the note on 3.8, **already wickedly practised . . . disputation**); Kritz and Dietsch choose the tribune Sicinius (see Comm. on 3. 34 §§ 8, 10, 11). Maurenbrecher (5. 54M), noting that Lactantius *Div. Inst.* 6. 18. 26 quoted these words of Sallust as applicable to Cicero, decided that the statement was a reference to Cicero's prosecution of Verres. Cf. the note on 4. 54, **He was suspected of having come to an agreement with the robbers**. Reference to *canina facundia* in Jerome *Ep.* 119. 1 and 134. 1 seems to imply a resorting to forensic oratory. This raises the possibility that the fragment was part of an observation on types of oratorical delivery, in which case fr. 1. Unc. Ref. would be part of such a context.

28. on to bodies naked and uncovered. Diomedes presented this fragment as *in nuda intecta corpora*; the MS he used had *in nuda intectato pora*. Using Carrio's conjecture concerning this unintelligible manuscript reading, Kritz read *iniecta corpora* and supplied *tela* to produce ⟨*tela*⟩ *in nuda iniecta corpora* ('weapons thrown on to unarmed bodies'). Maurenbrecher, following Keil and others, wrote the fragment as: *in nuda, in tecta corpora* ('on to unarmed and armed bodies') and put it into his text (4. 62) as part of the narrative of the siege of Tigranocerta, referring to the defenders' use of naphta against the besieging Romans. W. Clausen (*AJP* 68 (1947), 398) points out that while *nudus* occasionally signifies *inermis* ('unarmed'—cf. Sall. *Iug.* 107. 1) *tectus* on its own scarcely equals *armatus* ('armed') but has some such meaning as 'hidden' or 'concealed' in a literal or metaphorical sense.

The reading of Diomedes, Dietsch, and other editors was dismissed by Kritz as 'a most offensive tautology'; I agree with Clausen, who cites Apuleius *Met.* 10. 31; *in nudo et intecto corpore*, that the reading as Diomedes transmitted it should be retained. For this reading La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 50–1, citing Tac. *Germ.* 17. 1, suggested a possible context dealing with the German or slave mode of dressing as in 3. 88–9.

29. Now retreating, now advancing . . . in cavalry engagements. Editors before Maurenbrecher, noting Servius' comment on a common feature of the cavalry mode of fighting ('they retreat not through fear, but obeying a law of fighting') relegated this to fragments of uncertain reference. Kritz, referring to descriptions of a similar mode of fighting in Sall. *Iug.* 59. 3 and Liv. 31. 35. 3, conjectured description of an engagement against Mithridates or Tigranes. Maurenbrecher (4. 75M) opted for a specific battle, that of the Arsanias (see the introductory note to 4. 68–77) and put it into his text.

30. [Clouds] dimmed the light. Servius introduced this fragment with the comment *Sallustius de nubibus* ('Sallust on clouds'). Maurenbrecher (4. 80), quoting from Dio's description of the siege of Nisibis which notes that Lucullus deliberately waited for a moonless night when there was a violent storm which drove the defenders from the outer circuit of the walls (36. 7. 1), somewhat rashly put it into his text.

31. Surrounded on all sides. Maurenbrecher (5. 8M) citing Dio, 36. 12. 4, placed this in the context of the battle of Zela (see introductory note to 5. 1–7). All other editors prudently placed it among fragments of uncertain reference.

32. who were wandering around with no fixed place of exile. A variety of identifications has been proposed for this group. De Brosses and Gerlach applied it to those who had joined the revolt of Lepidus in 77; Kritz placed them among the fugitives who flocked to join Spartacus; Dietsch, who placed it among fragments of uncertain reference, mentioned as possibilities the followers of Sert-

orius or men who joined the Cilician pirates. Maurenbrecher seized on the latter suggestion and placed the fragment in his text as 5. 17M.

33. most eager for the law. De Brosses, Kritz, and Maurenbrecher (5. 19M) referred this to Pompeius and the Gabinian Law, citing Dio, 36. 24. 5. La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 53, while admitting the attractiveness of this placement, pointed out that the statement could apply to any one of the laws concerning the constitution, the tribunate, or the lawcourts dealt with in the *Histories*.

34. with things developing beyond all expectation. Maurenbrecher, citing Plut. *Pomp.* 27. 2, 'What caused their joy was the unhoped-for rapidity of the change, the market being now overflowing with provisions', applied this fragment (5. 25M) to the economic effects of Pompeius' rapid extermination of the pirate threat in western waters. But as La Penna (ibid. 53) points out, this very general statement could equally well apply to victories achieved by Sertorius in 76 or by Lucullus in Armenia.

35. a formal welcome to the temple of Bellona. Maurenbrecher rejected Dietsch's application of this to the welcome given to Pompeius after he had addressed the people near the temple of Bellona (goddess of war) outside the walls of Rome after he had returned from his victory in Spain in 71. Once again citing Plut. *Pomp.* 27. 2, Maurenbrecher (5. 26) applied the fragment to the year 67 when Pompeius returned after crushing the eastern pirates. But, given the corrupt state of the text, there is no certainty that Sallust's narrative included a detailed description of the war against the pirates.

36. stretching his hand towards his face. The only editor to include this fragment, Maurenbrecher (5. 27M) refers it to Asconius' description of popular dissent aimed at the consul of 67, Calpurnius Piso: *cum ille eos qui sibi intentabant manus prendi a lictore iussisset* ('since he had ordered those who were threatening physical violence against him to be arrested by the lictors') (Asc. *Corn.* 58. 20C). A reasonable attribution, but as La Penna pointed out, the

Asconius passage is dealing with mob unrest, not an individual threat; moreover, the phrase *in os intendens* (Sallust) *intentans* (Asconius) need not necessarily imply a threatening action.

37–74. Maurenbrecher's *fragmenta incerta* 1–38 (vol. 2, pp. 201–6). I follow the order used by Maurenbrecher and comment on nearly half of the fragments; the remainder are too brief or too vague or too corrupt to elicit useful comment.

37. pickets hurriedly organized. The text of this corrupt fragment is disputed. The manuscripts have *praecipue* or *pro||opere* from which Thilo conjectured *propere* ('quickly') or *pro opere* ('in proportion to the task'). Maurenbrecher conjectured *praepropere* which I have translated as 'hurriedly'. Dietsch suggested pro tempore ('to suit the occasion'); Putsch proposed *praecipue instructae* ('especially drawn up') which was accepted by Gerlach and applied by him to Spartacus' choosing better armed cohorts to carry out sentry duties.

38. In the second [line] he had stationed the fast-moving cohorts. The Latin has simply *in secunda* ('in the second'). Maurenbrecher suggested *in secunda historia* ('in the second book of the *Histories*'); I have preferred Clausen's *acie*, to produce 'in the second line'. Kritz made the attractive suggestion that it might refer to the setting up of an ambush by Sertorius during the war in Spain (cf. Comm. on 2. 28). In that case I suggest the word missing after *secunda* might well have been *regio* ('region, trace') used by Frontinus, *Str.* 2. 5. 31, but Kritz did not press his point.

39. a certain Ligurian. De Brosses identified this man with the anonymous 'him' who figures in fr. 3. 91; see there the note, **And Curio . . . orders him to set out.** Gerlach accepted this identification on the ground that the phrase is very similar to that used in Sall. *Iug.* 93. 2 (*forte quidam Ligus*). Kritz rejected this outright; Dietsch, however, voiced the suspicion that, since Quintilianus (*Inst.* 8. 6. 59) records only the last three words (*ad requisita naturae*—to answer a call of nature'), the grammarian

Diomedes has mistakenly combined two Sallustian fragments. Maurenbrecher made no comment on this fragment.

40. having withdrawn to a position where blows were easier to inflict. Servius interpreted the Virgilian line (*Aen.* 9. 749) *et sublatum alte consurgit in ensem* ('and he rises high upon his uplifted sword) as a *genus feriendi Gallicanum* ('a Gaulish manner of striking'), and cited the above fragment from Sallust to support his view. Dietsch argued that *locus quaerebant* ('they were seeking places') should be substituted for *loco cedebant* ('they were giving ground') as more apposite to the purpose of *regressi* ('having withdrawn'). Maurenbrecher suggested possible contexts: an engagement during Pompeius' march through the Alps to Spain, or the battle between the Romans and the German and Gallic fugitives led by Crixus (see Comm. on 3. 90).

41. the legate Publius had been dismissed by mutual consent. Maurenbrecher, following Dietsch, felt that the application of this to Publius Clodius by de Brosses and Kritz was too bold an assumption. I find it an attractive possibility: Publius Clodius, a member of Lucullus' staff in 68/7, went over to his other brother-in-law Marcius Rex late in 67. See Comm. on 5. 9 and 10. That the change was made by mutual consent is by no means unlikely. However, the wording is too vague for certainty on this point.

44. nor any ex-regular. I comment only on the technical term *pro milite* used in this fragment: it is a nominative noun used in the same way *pro consule* is used. According to Servius this combination is equivalent to *evocatus*, a man discharged after adequate service and once again summoned to the colours where he was under less harsh discipline than the normally enrolled troops. There may have been occasions in the *Histories* when the Roman army was composed of both elements; one practically certain case is that of the army formed by Crassus for the campaign against Spartacus. See the note on 4. 17, **though advanced in years, still possessed a martial spirit**.

45. they had positioned their parents and children on the walls. I take this to refer to a siege situation in which the besieged doggedly refused to submit. Maurenbrecher made no comment; Dietsch could offer no suggestion as to the city and the people concerned; Kritz too harshly rejected de Brosses' suggestion of the siege of Cyzicus; Calagurris, on which see Comm. on 3. 82–3, is another possibility.

46. they were not only not offering resistance . . . The MSS version of this fragment is *non repugnantibus modo, sed ne deditis quidem a.b.e.m.* The abbreviated final four words have been interpreted by Maurenbrecher as ⟨*armis bellum excitare metuentibus*⟩. The vulgate version of the abbreviation is *a.b.c.m.*, interpreted by de Brosses as *atrocis belli clades metuentibus* ('fearing the disaster of a bloody war'), by Dietsch as *adsentientibus bellandi consilium mittit* ('he sends to those who agree a plan to make war'). The fact that the fragment offers no clue to person or place, that the words *repugnantibus* and *deditis* could be dative or ablative, that the abbreviated segment cannot be securely interpreted provides a good example of the hazards associated with the elucidation of fragmentary textual material.

49. The singing and shouting of the sailors. Servius interpreted *iussa nautarum* as equivalent to *celeuma* of the Greeks, i.e. the singing and shouting of the sailors, urging each other on. My translation assumes that *iussa* is nominative; it could equally well be accusative with the subject of *impediebant* not expressed.

51. and the smart appearance itself of the accused man. The Latin version used by Maurenbrecher *atque ipse cultu rei*, the sense of which is difficult to interpret, is not commented upon by Dietsch or Maurenbrecher, who simply points out that the vulgate reading was *cultus*. Kritz read *cultus* and took *rei* to be the genitive singular of *reus* ('the accused'); I have translated his version. The reference is to the fact that the accused (whoever he was) did not, according to custom, appear *sordidatus* ('wearing mourning clothes'); see note on 2. 44, **in mourning garb**.

52. They were prostrating themselves. No comment from Maurenbrecher; Kritz suggested reference to ambassadors who had come to Rome to beg from the senate relief from the wrongs done to them by Roman officials abroad. Dietsch agreed with this suggestion and referred to the conduct of Cn. Dolabella (*cos.* 81), C. Antonius (*cos.* 63), C. Verres (*praet.* 74).

55. which rises . . . close to the setting in motion of the summer sun. Maurenbrecher did not comment on this. Kritz interpreted it as meaning that at the time when the sun's heat is at its maximum Orion rises. Dietsch pointed out that Orion rises between 16 and 17 June (Ovid, *Fast.* 6. 717); he therefore rejected Kritz's interpretation of *pulsus* as equivalent to *ictus*, the maximum summer heat. He believed that Sallust was referring to the summer solstice and that the word *pulsum* is an error; he could not, however, think of a replacement for it. In my translation I have given *pulsus/-us* the meaning 'setting in motion'; see *OLD* ad loc.

56. Quickly, fetch sandals! The Latin version is *soleas festinate*, in which Servius has interpreted the imperative *festinate* as similar in mode of expression to the Virgilian line on which he is commenting: *arma citi properate viro* ('hasten, provide arms for the warrior'). The *solea* was the simplest form of sandal (*sandalium*) fastened to the foot by means of a thong (Gell. 13. 22. 5). *Soleae* were used by the upper classes mainly for wearing in the house. If a man went out to dinner he walked in shoes (*calceus*), taking with him the *soleae* which he put on when he entered his host's house. Before he reclined at the table the *soleae* were taken away by a servant (Ovid. *Ars. Am.* 2. 212; Mart. 8. 59. 14). When dinner was over, the *soleae* were called for (Hor. *Sat.* 2. 8. 77). This practice applied more particularly during inclement weather. The reference here, therefore, was to a dinner of some sort—that arranged by Perperna for Sertorius is a possibility. Maurenbrecher, less aptly, suggested reference to Cossinius, suddenly surprised by Spartacus. See Comm. on 3. 63.

58. Strength is ineffective so long as it depends on . . . Maurenbrecher dismissed this fragment as too corrupt to

comment on; La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 43–4, believed that it formed part of some moral reflections occurring in a speech. However, he noted that the scholiast cited the fragment to illustrate the assertion: *Omne enim corpus, quod motu rei alterius commovetur, ad iaciendum stabilem non habet firmitatem* ('For every structure which is shaken by the movement of another object does not have a fixed steadiness for throwing'), and that the text being commented upon (*Theb.* 5. 383 ff.) referred to combatants in difficulty because of the heavy rolling of their ship in a storm. Consequently, La Penna suggested possible connection with the situation described in the Commentary on 3. 20, or with that described in the Commentary on 1. 87.

59. Apathy was by no means lacking. The MS reading used by Maurenbrecher has the verb *claudicabat* ('was lacking'); the vulgate used *claudebat* adopted by Kritz and Dietsch. There are three forms of the verb carrying this meaning: *claudeo/-ēre*; *claudo/-ĕre*; *claudico/-āre*. The form *claudo* is used in the two other places where the verb occurs in the *Histories*—3. 34. 26 and 3. 95.

65. immediately. Maurenbrecher (*frag. incerta* 29) gives his reasons for believing that this fragment contained only one word from Sallusts' work; i.e. *confestim*. Charisius, however, maintained that Sallust wrote *fessit ut nuntiis confestim lugubribus*. Kritz produced from this *fecit, ut nuntiis confestim lugubribus* (he did (?) in order that with the messengers immediately plunged into gloom . . .). Dietsch retained . . . *fessit*, maintaining that it was a partial survivor of Sallustian wording. He hazarded a reference to Lucullus on receipt of the news of Triarius' defeat at Zela; cf. the introductory note to 5. 8–14.

69. familiar with these [men?/places?]. The Latin has just *sciens horum*. Kritz believed these to be the words of Arusianus and removed them from the corpus of Sallustian fragments. Dietsch does not include it, but Maurenbrecher who could see no reason for Kritz's decision, restored the fragment to the Sallustian corpus.

73. (exchanges) battles, because . . . battles involve mutual action and reaction. Seems to be part of a definition, on

the same lines as fragment 29 Unc. Ref.; see Comm. ad loc.

75–105. The first printed edition of Niccolò Perotti's *Cornucopiae seu Latinae linguae commentarii*, was produced in Venice in 1489. In it Perotti documented his definition of Latin words with brief quotations from major Latin writers. Buried in this mass of about twelve thousand quotations are some 'new fragments', not elsewhere attested. In a description and critique of Perotti's work, based on the 1526 edition, R. P. Oliver (*TAPA* 78 (1947), 376–424) commented on Perotti's quotations from Sallust. The unquestionably genuine quotations from Sallustian works are distributed as follows: *Bellum Catilinae* 36; *Bellum Iugurthinum* 36; *Historiae* 28. On pp. 413–17 Oliver has listed thirty-one 'new fragments' cited from Sallustian works by Perotti. For the sake of completeness I have added these to my list of Fragments of Uncertain Reference, aware, of course, that not all, if any, of them are derived from the *Histories*. I have kept to the order in which Oliver has cited them, but have used Perotti's *Cornucopiae* numbering to indicate their source.

A remarkable feature of these 'new fragments', as La Penna noted, is the absence of proper names, of any reference to precise circumstances, or any detail which might encourage or clinch conjectural interpretation or placement. Nevertheless, in the Commentary below I have hazarded possible derivation from the *Histories* for some of these fragments.

80. The enemy were elated . . . our men, terrified . . . This could be a reference to the battle of Zela in which Mithridates gained a decisive victory over the Romans under Triarius (Plut. *Luc.* 35. 1–2; App. *Mith.* 89; Dio, 36. 12–13. 1. See the introductory note to 5. 1–7.

81. a plain gushing everywhere with water. Possibly part of Sallust's narrative of P. Servilius Vatia's campaign against the Isauri; see the introductory note to 2. 63–9 and the note on 2. 66, **except for areas watered by the Clurda.** Another possibility is a reference to the Lake

Maeotis region; see the note on 3. 55, **beyond the watery plain etc.**

84. Then, apprehensive about . . . their complicity in the conspiracy. La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 54, noting the description of Lepidus' followers as *scelerum conscientia exagitati* ('driven by their consciousness of their crimes') suggested reference to the followers of Lepidus after the defeat at Cosa, a parallel proposed by Oliver (p. 414). This may be closer to the mark than my own feeling that it referred to the Allobroges who agonized over a decision whether or not to join the Catilinarian conspiracy. See Sall. *Cat.* 40. 1, 4 and 41. 1.

86. and he sails toward the open sea in a small fishing craft. A possible ingredient of the narrative concerning Marius' flight from Rome when Sulla marched on the capital (La Penna, *SIFC* 35 (1963), 55). It would tie in with the context dealt with in frr. 1. 21–2. See Comm. on 1. 22.

87. than whom no man is better or more outstanding. The description in Sall. *Hist.* 2. 36: 'an impressive man, inferior to none in any type of activity' was applied by de Brosses to Sertorius, an identification rejected by Kritz and Dietsch; I there accepted Maurenbrecher's view that the statement was part of an epitaph on the death of Appius Claudius Pulcher (*cos.* 79). I suggest that the statement of this fr. 87 may be part of a characterization of Sertorius, on whom see the Commentary on frr. 1. 76–9.

89. soldiers who had twice been routed. The *Histories* provide several examples which would fit in with this statement. It could have been applied to the double defeat of Lepidus' army, at Rome and at Cosa; see the Commentary on 1. 68 and 1. 71. Other possibilities are the defeats suffered by Sertorius at Segovia (Comm. on 2. 49–50) and Segontia (Comm. on 2. 55–7); the successive defeats suffered by the Roman troops who served under Fabius Hadrianus late in 68 (App. *Mith.* 88) and under Triarius at Zela in 67 (App. *Mith.* 89); the Roman force under Varinius which was defeated by Spartacus at the

end of 73 contained remnants of the forces previously defeated when serving under Glaber, Furius, and Cossinius—see Comm. on 3. 64. B–C; in 72 Spartacus on his march northwards defeated the forces under the consuls L. Gellius and Cn. Cornelius Lentulus, and in the course of his return journey southwards he defeated their combined force for a second time. See Comm. on 3. 90.

91. the enemy were really superior in manpower and in effective strength. During his 69 campaign Lucullus decided to lay siege to the great fortress-city of Tigranocerta in an attempt to induce Tigranes to offer battle on terrain favourable to the Romans. The Armenian king's decision to offer battle, however, was based on his immense superiority in men and equipment. See Comm. on 4. 64–6.

92. When he was besieging the mountain which had been surrounded on all sides. This might well refer to Mt. Vesuvius on which the gladiators who had escaped from their school in Capua late in 73 took refuge. The praetor C. Claudius Glaber attempted unsuccessfully to surround the rebels and to crush the incipient rebellion. See Comm. on 3. 62.

93. he took control of the glades . . . Another possible reference to Sertorius' tactical placement of ambushes during the war in Spain. See the note on Fr. Unc. Ref. 38, **In the second [line] etc.**

94. He had already transported the whole army across. The reference could be to Lucullus' transportation of his army across the Euphrates in the course of his Armenian campaign in 69. See the notes on 4. 60. La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 55) suggested an allusion to Lucullus and his operations in the battle of the Arsanias (see the notes on 4. 72 and 73), but there is no indication that Lucullus used means of transportation, such as boats, in the crossing of the Arsanias.

95. Shortly after these words were spoken they joined battle. Tigranes' confidence about the outcome of the battle near Tigranocerta was expressed just before the battle in words referring to the size of the Roman force: 'If they have

come as ambassadors, they are too many; if as soldiers, too few.' See Comm. on fr. 91 above.

97. armed men were blockading the doors. Could be part of Sallust's narrative of the misadventures of M. Aurelius Cotta dealt with in the Commentary on 3. 12–13.

105. They all arose and attacked him simultaneously. La Penna (*SIFC* 35 (1963), 55) hazarded a reference to the body of soldiers under Hirtuleius who attacked Pompeius' legate D. Laelius (see Comm. on 2. 29 and 30), or to the killers of Sertorius in the final phase of his assassination as described in Plutarch's version (*Crass.* 26. 10–11). I prefer the latter attribution.

CONCORDANCE

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89	—	102	—
90	—	103	—
91	—	104	—
92	—	105	—
93	—		

[a] Three fragments in this section (1, 11, 12) were unknown to Maurenbrecher.

[b] Fragments of Uncertain Reference 37–74 correspond to Maurenbrecher's Fragments of Uncertain Reference 1–38.

[c] The thirty-one fragments (75–105) are from Perotti's *Cornucopiae*, and were not known to Maurenbrecher. I have removed from the corpus of fragments Maurenbrecher's 1. 83 (see note on fr. 12 *Unc. Ref.*); 2. 52 (see note in vol. 1, p. 218) and 2.68 (see note on 2. 59. 1).

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